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ABSTRACT 
 
 
180 DEGREES OUT: The Change in U.S. Strategic Bombing Applications, 1935-1955. 
 
By John M. Curatola  
 
Professor Theodore A. Wilson, Advisor 
 
This dissertation examines how the U.S. Army/Air Force developed strategic bombing 
applications during the 1930s and then changed them during World War II and in early 
Cold War planning.  This narrative history analyzes the governmental, military, and 
social influences that changed U.S. bombing methods.  The study addresses how the Air 
Force diverted from a professed strategy of precision bombardment during the inter-war 
years only to embrace area, fire, and atomic bombardment during WW II.  Furthermore, 
the treatise continues in this vein by examining how the USAF developed atomic and 
thermonuclear applications during the post war era and the Cold War.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
ZERO DEGREES 
Foundations 
____________________________________________ 
 
Shortly after August 6, 1945 following the dropping of the first atomic bomb 
on Hiroshima, the United States attempted to warn the Japanese people about the 
power of the newly developed atomic bomb.  In an effort to encourage the Japanese 
to sue for peace, Americans dropped leaflets over the home islands.  Written on 
leaflets prior to the Nagasaki detonation was an ominous warning: 
To the Japanese People:  
 America asks that you take immediate heed of what we say on this 
leaflet.  We are in possession of the most destructive explosive ever devised 
by man.  A single one of our newly developed atomic bombs is actually the 
equivalent in explosive power to what 2000 of our giant B-29s can carry on a 
single mission.  This awful fact is one for you to ponder and we solemnly 
assure you it is grimly accurate. 
 We have just begun to use this weapon against your homeland.  If you 
still have any doubt, make inquiry as to what happened to Hiroshima when 
just one atomic bomb fell on that city. . . . You should take steps now to cease 
military resistance.  Otherwise, we shall resolutely employ this bomb and all 
our other superior weapons to promptly and forcefully end the war.  
EVACUATE YOUR CITIES.1  
Despite this warning and because of Japanese inaction regarding surrender 
proceedings, early on the morning of August 9, a specially configured B-29 
“Superfortress” piloted by Major Charles Sweeney took off from Tinian Island.  The 
plane's mission was to drop a second atomic bomb.  Traveling northwest from the 
island, Major Sweeney’s primary target was the military arsenal located in the center 
of the city of Kokura on the northern end of the island of Kyushu.2  Prior to dropping 
the bomb, the flight plan called for Sweeny to rendezvous with two aircraft over the 
 2 
island of Yakoshima off the southern coast of Kyushu.  During the preflight 
inspection Sweeney discovered that a 600-gallon auxiliary fuel cell, designed to offset 
the B-29s center of gravity due to the weight of the bomb, was inoperative and 
replacing it would take an inordinate amount of time.3  Regardless of the inoperative 
fuel cell, Sweeny decided to continue with the mission.  After take off, and when one 
of the rendezvous aircraft failed to join up with the bomb-laden plane, Sweeny 
orbited over Yakoshima in hope of eventually joining with the aircraft that was 
carrying scientific measuring equipment.4  While briefed to make only one short orbit 
over the rendezvous point to join with the other plane, Sweeney orbited for forty-five 
minutes.5  Having delayed his attack and having no success in finding the other the 
other plane, Sweeny departed for his primary target. 
Upon arriving over Kokura, the B-29 made three passes over the town to drop 
the bomb using visual bombing methods.  However, on each pass the bombardier, 
Captain Raymond “Kermit” Beahan, failed to locate his aiming point due to smoke 
drifting over from the nearby city of Yawata.  The smoke was the result from a 
conventional bombing raid conducted earlier by 20th Air Force B-29s.6  The three 
passes over the town caused another delay in bombing and cost Sweeney’s aircraft 
another fifty-five minutes worth of precious fuel.7 
Because of the smoke and inability to locate the target, Major Sweeney then 
turned the B-29 toward the designated alternate target – the city of Nagasaki on the 
southern end of Kyushu.  Nagasaki was a military-industrial center for many years.8  
Located in the center of the Urakami Valley, Nagasaki was home to the Mitsubishi 
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shipbuilding yard and steel factory, and possessed a robust rail system connected to a 
large capable seaport.  
While falling critically short on fuel because of the earlier decision to orbit for 
the escort aircraft and the three unsuccessful passes over Kokura, the bomber 
continued to Nagasaki only to find the view of the city again obscured, but this time 
by clouds.9  Fuel calculations estimated that the bomber had only enough gas to make 
one bomb run over the city.  Despite instructions to drop the bomb using visual 
bombing techniques, and rather than abort the mission and drop the nuclear device 
into the sea, Major Sweeney order Beahan to release the weapon using radar bombing 
methods.10  However, with the aircraft just 25 seconds from the release point, an 
opening in the clouds appeared and Beahan yelled: “I’ve got it! I’ve got it!”11  
Acknowledging Beahan’s claim, Sweeney replied, “You own it!” At 11:01 the 
bombardier dropped his ordnance that ironically detonated near the largest Catholic 
Church in the Far East.12 
 
 
Figure 1.  Second Atomic Bomb Crew in front of a B-29 “Superfortress.”  Source:  National Museum 
of the U.S. Air Force, http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/photos/media_search.asp?q=nagasaki 
(accessed November 8, 2006). 
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After discharging the weapon, Major Sweeney had the B-29 conduct a steep 
left turn to avoid the blast effect of the bomb.  The bomb exploded at an altitude of 
approximately 1,500 feet with a blast estimated to be three times as powerful as the 
previous Hiroshima explosion.13  Upon detonation a large white flash ensued with a 
tremendous roar accompanied with a crushing blast wave and intense heat.14  
Analysis conducted after the war by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) 
estimated:  
Within a radius of 1 km from ground zero men and animals died almost 
instantaneously from the blast and pressure and heat; houses and other 
structures were smashed, crushed, and scattered; and fires broke out.  The 
strong complex steel members of the structures of the Mitsubishi Steel Works 
were bent and twisted like jelly and the roofs of reinforced concrete [at the] 
National Schools were crumpled and collapsed, indicating a force beyond 
imagination.15 
Heat from the explosion melted the granite off the façades of surrounding buildings 
and some estimates report the temperature from the ensuing explosion ranged from 
three thousand to nine thousand degrees centigrade.16 
After observing the detonation and now critically short on fuel, Sweeney and 
his crew headed for Okinawa and landed their plane with engines sputtering and 
propellers “windmilling” because of fuel starvation.17  After landing, ground crews 
towed the plane to the parking ramp because its fuel tanks were completely dry.  
Upon returning to Guam following the fuel starved landing at Okinawa, and after 
risking both the mission and the aircrew because of poor fuel management, General 
Curtis LeMay, commander of the XXI Bomber Command, chided Sweeney by asking 
him “You fucked up, didn’t you Chuck?”18  To this query Sweeney had no reply and 
 5 
only stood in silence.  According to the pilot’s group commander, Colonel Paul 
Tibbets, Sweeney’s silence “spoke volumes.”19 
After the B-29 departed the target area, smoke and dust engulfed the Urakami 
Valley and survivors claim that darkness descended upon the city.20  Those not killed 
in the immediate blast suffered from extreme heat and radiation burns.  Victims were 
burnt so badly that their skin was peeling and hung from their extremities like loose 
clothing, with those facing the explosion had the appearance of having the skin from 
their faces melted.21  Blackened, burnt bodies were everywhere and thousands had 
their skin turned as “red as cooked lobsters.”22  Many victims jumped into the 
Urakami River or nearby ponds of water to escape the intense heat and many of these 
bodies were found hanging onto shorelines, with some left half floating, or 
completely immersed.23  An estimated one-third of the casualties in Nagasaki died 
from flash burns and expired within a few minutes to a few hours.24  In the 
conflagration that ensued between fifty thousand to one hundred thousand people 
were estimated to have been injured, and the number of dead was placed at over 
thirty-five thousand.25 
However, the lingering effects of radiation caused up to 20 percent of the 
deaths with many unaware of their affliction for four weeks.26  Radiation exposure 
was largely based upon one’s proximity to the blast itself and usually caused the 
victim to have bloody diarrhea and/or vomiting, lethargy, lesions, a complete loss of 
white blood cells, deterioration of bone marrow, loss of feeling in the legs, hair loss, 
and acute inflammation of the mucus membranes of the throat, lungs, and stomach.27  
 6 
These same victims also suffered from fevers that went as high as 106 degrees for 
extended periods and endured swelling of the gums, mouth, and pharynx.28 
Unfortunately for the survivors, 80 percent of Nagasaki’s hospital beds were 
located within a few thousand feet of the detonation and were obliterated.29  Because 
of the damage from the initial blast and the subsequent fire, the city lacked adequate 
medical supplies and facilities to treat the thousands of victims.  Even if adequate 
medical services had been available, scientist estimated that the radiation casualty rate 
would have dropped only 5 to 8 percent.30 
Because of the bombing, subsequent flights of aircraft over the city sent 
survivors scurrying for shelter.31  Fear of additional atomic bombings led to a 
constant sense of uneasiness and nervousness among the remaining population.32  The 
state of shock the inhabitants of Nagasaki experienced hampered recovery efforts as 
residents displayed either aimlessness, hysteria, or decided to leave the city altogether 
for areas containing shelter and food.33 
____________________________________________ 
Thesis 
This stark scene witnessed at Nagasaki, and the mushroom cloud over 
Hiroshima three days earlier, not only marked the dawn of the atomic warfare age, 
but also highlighted the departure from professed U.S. Army Air Force (USAAF) 
doctrine and a divergence from forms of warfare previously deemed acceptable by 
Americans.  The threat implied in the aforementioned leaflet and the horrific scenes 
created at Nagasaki, Hiroshima, Tokyo, and other cities in the final days of the war 
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are representative of the changing nature of American strategic bombardment.  
Bombing operations in World War II conducted over Axis cities saw the U.S. initially 
attempt to conduct precision bombing against designated factories and infrastructure 
only then to then transition to wholesale bombardment against entire urban areas and 
cities.   
As World War II progressed and the Allied bombing campaign intensified, 
enemy cities were attacked not only their industrial capacities, transportation nodes, 
and command and control facilities, but these same urban centers were firebombed 
and attacked en mass for morale purposes.  Additionally, on August 6 and 9, 1945, 
the U.S. escalated the use of destructive power by utilizing atomic weapons as a 
means to prosecute war and affect the Japanese leadership and psyche.  Furthermore, 
after World War II ended the newly created U.S. Air Force embraced atomic, and 
eventually thermonuclear, bombardment as a viable and acceptable offensive 
application. 
Understanding the culture of a country is paramount to understanding the 
manner in which the state conducts war and how it prosecutes its national aims.34  In 
this regard, the conduct of war is partly an expression national ideas regarding 
morality and is telling of the collective values a population embraces.  War reflects 
the social values and norms of a society and is indicative of ideas and principles 
considered important by the majority of a given population.  While the idea of a 
uniquely “American culture” is hard to define, if it exists at all, the way in which the 
United States conducts war is a result of various geographic, historical, political, 
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economic, and ethnic factors unique to the American experience.35  The various 
factors and influences that shaped the U.S. resulted in Americans priding themselves 
on a sense of “fair play,” an adherence to Judeo-Christian ethical standards, and belief 
in largely western values and principles.  In light of these values and standards, prior 
to World War II Americans generally believed that avoidance of civilian casualties 
and wanton destruction should be avoided during the conduct of war. 
Reflecting ideas from dynastic wars in Europe, and for most of the nation’s 
first few decades, Americans viewed war as an event between two armies on a 
battlefield and not necessarily a national event requiring the mobilization of the entire 
country.  Up until the French Revolution, the armies of kings and emperors largely 
fought wars and campaigns without calling upon all the elements of power of a state 
or kingdom.  However, starting in the mid 19th century and continuing into the 20th 
century, the concept of “total war” emerged along with the industrial revolution and 
conflict increasingly grew larger, mechanized, and dependent upon logistical lines of 
communication.36 
The American Civil War is arguably the first major conflict in U.S. history 
indicative of this new trend in warfare as developments in rail transportation, rifled 
guns, and the telegraph set important precedents for future battles.  Along with the 
industrial revolution of the 19th century, machined weapons and materials became 
increasingly important to armies engaged in war.  With the advent of the industrial 
age, warfare had become an increasingly larger endeavor with armies becoming 
bigger in both size and capability.  In conjunction with mechanization, armies called 
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for more of a nation's manpower through “levees en mass” and national drafts.  The 
relatively small armies of kings and sovereigns gave way to larger national armies 
that employed new, more lethal, and technologically advanced weapons.37  With the 
larger size of war and the increasing use of machines in battle, countries developed 
the requirement to have more of the national population, both civilian and military, 
involved in the war-making effort. 
Along with increased manpower requirements to field an army, nations 
needed workers to mine raw materials, harvest food, and then move these items to 
urban centers were factories built war materials necessary to equip these larger 
armies.  Armies depended upon expansive factories staffed with hundreds of workers 
to design, develop, and produce munitions and armaments with these products again 
needing transportation to the battlefield for employment.  Because of these 
advancements in weaponry, military operations took place over expanded distances, 
involving more men and material on the battlefield with ever-increasing efficiency 
and lethality.38 
World War I provided the earliest example of this new relationship between 
modern armies and the nations they defend.  The pouring of men and material into 
battle during the trench warfare on the western front illustrates the increasing size, 
mechanization, and lethality of modern war.  In this regard, warfare became a 
function of the whole state and was not just limited to those in uniforms or in close 
proximity to the battlefield.  In the 20th century, war became a function of the entire 
nation, its people, infrastructure, production capability, and natural resources.  In 
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addition to the armies on the battlefield, the raw materials needed to supply a military, 
the people who produced weapons of war, and the factories in which they worked 
now became valid targets for military planners.  As production centers and urban 
areas became targets, the discerning of combatant and noncombatant became 
increasingly vague and harder to define.  The concept of total war began to blur the 
distinction between soldier and civilian. 
Despite these trends in warfare, Americans, like many other western countries 
during the 1930s, believed that non-combatant casualties should be minimized 
regardless of the increasing lethality inherent in modern weapons and the greater 
inclusion of national assets in the war making effort.  Civilian deaths were to be 
avoided and many nations embraced the idea of sparing non-combatants by accepting 
the idea as, what historian Sahr Conway-Lanz described, an “international normative 
value.”39  Regarding the killing of civilians in the advent of mechanized war, in 1923 
delegations from six countries met at The Hague to discuss international arms 
limitations in light of the experience from World War I.   
Called the “Commission of Jurists,” the body consisting of representatives 
from the U.S., Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the Netherlands drafted articles 
specifying limitations on warfare including the use of the new dimension of aerial 
bombardment.40  During the war the nascent air arms of Germany, Great Britain, and 
Italy developed airframes to support troops engaged in battle, but also build strategic 
bombing aircraft designed to attack national infrastructure and populations far behind 
the lines.  Because of these developments in air warfare and the ability to strike urban 
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centers, the Commission discussed the issue of urban bombing and the killing of non-
combatants.  In the end, the Commission determined that, “bombing to terrorize 
civilian populations, damage private property, or injure non-combatants was 
forbidden.”41  This mandate originated from a 1907 land warfare regulation that also 
specified that bombing historical, religious, cultural, and medical structures was also 
prohibited.42  Furthermore, the Commission drafted articles that banned, 
“indiscriminate attacks on civilian populations.”43  Although the Committee 
developed other regulations limiting the use of airpower during conflict, none of these 
articles was ratified by the attending nations nor where they ever implemented as 
international standards, but they were loosely accepted as authoritative directives.44 
The hapless and ineffective League of Nations echoed the same sentiment as 
the Commission.  In 1938 the League specified that bombing civilians ran counter to 
international law and specified that, “intentional bombing of civilians was illegal, 
[that] targets must be legitimate, identifiable objects, [and] must be bombed in a 
manner which would avoid negligent bombardment of civilian populations.”45  In 
addition to the League of Nations, during the inter-war period many other 
international and national organizations expressed this same sentiment in an attempt 
to limit indiscriminate bombing attacks. 
Despite the debate regarding America’s adherence to ethical virtues and moral 
standards, and avoiding arguments regarding the validity of such a claim, this 
professed allegiance to a sense of fair play and morality is a perception most 
Americans hold about their nation and the way in which it prosecutes war.  
 12 
Nevertheless, it would appear that the strategic bombing campaign in World War II 
and the use of nuclear weapons increasingly violated perceived moral underpinnings 
of American society.  Many Americans still advocated a devotion to these ideals as 
one senior government leader wrote as late as 1945: 
The reputation of the United States for fair play and humanitarianism is the 
world’s biggest asset for peace in the coming decades.  I believe the same rule 
of sparing the civilian population should be applied, as far as possible, to the 
use of any new weapons.46 
Exacerbating this moral dichotomy was the use of nuclear weapons that appeared to 
violate all laws or precepts regarding morality or ethics in war.  Comparatively, 
nuclear warfare posed this same dilemma to the U.S. and the world as a whole.  With 
the advent of nuclear technology, old patterns of warfare were seen as obsolete as 
more destruction could be effected in a relatively short period.47  The widespread 
killing of thousands of innocents by massive aerial bombardments or even by one 
powerful device does not appear to square with America’s perceived moral virtue or 
its subscription to a sense of fair play.   
In the 19th Century, Americans struggled with the issue of civilian casualties.  
From the Civil War when Sherman burned his way through the south, to the 
American west where the Army used indiscriminate force in many instances to clear 
Indians from the western plains, the issue of civilian casualties created a moral 
dilemma.48  However, during the 20th Century, Americans had to deal with not only 
the deaths of noncombatants, but with the changing nature of warfare.  World Wars I 
and II significantly revolutionized warfare, not only from a standpoint of larger 
armies and mechanization, but from increased lethality and destructive capability.  As 
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a result, war in the 20th Century added new dimensions of danger.  Not only did the 
war effort now include the worker and craftsman in the factory, but the rise in 
technology and mechanization enabled warring parties to range and target the 
production and population centers of an enemy nation.49  Factories, war-making 
infrastructure, and the civilian workforce became legitimate military targets despite 
their remote location from the battlefield.  War was now becoming total and 
encompassing all elements of national power.   
Prior to World War II the USAAF professed an adherence to a doctrine that 
was uniquely American - precision daylight bombing.  This doctrine, which emerged 
from the U.S. Army’s Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) in the 1930s, envisioned 
that bombers would fly to the industrial and administrative centers of an enemy 
nation and then destroy the means of production and capability required to generate 
and deploy an effective military force.50  Furthermore, and more importantly, in the 
execution of this mission, American air fleets would use precision methods to 
pinpoint designated enemy targets and avoid the generation of wholesale casualties 
and widespread destruction.  This concept of precision bombing focused only on vital 
enemy infrastructure and expressly attempted to avoid the targeting and killing of 
enemy civilians.  In this effort, the placement of bombs was designed to affect an 
entire war making effort without having to create massive casualties.  Even in the 
midst of World War II, U.S. Secretary of War Henry Stimson believed that American 
morality precluded the bombing of civilians and thought that war needed to “be 
restrained within the bounds of humanity.”51  Ironically, despite the widespread 
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destruction of Germany through the air campaign and the firebombing of Japan, 
Stimson believed that precision bombing would help ameliorate civilian suffering and 
reduce casualties.52 
The questions this dissertation seeks to answer are:  How did the U.S. change 
from a professed theory of precision bombing to eventually conduct area/wholesale 
destructive bombing that eventually included atomic and thermonuclear warfare?  
How and why did the United States military transform its strategic bombing 
applications and apparently divorce itself from the principles and tenets proffered by 
planners at the ACTS?  What were the factors and influences that led to this departure 
from Pre-World War II doctrinal strategies that eventually resembled those portrayed 
in the 1964 Peter Sellers movie Dr Strangelove?  Specifically, why did the Army Air 
Force, and its successor organization the U.S. Air Force (USAF), eventually conduct 
indiscriminate area bombing during World War II and subsequently begin to target 
urban population centers with nuclear weapons and embrace the idea of “nation 
killing?”53  Why did the U.S. conduct a “180 degree turn” with regard to strategic 
precision bombing doctrine and embrace nuclear applications as an acceptable means 
of warfare?  This departure from precision bombing doctrine seems even more 
intriguing when one considers that as late as 1944 even Lieutenant General Laurence 
S. Kuter, Chief of the Air War Plans Division, stated that it was “contrary to our 
national ideals to wage war against civilians.”54  
The answers to these questions are not necessarily military ones, but speak to 
American cultural mores, values, and ethics.  Through a study of American bombing 
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theory development, the execution of bombing efforts in both the European and 
Pacific theaters during World War II, and a review of the development of American 
nuclear strategies, one can gain an appreciation of how American strategic 
applications are reflective of the larger society as a whole and are indicative of 
American virtues and its collective values.  The bombing applications embraced by 
the U.S. military were not created in a vacuum nor were they isolated from the culture 
that created them.  Rather, these applications are reflective of the collective synergy 
created by, not only the Army Air Force, but the government and the American 
population.  Representative of this synergy is a quote from U.S. airpower advocate 
Bill Mitchell who argued, “Concepts of warfare are changed only through public 
opinion or by defeat in war.”55 
As the U.S. military is largely a cross section of the nation as a whole, the 
characteristics of the country are reflected in those who serve in uniform.  In this 
regard, American bombing methodologies were not just the product of American 
military men, but also a creation of the American population and the values it 
embraces.  All three elements the Army Air Force, the U.S. government, and its 
constituent population have contributed to the change in American bombing 
applications.  A study of this transition provides insight into not only the military 
applications of the U.S., but also reveals something about American cultural mores 
and its associated values and beliefs. 
____________________________________________ 
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Foundations 
Army War College professor, Conrad Crane wrote, “Military doctrine is 
simply a condensed expression of an accepted approach to campaigns, major 
operations, and battles.”56  In this regard, doctrine provides both a framework and sets 
guidelines that organizations use to establish methodologies and standard practices.  
Armed forces develop doctrine to establish modes of operation and organizational 
frames that provide a foundation for subsequent military operations.  Established 
doctrine often provides the intellectual paradigm for a given organization.  While 
doctrine outlines generally how an organization will operate routinely, frequently 
doctrine also serves as a departure point for more effective methodologies.  In order 
to understand how and why Americans changed bombing methods, it is important to 
understand bombings conceptual and doctrinal roots.  This morphing and 
modification of doctrine serves to provide an understanding of American bombing 
applications and the changes they incurred. 
World War I and the weapons utilized during this conflict seemed to tip the 
tactical and operational advantage to the defender and thus subdued the offensive 
spirit so prevalent among military theorists at the turn of the 20th century.  The 
casualty rates from World War I were estimated at ten million and this staggering 
figure poised difficult questions for military strategist.57  This increase in the scale of 
war and the new levels of lethality forced many military strategists to ponder the very 
future of warfare and its viability as a means to pursue national will.  The experience 
of World War I left a lasting impression and served as a catalyst for new ideas 
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regarding warfare and military applications.  How could nations in the future pursue 
national aims through the use of arms if the static trench warfare of World War I was 
to be the norm?  With the increasing efficiency of new weapons and technology, how 
could a nation effectively defeat an enemy and potentially avoid a repeat of the World 
War I experience?58  Aerial bombardment was seen as a solution to avoid the type of 
stalemate experienced on the Western Front and the excessive casualty rates that it 
generated.  
After World War I, some military theorists posited that in the next war the 
airplane could provide an answer to the stagnant, immobile warfare that had defined 
“The Great War.”  In this regard, the airplane and the capabilities it brought could 
once again make war serve the political aims of the state and reinstall warfare as an 
instrument of national power.59  Theorists believed that the airplane, perceived as 
inherently offensive in nature, could tip the balance of power in future conflict and 
thereby secure victory that was becoming so elusive in ground combat.  At the time, 
the leading theorist and most prolific proponent of air strategy at the time was 
General Giulio Douhet.  Douhet is largely recognized and credited with developing 
the first articulate and comprehensive doctrine for airpower.  His ideas eventually 
served as the initial blueprint for many subsequent air strategies.60 
Born in 1869, Douhet, an Italian artillery officer, saw great promise in the 
airplane and even before World War I broke out, he developed ideas and concepts 
regarding the effective use of an air force.61  Douhet believed that war was total and 
inclusive and encompassed all of a nation’s elements of power.  Douhet observed 
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how mechanization and technology was changing the very nature of war.  The 
development of new technologies and weapons was increasingly dependent upon a 
nation’s industrial might, productive capability, infrastructure, and natural resources.  
While Douhet did not see significant combat during World War I, and was jailed for 
insubordination in 1916, he scrutinized events and experiences of the war and 
concluded that the horrors of static defensive in modern warfare could be avoided 
through use of an independent air arm.  
Based upon the World War I experience, Douhet believed that modern 
conflict increasingly involved the whole of a nation’s populace and that all of a 
country’s resources would be required to support the war effort.  Toward this end, 
Douhet saw that modern war no longer allowed for the distinction between combatant 
and noncombatant.62  In an article entitled “Air Warfare,” Douhet stated, “The 
battlefield can no longer be limited; it will be circumscribed only by the frontiers of 
the nations at war.  Everyone becomes a combatant, for all are directly menaced.  The 
classification into belligerents and non-belligerents can no longer exist.”63  In this 
vein, he envisioned that the effect of war would not stay merely within the parameters 
of the battlefield itself, but that the effects would reverberate to all corners of the 
countries involved.64  
The Italian also argued that the “aerial field is the decisive field” and that a 
nation must have command of the air in order to successfully prosecute a war.65  
Douhet saw the airplane as a uniquely offensive weapon because of its speed and 
ability to avoid effective ground obstacles and defenses.66  With these characteristics, 
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and keeping in mind the widened scope of the battlefield and the technological nature 
of modern war, the airplane would become especially useful in the destruction of 
enemy industrial capabilities and infrastructure.  As future war would be all-
encompassing, Douhet advocated that aircraft should be used to attack “peacetime 
industrial and commercial establishments; important buildings, both public and 
private; transportation arteries and centers and certain designated areas of civilian 
populations.”67  In support of this assertion he even spelled out how such attacks 
could be effectively conducted: 
In general areas of large dimensions on which are found the usual buildings 
and a dense population.  To destroy them, it is necessary to employ three types 
of bombs: explosive, incendiary, and toxic in suitable proportion.  The 
explosive bombs produce the first ruins; the incendiaries produce fires that the 
toxic bombs prevent from being extinguished.  In addition, the complete 
destruction of the objective produces, besides the material effect, a moral 
effect that may have tremendous reactions.  It is sufficient to imagine what 
would happen among civilian populations of the other cities when the news 
had spread that the center attacked by the enemy had been completely 
destroyed and that no one could have been saved.68 
In addition to targeting capabilities and infrastructure, Douhet proposed 
attacking the enemy’s morale as a legitimate end.  He advocated the bombing and 
killing of people in order to destroy a population’s willingness to fight.  He was not 
seeking to attack just the military’s morale, but the entire nation’s morale, its ability 
to resist, and support the country’s war efforts.  He was explicit in this conviction and 
stated that one of the primary purposes of an independent air force was the “crushing 
of the material and moral resistance of the enemy.”69  Throughout his salient work, 
The Command of the Air, Douhet made clear that the targeting of an enemy’s morale 
was of primary importance and that victory will go to side that “succeeds in breaking 
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down the material and moral resistance of the other.”70  In this regard, Douhet thought 
that the psychological effects of bombing were just as important, if not more, as the 
physical and material effects.71 
Douhet was a realist with regard to modern war and did not express remorse 
about the bombing of civilian populations and their homes.  According to historian 
Ronald Schaffer, Douhet believed, “that nations must resign themselves to air attacks 
on their populated places in the same way an army commander resigns himself to the 
loss of troops when he knows that it is a way to secure victory.”72  Within a 
Douhetian context, civilians were just as relevant a target as the factories and centers 
of production that were being bombed because the purpose of war was to harm the 
enemy as much as possible.73  In this vein, the Italian urged his readers to confront the 
brutal facts of war and to view them “without false delicacy and sentimentalism.”74 
The stark, draconian picture that Douhet depicts does however have a humane 
dimension.  While aiming weapons at civilians, Douhet envisioned that the pain and 
suffering would be so immense that wars might become shorter in duration, thereby 
creating fewer casualties over all.  Because morale bombing was aimed “at civilians, 
that element of the countries at war least able to sustain them” that death would come 
quickly to those victims without prolonged agony and pain.75  In the end, a more 
humane approach could be the result if the deaths occurred quickly and the overall 
conflict was shorter in duration.  The casualties experienced as a result of World War 
I would thus be avoided.  Despite his advocacy of morale bombing and the use of 
both gas and incendiaries, it could be inferred that Douhet felt that an overall 
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amelioration would take place with the use of airpower and that itself was more 
humane in the end. 
American airpower theorists during the inter-war years espoused ideas that 
resembled those concepts proffered by Douhet.  Almost uniformly, American aviation 
theorists embraced the use of bombers against enemy cities and saw the importance 
of the air arm in future conflict.  However, an important difference was that American 
strategist did not see civilian populations as legitimate targets and made explicit 
distinction between combatants and noncombatants.  Thus, U.S. airpower strategists 
held to the belief that infrastructure and enemy forces constituted justifiable targets, 
not the civilian populations of the enemy nation.  As a result, the idea of targeting 
civilian populations was an anathema to U.S. military operations.   
The most influential of these early American proponents of air power was 
General William “Billy” Mitchell.  A World War I veteran with a strong personality 
and streak of individuality, Mitchell saw great promise in aviation and was a tireless 
advocate of airpower and an independent air force.  He demonstrated the promise of 
airpower by sinking the captured German battleship Ostfriesland in 1921 and 
signaled the eventual demise of the naval dreadnaught.  He saw an air force as a 
powerful tool in national defense and proposed that airplanes had many efficiencies 
and capabilities that made other platforms obsolete, particularly battleships.  His 
outspoken views regarding the role of aviation in national defense were so virulent 
that in 1925 he was court-martialed for insubordination. 
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After his departure from the military Mitchell continued his fight for airpower, 
this time in the public arena, published works, and made appearances in support of 
aviation.  One of his most influential writings, published in 1925, was entitled Winged 
Defense.  In this work he addresses the promise of airpower not only as a military 
weapon but as an economic tool and an integral part to the growth of the nation.  
While the book itself covered a number of issues relating to aviation, it touched upon 
the topic of aerial bombardment.  In the book he specifically avoided the advocacy of 
bombing civilians by stating: 
In the future the mere threat of bombing a town by an air force will cause it to 
be evacuated, and all work in munitions and supply factories to be stopped. . . 
Air forces will attack centers of production of all kinds, means of 
transportation, agricultural areas, ports and shipping; not so much the people 
themselves.76 
 
Furthermore, Mitchell saw a deterrent effect provided through aerial bombardment.  
In this regard, Mitchell believed bombing would slow or stop enemy rates of 
production and not necessarily require the actual destruction of industrial centers.  He 
proffered that “an attack from an air force using explosive bombs and gas may cause 
the complete evacuation of and cessation of industry in these places.”77  As a result, 
workers afraid of bombing would leave centers of production for safety in rural areas 
elsewhere.  The overall effect would be a reduction of enemy war material with an 
accompanying loss of front-line combat power but without inflicting substantial 
civilian casualties. 
While many visionaries proffered concepts regarding the use of airpower in 
future conflicts, the aforementioned Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) served as an 
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important center for the development of airpower theory and distilled and analyzed 
many of these nascent ideas.  Providing advanced professional education to Air Corps 
officers, the U.S. Army established the school at Langley Field, Virginia in 1926.78  
The new school’s mission was to “train air officers in the strategy, tactics, and 
techniques of airpower.”79  In 1931 the school moved to Maxwell Field in Alabama, 
and in addition to its teaching mission, it became an important center for the 
development of U.S. Army Air Corps (USAAC) doctrine and theory.80  The Tactical 
School, during the 1930s, served as the cradle for Air Corps concepts and the ideas 
articulated from ACTS served as the blueprint for American air efforts during the 
war.  Of the 320 Air Corps generals serving during World War II, over 80 percent 
were Tactical School graduates.81  From this location the doctrinal foundations were 
laid for Air Corps operations in all theaters of operation during World War II, and its 
influence was felt world wide. 
Debate continues as to the direct influence of Douhet on American air leaders 
of World War II.  General Larry Kuter, an ACTS honor graduate who served on the 
faculty of the school as a strategic bombing instructor downplays the influence of 
Douhet at the school stating that the Italian’s works were not included in the school 
curriculum.82  However, many of the more prominent USAAF generals at least 
professed to being cognizant of Douhet's ideas regarding the potential of airpower, 
but most would subscribe to Mitchell's influence and their own individual beliefs 
regarding the airplane and it capabilities in future conflict.83  ACTS lesson plans in 
1939 clearly admit that Douhet be credited with the idea of the strategic air offensive 
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and the first to recognize the potential of an air force against an enemy’s national 
infrastructure.84  Regardless of the Douhet influence debate, Mitchell's ideas and 
influence manifested themselves largely at the Tactical School during the inter war 
years and served as a foundation for much of the school’s curriculum.85  His ideas and 
tenets were pervasive throughout the school texts, and the school reflected Mitchell’s 
attitudes toward the role of aviation in the modern battlefield.  Additionally, several 
of Mitchell’s former aides were on staff at the Tactical School and were destined to 
become general officers and play significant roles in development of American 
airpower.86  When the faculty developed the concept of precision bombing and its 
associated methodologies, it is obvious that they constructed their ideas based upon 
precepts espoused by Mitchell.87 
By 1935 ACTS subscribed to ideas regarding the use of airpower against 
enemy war making capability.  In January the school responded to an Army War 
Plans Division document regarding employment of the air by arguing, “the principal 
and all important missions of air power when its equipment permits is the attack of 
those vital objectives in a nation's economic structure which tend to paralyze the 
nation's ability to wage war and thus contribute to the attainment of the ultimate 
objective of war, namely the disintegration of the will to resist.”88  In this regard, 
targeting equipment and production facilities were the aim, not necessarily 
indiscriminate killing of civilians. 
The school faculty made a concerted effort to study the bombing practices 
conducted against civilians in China, Ethiopia, and Spain and drew important 
 25 
conclusions regarding these engagements.89  While visionaries offered ideas and 
concepts, the ACTS considered the intellectual merit of airpower ideas and balanced 
them against real-world applications and results.  From their position, the officers at 
the school had the advantage of hindsight concerning the most effective and efficient 
use of airpower, and from this position they developed their own ideas regarding 
bombing applications.90  Concurrently, ACTS saw the development of the B-17, with 
its extended range, powerful engines, and accurate bombsight, as an important step in 
airpower development.91  As aviation technology advanced, so to did USAAF 
bombing doctrine.  Based upon their observations on foreign wars, and with the rapid 
growth of aviation technology, by 1935 the ACTS had fully developed the concept of 
daylight precision bombing.92 
Through an analysis of world events, the Tactical School rejected the idea of 
deliberately targeting civilians.  As a result of their studies, the ACTS Director of Air 
Tactics and Strategy, Major Muir S. Fairchild remarked: 
The Japanese bombing of Chinese cities had actually increased the morale of 
the Chinese nation, and was more responsible for unifying the populace than 
any other factor . . . the school preferred a strategy of delivering selective 
precision attacks against the enemy’s national economic structure.93 
In an ACTS lesson plan entitled “National Economic Structure,” Fairchild 
taught that attacking civilian populations was ineffective because such raids produced 
“temporary effects only and these [kinds of attacks] are not necessarily cumulative.”94  
The lesson plan stated that outside of the psychological effect, killing people did not 
hurt the war making capacity of a nation in the end.  Fairchild wanted to produce 
effects that would build over time and have a lasting effect upon a nation’s ability to 
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prosecute war.  Killing people did not yield such effects but he did believe that by 
destroying national infrastructure over time, intense suffering by the enemy 
population would eventually destroy national resolve and morale.95 
The application that the school advocated was the destruction of the enemy’s 
national economy through attacks only on vital installations.  In the above text and 
lesson plan content, it is obvious that the Tactical School rejected the idea of 
“Douhetian-type” bombing.  The faculty argued that strategic airpower could 
contribute to victory or secure it by attacks on the enemy state if properly focused 
upon “national economic institutions.”  In support of this idea, ACTS lesson plans 
argued, “direct attack of civilian populations is most repugnant to our humanitarian 
principles and certainly it is a method of warfare that we would adopt only with great 
reluctance and regret.”96  Aerial attacks did not need to be wholesale or widespread, 
but aimed at key components of an enemy’s national infrastructure.  By targeting 
these important components, the entire functioning of the enemy state would be 
disrupted.  As a result, ACTS assumed that the enemy’s national motivation for war 
and ability to resist would then wane and eventually disintegrate.97 
This same approach was discussed by General H. H. “Hap” Arnold, Deputy 
Chief of Staff for Air in the U.S. Army, and Colonel Ira C. Eaker, who in 1942 would 
serve as the first commander of the U.S. 8th Air Force spearheading the American 
bombing campaign in Europe.  In a 1941 text, these men wrote:  
It is generally accepted that bombing attacks on civilian populaces are 
uneconomical and unwise. . . . The most economical way of reducing a large 
city to the point of surrender, breaking the will of resistance, is not to drop 
bombs in its streets, but to destroy the power plants that supply light, the water 
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supply, the sewer lines.  Never, to date, and perhaps in no time, will any 
nation have a sufficient air force to be able to use it on other than priority 
targets.  Human beings are not priority targets except in certain special 
situations.98 
Hap Arnold’s position as the Chief of Staff of the Air Corps gave him great influence 
over the development and approval of bombing doctrine.  Born in 1886 and a 
graduate from West Point in 1907, Arnold was one of the Army’s first aviators and 
even undertook some of his ground instruction from the Wright brothers.99  Despite 
not serving in combat during World War I, Arnold developed an appreciation of 
American production and technological capabilities and saw great promise in both of 
these endeavors.  During the interwar years he became well versed on the myriad of 
requirements needed to administer, supply, train, and equip a large military force.  
Arnold’s organizational and managerial skills were instrumental in the development 
of the Air Corps and his appointment as Chief in 1938 provided him considerable 
power and influence over his command up until his retirement in 1946. 
Arnold’s aforementioned advocacy of targeting only supply centers and his 
views regarding precision bombing were key to the American bombing doctrine.  His 
sponsorship of strategic bombardment coincided with his advocacy of air power and 
the idea of an independent U.S. Air Force.  Arnold’s promotion of aviation was 
incessant and he was constantly looking for ways to publicize and announce the 
capabilities of air power to any who would listen.  Ironically, his zeal for the 
validation of airpower as an important tool in war would eventually conflict with the 
ideals of precision bombardment.  As the Chief of the Air Corps, and subsequently 
the Army Air Forces, his willingness to stray from this same doctrine later in the war 
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was a significant factor in the radical departure from the strategy he once helped to 
frame. 
Furthermore, Major General Haywood Hansell, a former Tactical School 
instructor and a proponent and framer of the precision-bombing theory argued that, 
“the idea of killing thousands of men, women, and children was basically repugnant 
to American mores.  And from a pragmatic view, people did not make good targets 
for the high explosive bomb, [which was] the principal weapon of the offense.”100  
While recognizing the importance of cities as targets, Hansell believed that targeting 
factories was a better use of airpower than “scattering bombs in urban areas.”101  
Hansell would go on to play a part in the development of the overall American 
airpower strategy for World War II and serve in both the European and Pacific 
Theaters of war.  However, in 1944, his allegiance to the idea of precision 
bombardment would cost him his command in the Pacific. 
This line of reasoning regarding precision also coexisted with the 
development of new bombing technologies and the advent of accurate bombsights 
and bombardment practices.  During this period, bombing accuracy was under 
constant development and the probabilities of hitting a given target were increasing.  
In exercises held during the 1920s and 1930s, the probability of hitting a target the 
size of a small factory was 64 percent from three thousand feet, and 19 percent from 
ten thousand feet.102  By the time World War II began, Air Corps leadership thought 
that it had the capacity to hit targets regardless of weather conditions.103 
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Avoidance of civilian casualties from aerial bombardment assault was also a 
concern for the U.S. federal government as President Franklin Roosevelt, who in 
response to the Soviet bombing of Helsinki, in 1939 stated, “The American 
Government and the American people have for some time pursued a policy of 
wholeheartedly condemning unprovoked bombing and machine gunning of civilian 
populations from the air.”104  This statement by the Commander-in-Chief is certainly 
explicit in its allegiance to the premise that civilian casualties were to be avoided and 
was in line with contemporary American mores.  Later that year, he announced, “if 
bombing proceeded unchecked hundreds of thousands of innocent human beings who 
had no responsibility for, and who were not remotely participating in the hostilities 
will lose their lives.”105  In 1938, the U.S. Senate, in response to the bombing of 
civilians by the Japanese in China and by warring parties during the Spanish Civil 
War, articulated this same sentiment by considering a resolution condemning 
“inhuman bombing of civilian populations.”106  Furthermore, on June 3, 1938 
Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, published a statement on behalf of the American 
populace condemning the killing of civilians in China and Spain through aerial 
bombardments and days later announced that a “moral embargo” be imposed on the 
sale of airplanes to countries that practiced such bombing.107 
On the eve of World War II on September 1, 1939, FDR pleaded to Great 
Britain, France, Germany, and Poland to refrain from bombing non-combatants.  In 
this speech he proclaimed an “urgent appeal to every government which may engage 
in hostilities [to] publically affirm its determination that its armed forces shall in no 
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event, and under no circumstances, undertake the bombardment from the air of 
civilian populations or of unfortified cities.”108  He reiterated this same sentiment 
three months later in an appeal to the Finns and Russian in their conflict in northern 
Europe to desist from the practice of bombing civilians.109  The next day, on 
December 2, 1939, FDR reiterated the effort announced by Secretary of State Welles 
in June and called upon American manufacturers and exporters to keep in mind the 
issue of bombing civilians when they negotiated contracts for the exportation of 
aircraft and aircraft technology to belligerent countries.110  
Precision bombing doctrine also served to set the stage for the validation of an 
independent air arm that could provide significant contributions in a future war.  
American theorists believed that a few bombers with selective targeting could 
neutralize an enemy's war-making capabilities, both cheaply and quickly.  This type 
of application obviously avoided the moral quagmire that Douhetian type attacks 
insinuated, and given the size and budget of America's 1930 era Air Corps, this idea 
had an attraction to a fiscally constrained nation whose air force was rather limited in 
both size and capability. 
The targeting of vital areas was also pragmatic from the standpoint that it 
maximized the limited resources of the Army Air Corps during the 1930s.  
Increasingly, airpower was seen as an attractive and comparatively cheap deterrent to 
the political situation that was developing throughout the globe.  Given the nature of 
America’s economic downturn during the depression, budgets for all types of military 
weapons were limited.111 
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In order to maximize the effect upon a potential enemy, and despite America’s 
isolationist leanings, bombers provided a relatively attractive and inexpensive means 
of delivering a potentially lethal blow to a future adversary.112  The unveiling of the 
B-17 “Flying Fortress” bomber and other aircraft equipped with newly designed and 
advanced precision bombsights promised to fulfill the type of bombing envisioned by 
the Tactical School.113  Despite the paucity of money to build aircraft and weapons 
during the 1930s, by the end of the decade the Air Corps was to expand rapidly and 
began to build more aircraft that supported the tenets of precision bombing 
doctrine.114 
 
 
Figure 2.  A YB-17 in Flight. Pictured is an early prototype model.  Source:  National Museum of the 
U.S. Air Force, http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/photos/mediasearch.asp?q=B-17&page=8 
(accessed November 17, 2006). 
 
In addition to, or as a result of, the moral and objective arguments, Americans 
embraced the idea of precision bombing.  This pro-Air Corps idea promised victory 
independent of other branches of the armed services with minimal demands on, and 
risks for American people.  Furthermore, historian Michael Sherry wrote, “this 
doctrine provided a more attractive alternative by employing the bomber as an 
instrument of precision rather than indiscriminate horror, laying its high explosives on 
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its targets with pinpoint accuracy, incapacitating the enemy without slaughter.”115  
Even as late as 1942 the idea of precision bombardment was still widely publicized as 
a lauded attribute of American military aviation.  Aviation pioneer and engineer 
Alexander de Seversky published a best selling book Victory Through Air Power 
shortly after the U.S. entry into the war.  In this work he argued that obliterating 
enemy morale can only be done through the use of precision bombing.116  Seversky 
argued that in a modern industrialized state, the will of a people can only be destroyed 
by attacking the necessities of life, largely food, shelter, water, and sanitation 
facilities.117  However, in order to destroy these required facilities from the air, 
precise bombardment is a requirement as area bombardment would waste aviation 
assets and in the end would be more costly.  While Seversky does not include any 
discussion regarding the morality of morale bombing, he at least limits air attacks to a 
few select target sets. 
Lastly, the use of bombers coincided with the U.S. growing fascination with 
technology and mechanization.  The idea of precision bombardment was developed at 
a time when the American populace was becoming increasingly fascinated and 
attracted to technology and the promise it had for the future.  Most Americans during 
the inter war period were excited about progress and the scientific breakthroughs 
being developed.  Fascination with the airplane, automobile, and radio provided 
fertile ground for the development of a doctrine that was dependent upon industrial 
might and engineering acumen.  Just as the U.S. embraced the industrial revolution in 
the 19th Century, it again welcomed mechanization but this time in the military 
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realm.  The advanced technology of the bomber combined with innovations in 
economic and industrial capabilities would supplant the brutality experienced during 
World War I and limit warfare to specific areas of an enemy’s infrastructure.118  This 
belief in scientific application held the promise that bombs would not kill people, but 
would destroy only things.119  The growth of technological skill and knowledge held 
the promise of avoiding the kind of terror that modern war was becoming. 
While the theory behind strategic bombing was susceptible to a number of 
interpretations, most American air planners viewed it as an application that would 
minimize civilian casualties and avoid the horror of World War I trench warfare, 
while yielding a significant military advantage over a modern enemy army.  The use 
of bombers not only seemed fiscally prudent, but the precision capabilities of these 
new platforms had the potential to avoid the moral dilemma surrounding the bombing 
of cities or densely populated areas.  During the interwar years, American airpower 
theorists and government officials rejected the idea of wholesale bombing proposed 
by Douhet and believed that bombing people was not only inefficient, but also 
morally reprehensible.  While differing from their European and Asian counterparts 
regarding civilian casualties, American air theorists saw great potential in strategic 
bombing and began to include this application into future war plans.  
____________________________________________ 
A Doctrinal Wedge 
For all the emphasis that American airpower theorists put on bombing an 
enemy’s state infrastructure and centers of production, ACTS planners created an 
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important exception and doctrinal wedge.  Air Corps planners left a placeholder for 
the kind of widespread moral/terror bombing that Douhet advocated.  In this vein, the 
Air Corps did not dismiss entirely terror bombing outright, nor did they remove it 
from the doctrine they constructed.  American precision bombing advocates left an 
important doctrinal loophole that eventually became the norm as World War II 
unfolded, and embraced, following VJ day and for the next few decades.   
While the Tactical School texts were widely accepted as Air Corps doctrine, 
the school put forth five optional categories for consideration when engaging in 
strategic air warfare: 
1. Direct attack on enemy armed forces. 
2. Indirect air attack of enemy armed forces by destroying the industrial 
elements which supplied and supported enemy armed forces. 
3. Direct air attack on economic and social systems and structure of the 
enemy state, including destruction or neutralization of major supporting 
systems. 
4. Direct air attack on enemy social centers, including cities and factory 
worker dwelling areas. 
5. Strategic air defense of one’s own urban, industrial, economic, and base 
areas.120 
 
In the above options, the intent behind number four is striking.  This option insinuates 
that a direct attack upon an enemy population is both a feasible and an acceptable 
course of action.  The inclusion and implications of this singular option create a 
dichotomy within the ACTS doctrine.  At a 1939 conference that discounted 
bombardment of civilians due to humanitarian considerations, participants also 
discussed the view that this kind of bombing could be used “as a possible means of 
retaliation.”121  This exception illustrates a doctrinal loophole in USAAC bombing 
strategies that left the door open for the application of Douhetian-type bombing. 
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When putting together the air plan for the upcoming war, a group of USAAC 
officers met in Washington, DC, during August 1941.  In a series of lengthy meetings 
they laid out the framework for the strategic air campaign should the U.S. enter 
World War II.  The product that came about was Air War Planning Document-1 
(AWPD-1).  AWPD-1 was based largely upon the existing doctrine and focused on 
destroying “carefully selected targets in the industrial and service systems on which 
the enemy people, their industries, and the armed forces were dependent.”122  Up to a 
point, the plan followed ACTS doctrine and the tenets developed during the interwar 
period.  However, the plan did stipulate that enemy civilian populations would be 
included in the targeting process.  Toward this end, it specified that humans could 
become legitimate targets for U.S. bombers.  While AWPD-1 did place civilians as 
the lowest priority, it clearly specified that American bombers would make civilians 
their objective when the timing was right.  While the document did not specify when 
this targeting would happen, regarding such attacks AWPD-1 stated, “immediately 
after some very apparent results of air attacks on the material objectives . . . [and] 
after some major setback of the German ground forces, it may become highly 
profitable to deliver a large scale, all out attack on the civilian population of Berlin.  
In this event, any or all the bombardment forces may be diverted for this mission.”123  
The document speculated that such attacks might be useful against the entire German 
population and cause a reduction of public support in a similar manner during World 
War I.124 
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Updated as the war unfolded, AWPD-1 continued to include the idea of 
undermining and destroying the will of the enemy to wage war.  Despite precision 
bombing doctrinal theories, a placeholder in the AWPDs and established doctrine had 
been created that could be utilized for the application of Douhetian tactics.  While the 
reasoning for this placeholder is apparent, conspicuously absent is an explanation as 
to why the framers of the AWPDs strayed from their stated doctrine and included 
Douhetian tactics as a potential means of ending the war quickly.  If the theory of 
precision strategic bombing was correct, why then did the men who wrote AWPD-1 
feel the need to include the targeting of morale in their planning?  Why did this 
apparent change from Army Air Corps doctrine appear in the primary planning 
document for the strategic bombing effort?  A review of what transpired over the 
course of the war might provide an insight to this answer. 
As late as 1944, Secretary of War Stimson was not convinced that morale 
bombing would be an effective tool, especially in Europe.  As bombing assaults grew 
larger, the Secretary considered the idea that morale bombing might not be useful in 
the capitulation of Germany.  He was unconvinced of airpower’s ability to affect the 
mindset of the German soldier.  In his diary he wrote, “can this [air bombardment] be 
counted on to affect German morale sufficiently to compel an otherwise successful 
German Army to surrender unconditionally?  I hardly think this is certain.”125   
Despite the Secretary's lack of faith in morale bombing, by the end of the war 
the USAAF deliberately attacked populations and urban centers.  Wholesale bombing 
attacks came about not just from the commander’s decisions in executing the 
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American bombing campaign, but also because the U.S. public supported such 
actions.  In addition to the USAAF and the American public, the federal government 
first gave implicit, and later explicit, approval for such bombing methods.  All three 
of these elements created a synergy that allowed not just Douhetian bombing with 
conventional weapons, but eventual acceptance of both atomic, and later 
thermonuclear, applications. 
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CHAPTER 2 
AT THE ACUTE: 
Bombing in the European Theater 
____________________________________________ 
In August 1944, the same General Kuter who wrote that it was “contrary to 
our national ideals to wage war against civilians,” sent a memorandum to the U.S. 
Army Air Force (USAAF) Chief of Staff, “Hap” Arnold.  The carefully worded 
memo outlined an Air Staff study addressing the topic of air raids specifically 
designed to target German civilian morale.1  The document speculated that a large air 
attack upon Berlin might create a significant psychological blow to the German 
populace and affect their support for the war effort.  The memo specified that the Air 
Staff thought that an air assault of this type was to be “concentrated so far as possible 
on the administrative center of the city; and should continue without respite so long as 
operational factors permit.”2  The document further suggested that these same kinds 
of raids might be useful on other German cities and even in towns of less than twenty 
thousand people.3 
However, Kuter was not totally convinced that the idea of attacking the 
German people was a good idea.  In response, General Arnold argued that the 
USAAF should not target the German people per se, but believed that “military 
objectives of numerous types can be made the targets . . . for example roving flights 
of bombers and fighters covering all of Germany to give every citizen an opportunity 
to see positive proof of Allied air power.”4  In Arnold’s response, he suggests that the 
morale of the German people might be affected without specifically targeting them.  
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Furthermore, Arnold stipulated that he “did not concur in the RAF belief that it will 
ever be entirely sound to execute an attack strictly against German morale . . . [but] 
did join in the belief that plans should be available to meet such an eventuality.”5 
Separately, the Royal Air Force (RAF), who designed an attack plan initiating 
the Americans discussions, hoped that an attack of this sort would be a culminating 
blow to the German people and force a quicker Nazi capitulation.  The plan called for 
the dropping five thousand tons of bombs in two hours on the administrative center of 
Berlin, and postulated that the raid might be “sufficient to devastate completely an 
area two and one half square miles.”6  The plan also speculated that the attack occur 
“during daylight hours [because] the population of the [targeted] area is high” and a 
raid of this magnitude offered the possibility of a “100 percent chance of destruction 
to all personnel and equipment in the area affected” with up to two hundred and 
seventy thousand killed.7  Furthermore, the planners thought that an attack of this sort 
needed to be directed against an area with the “highest density of population” in order 
to get the proper psychological impact and effect upon German morale. 
Despite USAAF discussions and polemics regarding the raid, the British and 
the Americans eventually executed the strike in February 1945 and killed an 
estimated twenty five thousand Germans.  After the raid, the New York Times 
reported, “More than 1,000 Flying Fortresses heaped additional ruin on Berlin in 
which an estimated 3,000,000 refugees from the eastern Reich have been jammed . . . 
the center of Berlin was left a shambles.”8  Regarding the raid one airman stated, “we 
just poured it in there . . . it [w]as wide open and you could just not miss.  It sure 
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looked good to me.”9  So many fires were started by the attack that the last planes in 
the bomber stream made their attacks in instruments because the smoke obscured 
their vision.10  This attack on Berlin, and ostensibly German morale, was a significant 
departure from the USAAF pre-war doctrine regarding precision bombing and was 
the result of a steady transformation of American bombing policy and principles. 
____________________________________________ 
RAF v USAAF 
With the attack on Pearl Harbor serving as the catalyst for America’s entry 
into World War II, the U.S. participation in the global conflict provided the USAAF 
the opportunity to prove the efficacy of the precision bombing strategy it developed 
during the inter-war years.  The framers of America’s strategic bombing doctrine now 
found themselves in a position to execute the strategies they devised at the Air Corps 
Tactical School.  Americans started their strategic bombing operations in Europe 
within the framework established in the pre-war doctrine.  However, as the air war 
against Germany progressed, the Army Air Force began to stray from the bombing 
precepts it had once vigorously advocated.  The Combined Bombing Offensive in 
Europe served as the starting point of America’s transition from precision bombing 
doctrine and the initial step toward wholesale bombing applications. 
The first Army Air Force bombers began arriving in England during the 
spring of 1942.  While the buildup of the U.S. Eighth Air Force in Great Britain took 
some time, the presence of American bombers and crews in England was already 
controversial.  Apart from the cultural differences of the two Allies, with the English 
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complaining that the Americans were “over-paid, over-sexed, and over here,” a 
significant doctrinal difference existed between American bombing concepts and 
British applications.  After the British Expeditionary Force’s defeat on the European 
mainland in spring 1940, England left much of its Army’s equipment in France and 
on the shores of Dunkirk.  As a result, the Royal Air Force (RAF) was the only 
offensive capability available to the British to strike back at Nazi Germany.  
Leveraging this single offensive capability, in late 1940 the RAF’s Bomber 
Command began conducting strategic bombing raids over Hitler’s Third Reich. 
The British approach to strategic bombing was markedly different from the 
Americans.  The British believed that they could disrupt German war industry by 
attacking production centers, national infrastructure, and the normal patterns of 
civilian life.11  While professing to loathe the bombing of civilians, the British placed 
great value on the effect bombardment would have on civilian morale and the 
subsequent result it could have upon armament production.12  During the early phases 
of the British air offensive, the RAF attempted daylight raids over Germany.  
However, for a number of reasons, the biggest being the high loss of aircrew and 
airplanes from German air defenses, the RAF curtailed daytime bombing 
operations.13  Because of the high loss rate, Bomber Command modified its strategic 
bomber fleet and switched primarily to nighttime operations.14  By conducting raids 
at night, the RAF hoped that the cover of darkness would provide sufficient safety for 
its bombers flying over hostile territory. 
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However, switching to night operations had significant consequences on 
bombing methodology because it precluded the visual sighting of a target through the 
optical bombsight.  It was impossible to locate factories and individual buildings at 
night from twenty thousand feet, but it was still possible to find cities and major 
industrial areas.15  As a result, Bomber Command began conducting saturation 
bombing against large German cities and production centers.16  By bombing large 
areas, the British hoped that the law of averages would work in their favor and 
destroy German industry as well as the morale of the civilian workforce.17  This 
change in British bombing methodology had dire consequences for German civilians 
and reflected the draconian bombardment ideas initially advocated by Douhet. 
Despite the RAF’s dismal experience with daytime bombing missions, the 
U.S. came into the war still subscribing to the idea of daylight precision 
bombardment.  British civilian and military leadership, reeling from their excessive 
daytime losses, hoped to have the Americans join them in their nocturnal area 
bombardment raids.  However, the USAAF was not equipped to fly night missions 
nor was it willing to abandon the precision doctrine it had so eagerly developed 
during the inter-war period.  In an October 1942 paper addressing the use of night 
area bombing, the Commander of the U.S. Eighth Air Force, Brigadier General Ira 
Eaker defended the American strategy by referencing its economy of mass.  In this 
document, he argued, that day bombardment was superior to night bombardment ten-
fold.18  He believed that it would take one thousand night bombers to create the 
effects that a force of one hundred day bombers could accurately produce.19 
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The issues regarding Allied bombardment methodologies became a significant 
point of contention during the Allied Casablanca Conference in January 1943.  The 
RAF contingent at the conference proffered that the U.S. support the British in their 
night bombing campaign and planned to have Winston Churchill press the issue with 
President Roosevelt.  To argue the American position, General Arnold called Eaker to 
the conference to have him persuade Churchill of the efficacy of daylight 
bombardment.  After a thirty-minute meeting with Eaker and listening to him plead 
the USAAF case, Churchill replied, “You have not convinced me that you are right, 
but you have persuaded me that you should have opportunity to prove your 
contention.  When I see your president I shall tell him that I will withdraw my 
suggestion that the U.S. bombers join the RAF in night bombing.”20  This doctrinal 
victory by the USAAF enabled it to pursue the daylight applications apart from the 
RAF and maintain U.S. autonomy in bombing operations. 
As a result of this discussion, the Allies drafted the “Casablanca Directive.”  
This was the blueprint for Allied Bombing efforts in the European Theater and the 
document specified what types of targets the USAAF and the RAF were to attack.  
More importantly, the directive was sufficiently vague to allow each air force to 
pursue bombing operations in its own manner.21  According to Hansell:  
This directive specified vigorous prosecution by both the British and 
American air forces toward a common grand strategic objective, optimizing 
the special strengths and capabilities of each air force toward a common goal.  
The directive endorsed both the American and British strategies for air power, 
and recognized both the RAF experience and the American tactical doctrine.  
The U.S. Eighth Air Force and RAF could cooperate as coordinate members 
of a team progressing toward a common destination.  The RAF was free to 
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continue its chosen air strategy and the Eighth Air Force was free to pursue its 
doctrine of destruction of selective targets by daylight.22 
This directive was the seminal document for the “round the clock” bombing 
operations that characterized the Allied Combined Bombing Offensive.  
Beginning with the first flight of American B-17 and B-24 bombers over Nazi 
territory in January 1943, the Army Air Force initially pursued a precision bombing 
strategy in accordance with its published doctrine.  Simultaneously the British 
continued their night area attacks upon German urban population centers and 
production centers.  However, the American bombing methodology in the European 
Theater of Operations was to change significantly over the course the war.  As the 
Combined Bombing Offensive progressed, USAAF bombardment methods came to 
resemble those of their British counterparts and were eerily similar to raids once 
espoused by Douhet.  The reasons for this change were many. 
____________________________________________ 
Practical Considerations 
To drop a bomb accurately from a moving aircraft is a complex operation that 
requires the computation of a number of variables.  Among these variables are true 
airspeed, aircraft pitch and yaw, crosswind drift, altitude, air density, and bombing 
interval.  Despite the complexity of aerial bombardment accuracy, the USAAF was 
the world’s leader in bombing theory and advanced bombing techniques.23  For 
airborne targeting, USAAF strategic bombers were equipped mostly with the Norden 
Mark (Mk) XV bombsight.24  The Norden computed the many variables of precision 
bombing quickly and automatically.  American airmen were optimistic about the 
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Norden sight and thought it could provide the accuracy the Air Force doctrine 
required. 
The Mk XV sight (Figure 3) was an ingenious design and an impressive leap 
in gyroscopic and optical technology.25  The unit was a two-piece assembly held 
stable by a pair of spinning gyroscopes, regardless of an aircraft’s pitch, yaw, or roll.  
This arrangement allowed the bombardier in a moving airplane to aim his ordinance 
accurately at a fixed position on the ground.  A unique aspect of the Mk XV’s design 
was a remote pilot feature that connected the sight to the aircraft flight controls, thus 
allowing the bombardier to assume control of the aircraft while on the bomb run.26  
This capability allowed the bombardier to make course corrections during the bomb 
run that would supposedly result in a more accurate bombing pattern on the selected 
target. 
Air Corps personnel expressed praise and admiration for the small, fifty-
pound sight and were amazed by its capabilities and potential.  Many viewed is as a 
technological marvel and wonder of engineering.  One aircrew member remarked, 
“The more I found out about the bombsight, the more ingenious and inhuman it 
seemed.”27  Another stated, “It was something bigger . . . I ended up with a conviction 
. . . that a bombardier can’t help feeling inferior to his bombsight.”28 
The U.S. spent $1.5 billion developing the bombsight, more than half the 
amount allocated to the Manhattan Project.29  The Norden’s design and intricate 
internal functions were highly classified, and it had been rumored that the Army Air 
Force required each bombardier to swear an oath to protect the secret design.30  Due 
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to the impressive capabilities of the Norden sight, it quickly developed the 
exaggerated reputation of being capable of putting “bombs in a pickle barrel.” 
 
 
Figure 3.  A Norden Mark XV M-1 bombsight in the nose of a B-17G.  Source: Author’s collection. 
 
Originally designed for the U.S. Navy to sight both stationary and moving 
targets, the Norden was adopted by the USAAF in 1932 over its own Sperry 
developed sight.31  By the end of the war, Norden manufactured more than fifty two 
thousand sights for all branches of the armed services.32  The sight was so precise that 
bombardiers could drop bombs within fifty feet of a practice target from twenty 
thousand feet.33  Based upon these capabilities, the Army Air Force expected 90 
percent of bombs dropped to land within one mile of the aiming point with 40 percent 
landing within five hundred yards.34  The reputation of the Norden was so pervasive 
that in an issue of Collier’s weekly magazine a cartoon had an American bombardier 
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asking the question while on a bombing run, “Was that address 106 Leipzigerstrasse, 
or 107?”35 
However, for all the accolades attributed to the Norden bombsight and the 
ideas regarding daylight precision bombing, the reality of the air war in Europe posed 
significant problems for the USAAF.  The idea of targeting and hitting only selected 
areas of the German military machine and economic infrastructure was harder than 
airpower enthusiasts envisioned.  While the Americans fought so intently to preserve 
their doctrine of daylight precision, the results of bombing accuracy up to 1944 were 
similar to that of their RAF counterparts who continued to drop bombs by night 
without the aid of the Norden.36 
After the war, the U.S government initiated a comprehensive and in-depth 
study of the bombing efforts to determine the effectiveness of the strategic campaign.  
Called the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), this effort employed thousands 
of civilian and military personnel and painstakingly recorded the results of American 
bombing efforts.  The USSBS produced a multi-volume record of bombing 
effectiveness in both the European and Pacific theaters.  These volumes include a 
myriad of analytical and quantitative analysis regarding execution of the bombing 
efforts and their effects upon German and Japanese infrastructure.  Controversy 
surrounded the study as it was drafted and then again upon its publishing.  Following 
the war, both strategic bombing advocates and opponents used the results and figures 
published in the report for their own aims.  A recent review of the USSBS argues that 
the survey’s conclusions are often mistakenly viewed as fact when they should 
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largely be seen as an interpretation of bombing data.37  Aside from the doctrinal 
polemics, the survey contains a wealth of information regarding accuracy. 
According to the USSBS, the American Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces were 
unable to achieve the levels of accuracy expected in the pre-war doctrine.  Many 
factors militated against precision bombardment in the European Theater.  Weather 
was one of the more significant impediments to precision bombing and an important 
factor determining the success of any mission.38  The study found that in all of 1944, 
for any area of Germany, on average, only one hundred and four days of clear 
weather occurred to conduct visual or visual-assist bombing.39  Season weather 
patterns affected the ability to accurately sight targets and meteorological conditions 
conducive to visual bombing existed largely only from April to September.  From an 
altitude between twenty to twenty five thousand feet, the occurrence of weather 
suitable for accurate bombing was roughly 40 percent.40  As a result, the study 
determined that on average only about half of the Eighth Air Forces’ aircraft aimed 
their bombs visually.41  Regarding precision bombing strategies, the Bombing Survey 
concluded that:  
Many limiting factors intervened; target obscuration by clouds, smoke screens 
and industrial haze; enemy fighter opposition which necessitated defensive 
bombing formations, thus restricting freedom of maneuver; anti-aircraft 
defenses, demanding minimum time exposure of the attacking force in order 
to keep losses down; and finally time limitations imposed on combat crew 
training after the war began.42  
For all its capabilities, the potential accuracy of the Norden was irrelevant if the 
bombardier was unable to sight his aiming point from the cloudy, war-torn European 
skies. 
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Clouds, overcast, and smoke were only some of the obstacles to precision 
bombing.  German Luftwaffe fighters and flak batteries were among other problems.  
During the first few years of the bombing campaign, bomber loss rates from German 
fighters and flak took a heavy toll on the Eighth Air Force.  By the end of the war, 
9,949 bombers were shot down with 79,265 men lost in action.43  Early loss rates for 
bombers remained around 8 percent of the bombing force.44  With this loss rate, 
airmen would not, statistically at least, survive their tours of duty consisting of 
twenty-five missions.45  
Furthermore, bomber aircrew operated in a dangerous and inhospitable 
environment.  Temperatures at bombing altitudes of 20,000 feet were sub zero and 
averaged between negative 40 to 70 degrees Fahrenheit.  At these extreme 
temperatures, airmen were subject to frostbite after only a few seconds of exposure to 
the elements and unprotected skin would freeze to metal components of the aircraft 
upon contact.  Additionally, hypoxia, a lack of oxygen in the bloodstream, was a 
constant threat at high altitudes.  A crewman might easily succumb to hypoxia if an 
oxygen mask regulator froze from the individuals own breath condensation, as was a 
frequent occurrence.  Aircraft commanders had to continuously conduct voice checks 
to ensure crewmen remained conscious in the rarified air. 
More importantly, these aircrews were subject to the fear and anxiety that 
goes along with combat.  During the conduct of the Eighth Air Forces’ effort, almost 
2,000 aircrew were removed from flight duties because of fear or refusal to fly.46  
While this is a statistically small number given the over 100,000 aircrew in the 
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Eighth, it is indicative of the stress these crews experienced and the fear that 
accompanied them in their raids.47  While the prewar doctrine promised precision, the 
idea was tested over the peaceful and relatively clear skies of the Unites States.  
However, the actual conditions over Europe were much different.  One Eighth Air 
Force officer stated, “There is a lot of difference between bombing an undefended 
target and running a barrage of six-inch shellfire while a swarm of pursuit [fighters] 
are working on you.”48 
Furthermore, early bombing operations and accuracy suffered from poorly 
trained crews who were unfamiliar with bombers and the realities of air combat.  New 
pilots and crews often came straight from a training command right to a combat unit 
without sufficient competency in a four-engine bomber and were unfamiliar with 
flying in bomber formations.49  When queried after the war about when during the 
war did new, well-trained crews arrived in the England, future Air Force Chief of 
Staff, General Curtis LeMay replied dryly “That never happened.”50  Furthermore, 
aircrew and gunners were often untrained in aerial marksmanship and had poor 
gunnery skills.51  As a result, the defensive armament of the bombers was ineffective 
if gunners could not effectively employ their weapons and fend off Luftwaffe attacks.  
While the Eighth Air Force did develop in-theater training for new crews, the 
experience of aerial combat was a phenomenon that could hardly be replicated in a 
training environment. 
Because of these factors, the bombing survey concluded that, on average for 
the entire bombing effort, “only twenty percent of the bombs aimed at precision 
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targets fell within the target area.”52  Accuracy rates of the Eighth Air Force alone 
show that in 1943 approximately 20 percent of bombs fell within 1,000 feet of their 
designated targets with that statistic changing to 60 percent by April of 1945.53  As 
aircrews become more proficient as Luftwaffe fighter and flak effectiveness dwindled 
and by the last few months of the war, the Circular Error for heavy bombers went 
from 3,400 feet in early 1943 to approximately 1,000 feet in April 1945.54  While 
accuracy rates rose throughout the course of the war, and spiked near the end, the 
overall results were still not what the framers of precision bombardment had 
originally envisioned. 
In response to the poor visibility and weather, the Army Air Force began to 
investigate blind-bombing techniques.  In one of these initiatives the Americans 
turned to their British counterparts for a possible solution.  In March 1943, the 
USAAF obtained RAF-developed radar bombing equipment called “H2S.”  H2S was 
a device that emitted a radar beam that reflected off the ground surface below and 
provided a graphic depiction of the terrain on a small cathode-ray tube located in the 
aircraft.55  After studying the system, the USAAF subsequently developed an 
Americanized version called H2X (named “Mickey Radar” by aircrew).  By 
November, the USAAF had conducted sufficient crew training and airframe 
modifications to execute its first radar bombing missions. 
The initial missions using H2X were promising, but the new technology had 
its limitations.  While 80 percent of Eighth Air Force missions in late 1944 used some 
kind of electronic device for bombing or navigation, many of these missions were 
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considered failures.56  The bombing survey found that these poor results came from 
“cloud static, increased crew fatigue caused by adverse weather conditions, a high 
possibility of operator error, and the difficulty in briefing radar missions.”57  When 
bombing a target that was completely overcast and obscured by clouds and when 
using H2X or other electronic bombing aids, the Bombing Survey determined that the 
Eighth Air Force placed only a paltry .02 percent of the bombs within one thousand 
feet of the aiming point.58  The survey determined that H2X was effective as an aid to 
visual bombing, but bombing by radar alone was the least effective method.59 
 
 
Figure 4.  First radar bombing mission over Bremen, November 13, 1943.  Note the complete overcast 
under the bombing formation.  Source: National Museum of the U.S. Air Force, http://www.national 
museum.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/060517-F-1234S-004.jpg (accessed March 4, 2007).  
 
 
Reporting the inaccuracy of H2X and other aids, the Bombing Survey also 
reported, “Bombs dropped by instruments [radar] in precision raids directed against 
specific targets fell over a wide area comparable to that covered normally in an area 
raid.”60  In this case American bombing methodology yielded results similar to the 
RAF.  Furthermore, the survey determined that “precision” was a relative term when 
 56 
applied to radar bombing.  A review of USAAF accounting methods found that the 
word had a liberal interpretation.  The Survey reported, “If the specific target was, for 
example, a marshalling yard located in a German city, as so often happened, such a 
raid has the practical affect of an area raid against the city, but on the basis of the 
declared intention of the attackers it would go into the air force records as a precision 
attack on the transportation system.”61  In this vein, the missions counted as precision 
raids regardless of where the bombs fell.  This liberal use of the word “precision” 
with regard to radar bombardment allowed the Army Air Force to portray the 
perception that it was adhering to the doctrine of precision strike. 
The inaccuracy of bombing through normal visual methods combined with the 
limitations of early radar systems show that precision bombing was a theory that was 
not yet feasible.  Despite the low accuracy rates and radar bombing results in July 
1945, the Army Air Force’s monthly periodical entitled Impact still referred to 
pinpoint bombing and highlighted the difference between U.S. bombing practices and 
that of their British counterparts.  In the end, there was little difference between 
British and American bombing results, and any differentiation between the two 
efforts is largely semantics.62  While the USAAF openly adhered to its doctrine of 
precision based upon prewar aiming expectations, the realties of the war precluded 
the full realization of this strategy.  Americans clung to the tenets of precision 
bombing, but in the final analysis, the USAAF demonstrated at least an implicit 
acceptance of area bombardment and the collateral damage that was associated with 
the inability to bomb accurately.  
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____________________________________________ 
Strategic Pragmatism 
Changes to U.S. strategic bombing practices also came about from pragmatic 
rationales.  As the war progressed, key persons in the American military and the 
federal government allowed and approved bombing operations that were a departure 
from established doctrine.  Many of these individuals had an agenda and rationale for 
facilitating this change in bombing practices and saw that the application of 
Douhetian tactics as merely a means to an end.  The attitudes of these individuals and 
their willingness to depart from precision bombing doctrine set a precedent that was 
to reverberate far into the future. 
Through the feats of Charles Lindbergh, Amelia Earhart, Wiley Post, and 
Roscoe Turner, civil aviation enjoyed great popularity during the interwar years.  Air 
races, new speed and distance records, and the pilots who accomplished these feats 
were front-page news during this “golden age of aviation.”  While civilian aviation 
experienced a renaissance, the Army Air Corps found it difficult to establish itself in 
light of interservice rivalries of the era.  With the nation reeling from the effects of 
the Depression, both the Army and the Navy were constantly clamoring for a share of 
the meager national defense budget.  One officer who was to become a key figure in 
the strategic bombing effort likened the inter-war Air Corps to a “flying club” and a 
“public relations outfit” as opposed to an efficient military force.63  This American 
paucity of defense spending and appropriation was based upon the premise that the 
U.S. could continue to count upon the relative safety that two vast oceans afforded.  
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In addition to this lack of military concern, the political temperament of the time 
favored isolationism as Americans sought to avoid foreign conflicts and international 
commitments.  The reminder of American experiences in World War I combined with 
internal economic and social concerns facilitated the nation’s focus on the domestic 
over the foreign. 
However, the men who developed the Air War Planning Documents and filled 
the ranks of the Air Corps Tactical School understood the merit of military aviation at 
a time when the federal government and the general population saw aviation as a 
mere adjunct to an entire war effort.  When the U.S. found itself involved in World 
War II, Army Air Force leadership realized that it had an opportunity to prove the 
value of aviation.  As a result, General Arnold wanted to ensure that his service play a 
significant role in the conflict. 
However, during this same period, much of the American military 
establishment was still skeptical of an independent air arm and thought aviation 
should remain subordinate to ground or sea operations.  In support of this ideation, in 
1939 and 1940 new USAAC aircraft purchases, apart from a few early B-17s, were 
mostly limited to airframes designed to conduct close air support to ground forces and 
not for strategic bombers or planes with significant range and payload.64  Through a 
review of conflicts elsewhere in the world during the 1930s, most foreign air forces 
were merely supporting elements to a land campaign and did not act independently 
from ground commanders.65  This prevailing view of airpower was also evident by 
the lack of strategic bomber development in all other countries except Great Britain.  
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All the Axis powers, as well as the USSR, built air forces with large air fleets that 
directly supported the ground campaign and paid little attention to four-engine 
bombers with long-range capabilities. 
Arnold hoped to prove the value of military aviation while demonstrating the 
importance of an independent U.S. air force.  Arnold was not alone in this thought as 
many officers in the USAAF saw merit in this endeavor.  For Arnold, creating an 
independent air force became an over riding-priority.  In the upcoming conflict, 
Arnold hoped to validate his contention.  If the Combined Bombing Offensive in 
Europe proved to be an important tool in winning the war, it would not only help the 
cause of military aviation, but would also validate the premise of an independent air 
force. 
Arnold openly called terror bombing “abhorrent to our humanity, and our 
sense of decency.”66  In public, his views reflected the accepted values that 
Americans had professed before the war had begun.  However, in private he had no 
such misgivings about the effect bombardment had on enemy civilians.67  Regarding 
World War II he explained, “This is a brutal war and . . . the way to stop the killing of 
civilians is to cause so much damage that their government ceases fighting.”68  
However, in line with precision doctrine, he quipped, “This doesn’t mean that we are 
making civilians or civilian institutions a war objective, but we cannot pull our 
punches because someone may get killed.”69  These same views were evident when 
Arnold responded to Secretary of War Stimson regarding the firebombing of Dresden 
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in February 1945.  Arnold’s retort to the Secretary was simply, “We must not get soft.  
War must be destructive and to a certain extent inhumane and ruthless.”70 
To avoid a possible public relations backlash when killing lots of civilians 
while simultaneously cultivating popular support at home for an independent air arm, 
Arnold continuously walked a fine line between advocating Douhetian-type tactics 
and a strict adherence to the doctrine of precision bombing.  To avoid public ire while 
still prosecuting his objective of validating airpower, Arnold followed the advice 
given to him by General Carl Spaatz during Congressional appropriation hearings 
during the 1930s: “Tell the truth, but don’t blurt it out.”71 
Despite a huge surge in the size and capability of the USAAF, the beginning 
efforts of the bombing offensive were not living up to promise of precision strategic 
bombardment.  While the B-17 and B-24s were putting theory into practice, the initial 
results of the bombing campaign were disappointing.  As the U.S. attacked targets in 
Germany, American aircrews in terms of tactics, techniques and procedures 
experienced a steep learning curve.  As a result, Arnold continually pressed Eaker and 
the Eighth Air Force for more substantial effects to prove the worth of air power and 
the expenditure of funds for the USAAF bomber fleet.72 
Arnold’s office was located in Washington, DC, but his power and influence 
reached globally.  Arnold wielded considerable power in all theaters of the war, and 
his authority in the USAAF was absolute.  According to official USAAF history, 
Arnold personally selected air commanders and in this role, he held great sway and 
influence regarding their respective professional futures and subsequent 
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assignments.73  Additionally, he communicated with them frequently and through his 
force of personality, and the power he held over their careers, his influence was 
immense.  This influence over these commanders often affected theater 
applications.74  Though not involved in running the day-to-day combat operations, 
Arnold’s authority to relieve commanders gave him great leverage over their actions.  
He often strongly expressed his concerns to field commanders when they did not 
deliver the results he expected.75 
 
 
Figure 5.  General H. H. Arnold.  Source: National Museum of the US Air Force, http://www.national 
museum.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/060913-F-1234S-007.jpg (accessed March 9, 2007). 
 
 
Arnold’s influence and agenda was an important factor in the change in 
bombing applications.  According to historian Michael Sherry, “It was not necessarily 
Arnold’s intention to make the war more costly or brutal--but efficiency; the clean 
kill, promised large rewards for the man [Arnold] and the air force.  But intentions 
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and their results did not often correlate.”76  Arnold’s professional agenda and visions 
for the future of his service were the priority.  His motivation for a high number of 
combat sorties and the proof of the strategic bombing concept lay with his main goal, 
which was to make the largest possible contribution to winning the war and to ensure 
that the USAAF receive credit for it through publicity.77  
Evidence of Arnold’s views is present a 1943 letter to Eaker, where the chief 
referred to the Eighth Air Force raids over Bremen and Vegesack.  In this 
correspondence, he congratulated Eaker by saying, “When the German news agencies 
refer to these missions as ‘terror raids,’ we know that the effect is all that we could 
wish.”78  He concludes the letters by writing, “I want to extend to you and to all those 
who took part in these missions my congratulations on a job well done and my 
anticipation of bigger and better ones in the future.”79  The mention in the German 
press calling these operations “terror raids,” combined with Arnold’s hope for “bigger 
and better ones in the future” indicate his willingness to change U.S. bombing 
applications and implicit acceptance of applications outside of precision.  While 
Arnold’s public position on bombing was in line with published USAAF doctrine, his 
personal views, combined with his absolute rule of a global organization, encouraged 
bombing results that strayed from precision applications. 
Still yet, another example of Arnold’s desire for results and media coverage 
was evident in a letter to Lieutenant General Carl “Tooey” Spaatz, head of U.S. 
Strategic Air Forces in Europe.  In this letter, Arnold wrote: 
The public reaction to our strategic bombing activities indicates that they are 
getting the impression that we are only partially destroying our targets and 
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that the British are finishing the work which we have only started . . . Can’t 
we, someday, not in the too far distant, send out a big number--and I mean a 
big number--of bombers to hit something in the nature of an aircraft factory 
and lay it flat.80 
Given the personal views of Arnold and the emphasis he added, the tone of this letter 
infers that Arnold was looking to completely annihilate a target for media and public 
relation purposes rather than for practical military necessity. 
Arnold was not alone in embracing Douhetian applications.  Eisenhower, was 
a proponent of such actions as long as they would hasten the end of the conflict.  In 
his role as the supreme allied commander, Eisenhower saw strategic bombing 
promising a way to accelerate Nazi Germany’s capitulation and shorten the war.  
Eisenhower’s primary concern over the defeat of the Nazi state made him a 
pragmatist regarding the use of force.  While Ike did not necessarily embrace 
wholesale Douhetian applications for the sake of creating destruction, he was willing 
to accept them in order to meet his strategic aim. 
In addition to redirecting the strategic bombing effort to support the tactical 
fight during the D-Day operations in Northern France, Eisenhower’s pragmatism is 
evident in August 1944 when Lieutenant General Spaatz wrote to the Supreme 
Commander regarding the aforementioned RAF plan to bomb Berlin.  The raid 
specifically targeted German morale and its stated goal was to achieve “in a single 
blow the complete devastation of the administrative and governmental centre of 
Berlin.”81  The plan envisioned that this raid could kill or seriously injure two 
hundred and seventy five thousand people.82  Called THUNDERCLAP, the plan 
included a particularly Douhetian intent as it specified, “whole populations of Berlin 
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would be spectators of the catastrophe, and, in the state of the war which has been 
postulated, the effect might be decisive.”83 
Spaatz disliked the premise behind THUNDERCLAP and expressed his 
opinions to Eisenhower.  On August 24, 1944, Spaatz reminded the Supreme 
Commander, “The U.S. bombing policy, as you know, has been directed against 
precision military objectives, and not morale.  I am opposed to this operation as now 
planned.  We are prepared to participate in an operation against Berlin, but in so 
doing will select targets for attack of military importance.”84  In response to Spaatz’s 
letter, on August 28, Eisenhower replied, “While I have always insisted that the U.S. 
Strategic Air Forces be directed against precision targets, I am always prepared to 
take part in anything that gives real promise to ending the war quickly.  The policies 
under which you are now operating will be unchanged unless an opportunity arises 
where a sudden and devastating blow may have an incalculable result.”85 
On September 9, Eisenhower directed Spaatz to conduct the raid when given 
the order.  However, the approval of the operation was to coincide with another 
Allied operation and Eisenhower was hoping that the bombing raid could exacerbate 
the effects of the airborne assault of Operation MARKET GARDEN.86  MARKET 
GARDEN was a British plan that utilized airborne forces to try isolating German 
forces in the Netherlands and Belgium by securing bridges and associated road 
networks.  If successful, allied forces would then have a shorter route into Germany 
and establish a base of operations for subsequent offensives.  Since the MARKET 
GARDEN operation was a failure, the THUNDERCLAP raid, with its promising 
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effects, was postponed.  When finally conducted, on February 3, 1945, the raid 
coincided with a Soviet ground offensive in the Eastern Front in hopes of heightening 
the effects of the Russian attack. 
Spaatz directed the Eighth Air Force to bomb Berlin in the hope that the 
THUNDERCLAP mission would succeed despite his initial misgivings.87  When the 
Army Air Force bombers raided Berlin, bombardiers aimed their bombs both visually 
and by radar at specific targets.88  Included in the target set were not only the rail 
yards at Tempelhof, but also public and political structures such as the Schlesischer 
rail station, the Air Ministry, Reich Chancellery, the Foreign office, and the Gestapo 
headquarters.89 
Although the raid disrupted daily life in Berlin, Operation THUNDERCLAP 
did not prove to be the decisive blow that the RAF had envisioned and the infamous 
Dresden raid conducted ten days later quickly overshadowed it.  While the Dresden 
raid captured the press’s attention, mostly because of the inflation of casualty figures 
by Nazi propaganda, the THUNDERCLAP episode not only provided insight into the 
attitude of the Supreme Allied Commander, but also tells of the willingness of the 
U.S. Strategic Air Force Commander to order such a raid.  Despite Spaatz’s 
reservations regarding this type of bombing, his actions indicate the fine line the 
USAAF was walking with regard to precision bombardment and the requirements of 
the Allied war effort.  Furthermore, under the auspices of Eisenhower’s desire to end 
the war quickly, bombing German cities daily became a common practice and served 
as the rationale for subsequent raids.90  
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After the Dresden firestorm and the negative press it received, the USAAF 
reiterated its policy regarding bombing doctrine and attempted to distance itself from 
the RAF methodology.  In dealing with a possible public backlash, Supreme Allied 
Headquarters decided to reply to any inquiries by stating, “There had been no change 
in bombing policy, the U.S. Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF) had always directed their 
attacks against military objectives and would continue to do so.”91  The discussions 
over the Dresden raid, and to a smaller degree, the Berlin raids raised the issue about 
the kind of bombing the USAAF was conducting.  However, these discussions 
produced no large-scale inquiries that addressed bombing practices falling outside 
established USAAF doctrine.92  Throughout the bombing campaign in Europe, Air 
Force leadership continued to extol the virtues of precision and denied deliberate 
“terror bombing” or area bombardment practices.  While the original USAAF intent 
avoided the moral dilemma of Douhetian bombing, the reality of the Combined 
Bombing Offensive did not match the doctrine publicly advertised. 
European Theater commanders were not the only individuals who approved 
attacks on civilians.  General George C. Marshall, Army chief of staff, who was an 
early advocate for an independent U.S. air force, also saw value in Douhetian 
applications and gave his implicit approval to another Douhetian effort, Operation 
CLARION.  CLARION was a combined U.S.-British effort to use Allied airpower 
and scour all of Germany and attack transportation assets, infrastructure, and 
equipment.  Most of the targets included road and rail networks located in small 
towns that had remained relatively untouched by the strategic bombing offensive.93  
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When briefed about the CLARION plan and the wide-ranging nature of the operation, 
Marshall, who was at the Yalta Conference, suggested that in addition to the recent 
raids on Berlin, “[targeting] Munich would probably be of great benefit because it 
would show the people that are being evacuated to Munich that there is no hope.”94 
Marshall’s statement regarding the CLARION plan and his implied approval 
of this operation hints at a willingness to support attacks upon civilian populations 
and morale at the highest levels of the U.S. military.95  His acceptance of Douhetian 
type operations was evident earlier in the war when discussing the potential of 
bombing Japan cities.  In a 1941 meeting, he argued, “There won’t be any hesitation 
about bombing civilians-it will be all out.”96  While Marshall himself did not pick 
target sets nor did he have a hand in daily bombing operations, he left these decisions 
to commanders who were willing to embrace Douhetian practices and had no 
objection to such operations.97  
The rationale for launching CLARION was also tied to the apparent loss of 
Allied offensive momentum in late 1944.  Just as Eisenhower had approved 
THUNDERCLAP in concert with MARKET GARDEN, CLARION was approved in 
reaction to a late German offensive in the west.  On December 16, the Germans 
launched their last-ditch effort in the Ardennes Forest near Luxemburg.  Designed to 
thwart Ike’s ground offensive and split the Allied forces, the “Battle of the Bulge” 
reminded that Allies that the war was not yet won. 
By January 1945, the German advance was thoroughly defeated; however, the 
repercussions of this Wehrmacht assault reverberated throughout the Allied High 
 68 
Command.  The December attack gave the Allies the impression that the final victory 
over the Nazi state was still beyond reach.  As a result, in February Eisenhower 
approved CLARION in hopes of accelerating Nazi Germany’s defeat, despite its 
Douhetian character.98  During the high point in the Ardennes fighting, at a USSTAF 
staff meeting on December 23, General Spaatz told RAF Air Chief Marshall Arthur 
Tedder that the forces under U.S. command were prepared to execute CLARION 
when required.99  In this vein, U.S. commanders willingly conducted operations that 
fell outside of existing doctrine in order to attain their strategic objective.  Concerns 
over a prolonged ground offensive provided the Allied Commander sufficient cause 
for operations like CLARION and THUNDERCLAP. 
THUNDERCLAP and CLARION did not prove to be the culminating blow, 
but the raids certainly subscribed to a Douhetian methodology.  Given the situation at 
the time, and both Eisenhower’s and Marshall’s concern over a potential loss of 
Allied momentum, the execution of CLARION was viewed as a military necessity.  
The operation, in retrospect, could appear simply as an attempt by the Allies to kill 
and harm German civilians indiscriminately.  However, given the tactical situation in 
late 1944/early 1945 and the state of the Western European offensive, the approval of 
such raids by Allied leaders was both prudent and practical.  The apparent loss of 
momentum in the western front and the desire to conclude the war as quickly as 
possible provided another impetus for the change in bombing operations. 
In conjunction with the approval from Allied military leaders, the American 
national leadership also sanctioned the change in bombing methods.  While not 
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overtly approving Douhetian practices, President Roosevelt implicitly approved the 
transition of USAAF bombing applications.  At the same 1943 Casablanca 
Conference that outlined the objectives of the Combined Bombing Offensive, the 
president broached the topic of the Axis’ “unconditional surrender” with Churchill.  
The term helped set the stage for both European and Pacific bombing operations.  
Many argue that the declaration of the unconditional surrender mandate was more an 
extemporaneous quip than an attempt to establish a deliberate goal and end state.100  
Some accounts claim that Churchill was surprised at FDR’s utterance of the term and 
was unaware that the President was going to voice such a statement.  Adding to the 
spontaneity argument is the fact that the final press release for the conference failed to 
include the term unconditional surrender, although it was included in a draft 
release.101 
Regardless of its possible spontaneity, unconditional surrender represented 
American war aims and was indicative of U.S. attitudes toward the enemy, 
international relations, national politics, and served as the rallying cry for the war 
effort.102  The term implied not just the defeat of the Axis powers militarily but called 
for the enemy’s complete political acquiesce to Allied will and power.  The condition, 
some argue, prolonged the conflict and caused needless deaths while precluding a 
potential political compromise.  However, given the nature of Hitler’s war aims and 
the ruthlessness of Japanese occupations, a negotiated compromise would have been 
hard to fathom.  The enmity resident and goals of each side effectively precluded any 
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chance of a political settlement that could have spanned ideological, political, and 
sociological gaps. 
Prior to World War II, European wars during recent history ended with some 
kind of negotiated peace between the combatants.103  World War I and the Treat of 
Versailles was the latest example of a negotiated peace.  However, fresh with the 
memory of World War I comprises, unconditional surrender implied assurances that 
no deals would be made that could potentially sow the seeds for another war or leave 
any outstanding issues unresolved.  The use of this term established a precedent for 
modern war and allowed for no compromise of the goals and objectives of the Allied 
forces.104  As a result, the Americans and their Allies were fully committed to the 
destruction of the Axis states, their armies, and their political entities. 
Furthermore, the term served as an uncomplicated and clear message for 
public address, provided assurance to a suspicious Soviet state that the western Allies 
were in for the long haul, and provided the ideological foundation for the Allied 
effort.105  The term’s primary importance lay in its galvanizing the Allies and their 
purpose at a time when they had no specific terms for the end of hostilities.106  The 
term helped frame Allied goals and objectives and turned the war into a moral 
crusade against fascism and expansionist tyranny.  
FDR believed that “peace can come to the world only by the total elimination 
of German and Japanese war power. . . . This means the unconditional surrender of 
Germany, Italy, and Japan.”107  This particular condition for the end of hostilities had 
broad implications for Allied military action as it meant the complete defeat and 
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annihilation of Hitler and the Nazi regime with no possibility of co-existence or 
compromise.108 
These terms equated to the total crushing of the Nazi state, leaving no room 
for another revival of the German Dolchtoss (stab in the back) excuse used so 
effectively after World War I.109  Many in the U.S. government believed that the 
failure to achieve a complete surrender of Germany in World War I had sewn the 
seeds for the next one.  The demand for an unconditional surrender of the Nazi state 
in World War II would prevent another conflict with Germany in the future.  
However, the unconditional surrender requirement carried an implied tasking.  This 
term created an environment that enabled Douhetian applications during the 
combined bombing offensive.  The term unconditional surrender not only implied the 
destruction of Nazi political and military organizations, but also insinuated the 
physical destruction of Germany.  
Prior to the war, FDR was an early advocate of airpower.  As Commander-in-
Chief, he established the precedent for the growth of the Army Air Force and 
especially its bomber fleet in the late 1930s.  Even before the war had begun, 
Roosevelt pressed Congress and American industry to increase aircraft production.  In 
May 1940, he suggested that the US needed to produce “At least fifty thousand planes 
a year.”110  Having great faith in American production and economic capability, FDR 
saw that the best way of ensuring an Allied victory was to produce as much war 
material as possible.111  In support of this effort during the early 1940s, he established 
aircraft production goals with an emphasis on bomber aircraft.  In April 1942, he 
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promised, “soon American Flying Fortresses would be fighting for the liberation of 
the darkened continent of Europe.”112  This claim is indicative of his initial support of 
strategic bombing and the importance of the bomber fleet. 
FDR also saw efficiency in aerial bombardment because as he saw it, “This 
kind of war would cost less money, would mean comparatively few casualties, and 
would be more likely to succeed than a traditional war by land and sea.”113  In this 
light, FDR subscribed to certain aspects of Douhetian thought and hoped for a 
relatively quick war that would avoid the misery and endless violence experienced 
during World War I.  Despite his advocacy for the production of aircraft and belief in 
a quicker war by use of airpower, Roosevelt never specifically commented about the 
efficacy of strategic bombing and avoided queries regarding the damage the bombing 
offensive was creating.114  While never overt, his comments regarding bombing were 
always indirectly supportive.  However, his push for more bombers, increased aircraft 
production, the expansion of the Army Air Force, and unconditional surrender were 
key steps in the development of U.S. strategic bombing development and its 
subsequent transition. 
FDR harbored no guilt over the damage inflicted upon the Germans and the 
Nazi state.  Despite his earlier condemnation of the Soviet Union’s use of bombers 
against Finland, the president believed that Germany and its population needed to be 
punished for its aggression.  The president thought that most people in the U.S. and 
England erroneously believed that only a few Nazi leaders were responsible for the 
war, not the entire German nation.115  In August 1944 when discussing post conflict 
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Germany with his Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, the president 
remarked, “The German people as a whole must have it driven home to them that a 
whole nation has been engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of 
modern civilization.”116  He wanted to the “tough with Germany” and have them 
understand “the fact that they are a defeated nation, collectively and individually, 
must be so impressed upon them they will hesitate to start any new war.”117 
By harboring such animosity toward Germans and holding them collectively 
responsible, FDR showed he had little or no remorse for the destruction the U.S. 
bombing effort was creating.  He believed that Germany must be taught a lesson and 
that they could not continue in this pattern of military action.  In his mind, the defeat 
of the Germans must be thorough, complete, and transcend generations.  FDR’s 
successor Harry Truman shared this sentiment and upon the new presidents return 
from Potsdam declared, “The German people are beginning to atone for the crimes of 
the gangsters whom they placed in power and whom they wholeheartedly approved 
and obediently followed.”118 
Other evidence of FDR’s approval of bombing methodologies came in his 
establishment of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey effort.  On September 9, 1944, 
FDR wrote to Secretary of War Henry Stimson suggesting, “It would be valuable in 
connection with air attacks on Japan and for post war planning to obtain an impartial 
and expert study of the effects on Germany which was authorized in enlarged scale as 
the Combined Bombing Offensive at the Casablanca Conference.”119  In this study, 
the president directed elements of the U.S. government to capture information on 
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enemy rates of production and the problems associated with shattered infrastructures.  
He also hoped to obtain “Some indication of the psychological and morale effect on 
an interior community.”120  By signing a letter to study the results of “psychological 
and morale effect” FDR was at least acknowledging raids targeted these areas and 
objectives.121  This singular act proves that FDR was at least cognizant of Douhetian 
bombing and had at least an awareness of its consequences. 
As the war in Europe unfolded, commanders in the theater and at home 
accepted pragmatic solutions to operational and strategic challenges.  Historian 
Ronald Schaffer correctly identified this idea by arguing, “the most important factor 
moving the [US]AAF toward Douhetian war the attitude of the country’s top civilian 
and military leaders.”122  This pragmatism was evident in the attitude of Arnold who 
pushed for bombing results and sought to make a name for the USAAF.123  Likewise, 
Spaatz willingly ordered area type attacks and oversaw bombing operations that fell 
outside USAAF doctrine.  Eisenhower and Marshall, who both wanted to conclude 
the war as quickly as possible, saw merit in Douhetian practices.124  FDR, who saw 
bombing as new dimension of warfare, gave his implicit approval of USAAF 
bombing practices to punish the Germans for their aggressiveness.125  All of these 
men had a role to play and contributed to this transition.  While their pragmatic 
rationales were understandable given the situation, there is no doubt that their 
individual and collective influences facilitated the movement from precision 
bombardment to wholesale attack.  Either directly or indirectly, these men had a hand 
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in the development of Douhetian bombing practices over Germany.  However, these 
men alone were not solely responsible for transition of bombing applications. 
____________________________________________ 
Public Perceptions 
The transition of Air Force practices to Douhetian application in the European 
Theater occurred also because of other factors and influences.  The framers of the Air 
War Planning Documents envisioned the possibility of targeting populations and 
bombing large-scale areas.  This placeholder in the planning documents that foresaw 
targeting civilian populations became a reality not only because of the reasons already 
discussed, but also from the approbation of the American public.  American citizens 
provided support for such methodologies despite the moral dichotomy.  While public 
approval for the bombing campaign did not in itself create the transition, it facilitated 
the changeover toward Douhetian methodologies. 
Despite America’s relatively small casualty figures during World War II when 
compared to other nations, another motivation for the transition of bombing practices 
was the desire to mitigate U.S. deaths.126  Since bombers and their payloads contained 
more firepower than traditional ground units did, they could theoretically inflict more 
damage upon an enemy.  As a result, bombers were seen by some as a catalyst for the 
resolution process.  Much like Douhet had imagined airpower’s ability to shorten 
wars, Americans believed that strategic bombing could reduce overall casualty rates 
by creating sufficient enemy fatalities, thus resulting in a shorter war.  Even in such 
Douhetian raids as Operation THUNDERCLAP, the sparing of Allied forces was one 
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of the intentions and motivations for the bombing campaign.  This premise is evident 
in the opening paragraph of the THUNDERCLAP operations order as it speculated, 
“If the operation should succeed in curtailing the duration of the war by even a few 
weeks it would save many thousands of Allied casualties and would justify itself 
many times over.”127 
Furthermore, technological fascination was widespread in the U.S. during the 
interwar years and served as an impetus for many aviation advances.  Most 
Americans were excited about the technological breakthroughs of the time and saw 
these advancements as an indication of American progress, society, and 
civilization.128  These technological developments, combined with the mass 
production of consumer products, changed the very nature of American life and the 
way they viewed the future.129  General Arnold too was an advocate of technological 
development and attempted to leverage scientific and engineering advances as much 
as possible.  He thought, as did many Americans, that the U.S. should leverage 
technology to the greatest extent possible.  With the increase of technological 
prowess, airpower by the beginning of the war too had matured and grown more 
powerful and could be employed more selectively than ground or naval forces.130 
Throughout the inter-war years, advances in aeronautical engineering, radar, 
navigation, and weapons development held promise for a quicker and more decisive 
victory.  The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics and the Naval Research 
Laboratory provided a yeoman service during this period and provided the U.S. with 
a significant lead in innovation and engineering.131  Both of these organizations laid 
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the foundations and set the stage for a military that was quick to access new 
technologies and apply them on the battlefield.132  As a result, most in the U.S. 
believed that new technology could, and should, spare American lives and bring 
closure to the war as soon as possible.133 
In addition to the growing infatuation with technology and aviation, 
developing public support for the war and ensuring that Americans understood the 
reasons why the U.S. was involved in the conflict was of paramount importance to the 
federal government and to FDR.  Many Americans in both the federal government 
and in the private sector believed that the U.S. needed its own information campaign 
to counter the Nazi propaganda machine and mobilize public opinion for the war.134  
So important was public support that in June 1942 FDR established the Office of War 
Information (OWI) under the direction of Elmer Davis.  The OWIs main function was 
to coordinate government information activities, liaison with the press, radio, and 
motion picture industries, and communicate American war aims to the general 
population and to the world.135  In this endeavor, the OWI conducted an American 
version of a propaganda campaign designed to stir emotions and cultivate American 
domestic support for the war effort.  While the American effort based its message on 
truths wrapped in patriotic tones, the OWI produced movies, radio broadcasts, and 
published articles and pamphlets declaring the superiority of democracy over fascist 
totalitarianism.136  All of the OWI’s messages portrayed the image of a powerful 
American nation that was fighting against nefarious and evil powers that threatened 
democratic states. 
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Most of the messages publicized by the OWI were simplistic and trite but 
extolled the virtue of the nation’s industrial might and military efforts through a 
multi-media effort.137  A significant endeavor for the OWI was to coordinate the 
message sent to the public through motion pictures.  In this effort, the OWI sought to 
influence the studios and executives in Hollywood so they would produce films 
supportive of the war.  While Hollywood maintained its independence and artistic 
license, studios harmonized their efforts with government messages that largely 
supported OWI approved themes. 
In order to help Hollywood produce films that supported these governmental 
themes, the OWI consistently produced guidance on how studios could help in the 
war effort, participated in executive meetings regarding story lines, and reviewed 
scripts and screenplays.138  In this endeavor, the OWI outlined five prevailing 
messages that it believed need to be publicized to the American population: Why we 
fight; the enemy; the united nations (meaning the Allied effort); the home front; and 
the fighting forces.139   
For the European Theater, the OWI preferred to focus upon anti-fascist 
themes rather than racial stereotypes.  In this regard, the Germans were given some 
respect and differentiations were made between “good Germans” and “bad 
Germans.”140  OWI generally approved of films that addressed the brutality of the 
Nazis in occupied territories and contrasted it with prewar peace.141  Movies such as 
This Land is Mine (RKO, 1943), The Cross of Lorraine (MGM, 1943), Hangmen 
Also Die (United Artists, 1943), and the classic Bogart film Casablanca (Warner 
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Brothers, 1942) all portrayed the draconian nature of Nazi occupation and its 
murderous ways.  Even Tarzan got into the act as Johnny Weissmuller once again 
played the king of the apes in Tarzan Triumphs (RKO, 1942).  In this film Tarzan 
rallies the local population near his jungle, to include the animals who evidently were 
able to differentiate between Germans and the Allies, to “Kill Nadzies” who were 
trying to exploit natural resources for the German war effort.142  While Germans 
could be considered good or bad, the idea that Nazism was such a malevolent 
phenomenon would no doubt influenced Americans to accept the bombing of German 
cities.  While it could be argued that “good Germans” were being killed in these raids, 
the lack of public outcry over the bombing effort in Europe indicates an acceptance of 
the realities of war and the bombing campaign. 
Radio too became an effective medium as quick one-minute transcriptions 
plugged the war effort and leveraged popular radio personalities of the day who 
reminded Americans of the seriousness of the war effort.143  Furthermore, the OWI 
published pamphlets and small booklets that conveyed patriotic temperament and 
praised Allied war efforts.  The office also aimed its efforts at overseas readers and 
published a periodical entitled Victory that informed other nationalities as to 
American war progress.144  
Over time, the ideals and themes disseminated by the OWI and other federal 
agencies became the accepted view most Americans had regarding the war.145  
Through a mixture of both patriotism and profit, Hollywood became complicit it the 
war effort by helping to generate sufficient public enmity and animosity toward the 
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Axis enemy.146  Despite the over-inflated tones and the images published by the OWI 
and other governmental entities, Americans began to embrace these idealized 
messages and saw them as a reflection of the larger American society.147  Because of 
these propaganda efforts, the American public became conditioned to support the war 
effort and its military commanders.  This in turn generated overwhelming public 
approval of Allied action and resulted in very little dissent from the wider-held 
opinions.  However, these patriotic messages were not the sole realm of the federal 
government, but echoed by commercial enterprise, independent news agencies, and 
popular magazines. 
This predisposition of the U.S. citizen to support the military served to enable 
the transition of USAAF bombing practices.  Throughout the bombing campaign the 
American public raised no large protest or objections to the effects of the bombing 
offensive and largely supported its actions.  However, the execution of the bombing 
campaign and the doctrine advertised by the Army Air Force created a dichotomy in 
the public realm that largely went unnoticed.  While the Army Air Force publicized 
its raids as “precision,” popular periodicals of the time often praised the widespread 
damage seen in Germany.  As early as December 1943, one popular magazine ran an 
article entitled “Germany’s Choice - Quit or Be Destroyed!”148  The article made 
repeated references to the amount of destruction dealt upon the Nazis, while still 
touting the Air Force precision bombing methods.  Interestingly, this article belies 
precision applications as it also reported that “the death and destruction of vast 
sections of enemy cities [was] unavoidable.”149  A November 1943 Saturday Evening 
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Post article quoted one Air Force officer who boldly stated, “The German people 
must make their choice, surrender or total ruin.”150  The printing of the “total ruin” 
quip at least hints at a bombing methodology that was less than precise, widespread in 
effect, and with an expectation that this was a lauded attribute of the bombing efforts. 
A review of Time magazine from early 1943 to June 1945 found no articles 
that called into question the amount of devastation the bombing offensive was 
creating.  Rather, the articles published usually lauded the air raids and their effects 
while raising no moral objections to the Air Force’s efforts.  Repeatedly, these stories 
provided an embedded approval of bombing efforts and praised the heroism of the 
aircrews conducting these raids.  Even after the infamous Dresden raid in February 
1945, the March 5, issue of Time magazine reported that the city was “a main feeder 
point for the Silesian front” and made no mention of civilian casualties.151  
Furthermore, in the March report the periodical attempted to validate the purpose 
behind the raid.  Time address the controversy regarding the Dresden firestorm, but 
did not question the bombing methodology.  At the end of the war, the VE Day 
supplement to the Pittsburgh Sun-Telegraph newspaper included a cartoon that 
depicted a formation of bomber aircraft in the shape of a large finger pointed at the 
Japanese rising sun as they flew over a smoldering Germany.  Accompanying the 
formation was the word “DOOM.”152 
During the European bombing offensive, USAAF Generals Eaker and Spaatz 
were on the covers of the magazine with accompanying stories portraying them in a 
hagiographic manner.  Both articles were largely human-interest pieces providing 
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insight into these men and their characters, and having decidedly optimistic tones.  In 
the Spaatz piece, Time portrayed the general as a card-playing gambler who was 
paving the way for a new form of warfare while harboring a disdain for Germans.  
Equally positive, the Eaker story reported that he was a soft-spoken man with a core 
of hardness and tenacity.  The background artwork on the covers of the respective 
magazine itself hints at a Douhetian methodology by displaying bombs raining down 
in the background behind portraits of the generals.  
However, after the Berlin and Dresden raid the Germans were vociferous in 
their claims against the Allies regarding “terror bombing.”153  In response, the AP 
new service ran an article that specifically stated, “Allied air commanders have made 
the long awaited decision to adopt deliberate terror bombing of the great German 
populations centers as a ruthless expedient to hasten Hitler’s doom.”154  This story led 
to a flurry of internal USAAF discussion and messages addressing the bombing of 
German cities.155  This story initiated a doctrinal crisis within the organization, but in 
the end changed little regarding bombing methodologies.  While the story certainly 
ran counter to what the USAAF public statements, it did not result in any significant 
repudiation of bombing applications by the public nor did it change popular sentiment 
regarding the strategic effort. 
When Spaatz returned to the continental U.S. following VE Day he, along 
with General Omar Bradley, other Army generals and returning veterans, were treated 
to a parade and a heroes’ welcome.  The front page of the Philadelphia Daily News 
headline for June 4, 1945 read “500,000 OUT TO HAIL GENERALS” and 
 83 
prominently featured pictures of him and Bradley.156  Accompanying the parade was 
a flyover with the newspaper reporting, “Roaring overhead . . . will be . . . 100 giant 
B-29s and B-17s, the great planes which are laying waste to the once ambitious 
Japanese empire.”157 
Like Time magazine, the New York Times echoed similar sentiment of the 
bomber offensive.  During the same period, articles consistently reported, in a 
positive manner, the progress of the bombing campaign.  Columns in the New York 
Times were full of descriptions praising the Air Force and the damage it had inflicted 
upon German cities.  When Dresden was bombed, the paper published a skeptical 
view of German casualty and damage reports and said, “The Germans pulled out all 
the stops on the sympathy propaganda, reporting that Dresden has been turned into a 
heap of ruins.”158  In this same article, the author defensively speculates that the city’s 
cultural artifacts were safe and that pointed out that as in France and Britain, these 
irreplaceable items and artwork had probably “Long since [been] removed to safety 
vaults.”159  
This pro-bombardment sentiment of the New York Times was clearly resident 
in an op-ed piece published on March 8, 1944.  The newspaper printed rebuttal to 
prominent pacifist and anti war advocate, Vera Brittain who, along with twenty-eight 
members of the clergy, protested the war and called the strategic offensive “massacre 
by bombing.”160  The editors of the paper met this lone voice of dissent with 
indignation.  In response to Ms. Brittain, the editors replied rather curtly “We should 
leave tactics and strategies to the generals hoping they can be as merciful as they can. 
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. . . But let us not deceive ourselves into thinking that war can be made humane.”161  
Furthermore, another printed response to Ms. Brittan’s protest asked, “Just how in 
Earth they [Ms. Brittan and her fellow protestors] expect to achieve their highly 
valued justice, tolerance, humanity, brotherhood, and tenderness without socking the 
rapacious German nation with every pound of explosives available they do not 
say.”162  While the paper provided a forum for discussion, the responses to Ms. 
Brittain were telling.  Both the responses argued in support of the ongoing 
bombardment and an acceptance for USAAF efforts.  These counter arguments to Ms. 
Brittain reflected contemporary American thought regarding bombing.   
Concurrently the USAAF created its own publication entitled Impact that 
looked very similar to the more popular Life magazine.  Impact routinely printed 
pictures and published positive stories regarding the bombing effort and the effect it 
was having on the Axis.  In addition to reporting the developments of the air war in 
all theaters of the war, the periodical published pictures that were telling of the 
devastation in Germany because of the air assault.  Moreover, like its civilian 
counterparts, Impact still referenced precision applications when addressing the 
strategic effort.  While Impact’s distribution was limited and was not intended for 
distribution to the general public, it was widely circulated among Air Force personnel 
without concern for moral indignation over its content. 
In addition to the features and articles, civilian magazines regularly printed 
advertisements for businesses supportive of Army Air Force efforts and the bombing 
campaign.  Many small manufacturers linked their companies to the air offensive as a 
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way to promote their products.  Companies such as Nicholson Files, Yale Locks, and 
South Wind Heaters, and a host of others advertised their connection to the USAAF 
to bolster their sales and reputations.  In addition, many larger manufacturers that 
produced components and parts used in airframes for the bombing effort also 
advertised their association with the Air Force.  General Electric, AC Delco, 
Studebaker, Texaco, and General Motors all publicized how their products supported 
the bombing campaign and aircraft designs.  Since these companies willingly tied 
their products to the bombing effort for increased sales, these ads are indicative of a 
widespread approval of USAAF operations in the eye of the American public.  
The USAAF itself made deliberate public relations efforts by printing a book 
in late 1943 called Target: Germany that covered the exploits of the Eighth Air Force 
during its first year.  Copies of this book also included advertisements from local 
venders who helped to sponsor the printing of the manuscript.  Additionally famous 
literary author John Steinbeck wrote in support the USAAF cause.  In 1942 he 
published Bombs Away: The Story of a Bomber Team.  The work outlined how the 
USAAF trained bomber crews and the responsibilities of each crewmember based 
upon their assignment in the airplane.  In the preface of the book Steinbeck wrote, 
“The Air Force proves the stupidity of the bewildered Europeans, who seeing this 
nation at peace, imagined that it was degenerate, who seeing that we fought and 
quarreled in our politics, took this indication of our energy as a sign of our decadence.  
The fortresses and B-24s, the Airacobras, and P-47s have by now disillusioned 
them.”163 
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Figure 6, 7, 8.  Advertisement excerpts from the Saturday Evening Post and Colliers.  Left: Studebaker 
Ad, July 11, 1942, Collier’s.  Center: Yale Lock Co. Ad, November 6, 1943, Saturday Evening Post.  
Right: South Wind Heater Ad, February 17, 1945, Saturday Evening Post. 
 
 
Even Hollywood got into the act as Oscar winning director Bill Wyler 
produced a documentary called Memphis Bell, named for the nose art of the bomber, 
extolling the accomplishments of the first B-17 crew to complete its full compliment 
of twenty-five missions with no crew losses.  This forty-five minute documentary was 
deftly crafted to depict the bombing effort in the best light possible and highlight the 
sacrifice of the many aircrews.  Additionally, Walt Disney made an animated feature 
of de Seversky’s best selling book on airpower that was equally popular on the big 
screen.164  Furthermore, big box office stars such as Jimmy Stewart and Clark Gable 
also participated by joining the USAAF.  In fact, Stewart became a skilled combat 
commander and eventually rose to the rank of general in the Air Force Reserves.  In 
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all, American popular culture willingly embraced and praised the accomplishments of 
the strategic air offensive and largely felt no remorse for its consequences. 
American approval of the strategic bombing campaign and the damage it 
created is also evident in Gallup polls taken during the war.  In a March 1944 survey, 
Gallup asked the question: “If military leaders believe it will be necessary to bomb 
historic religious buildings and shrines in Europe, would you approve or disapprove 
of their bombing them?”165  74 percent of Americans answered in the affirmative 
while only 19 percent disapproved.166  Along this same line of thinking, when queried 
in January 1943: “If Hitler offered peace now to all countries on the basis of not 
going farther, but of leaving matters as they are now, would you favor or oppose such 
a peace?”167  An overwhelming 92 percent of Americans opposed such an offer.168  
These figures not only illustrate the American sentiment regarding bombing 
applications but also show the clear disdain Americans had for the Axis. 
As a result, during the Combined Bombing Offensive military leaders did not 
have to consider public scrutiny or concern themselves with moral indignation when 
planning bombing raids and their effects.  The bombing of German cities was not a 
contentious issue among Americans and posed no moral difficulties.  When reviewing 
public opinion polls of the period, the specific question about the bombing of Axis 
cities and populations is conspicuously absent.  Apart from the aforementioned 1944 
query regarding historic religious buildings, polls were largely silent on the matter of 
bombing.169  The issue regarding the morality of bombing Germans cities, even after 
the Dresden raid, was not addressed.  The only questions that were evident regarding 
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bombing, save for the aforementioned query, during the war centered on the dropping 
of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the answer to that question was 
overwhelmingly in favor of their use.  The absence of questions and polls relating to 
the morality of the bombing effort is in itself indicative of the lack of American 
concern regarding Douhetian applications.170 
While the Dresden raid made some headlines and forced the Air Force to re-
iterate its established, pre-war bombing doctrine, the American population largely 
condoned the widespread damage and embraced the potential that airpower had for 
the defeat of Nazi Germany.  The issues regarding the morality of the bombing effort 
in Europe was largely an individual concern, if it was a concern at all.  Even Dr. 
Norman Vincent Peale, leader of the Reformed Church in America and author of the 
popular book The Power of Positive Thinking, in February 1944 declared that the 
bombing of Germany was “retributive justice” and that “Berlin and other German 
cities should be bombed.”171  Additionally, and in response to Vera Brittan’s 
protestations over the bombing effort, the Bishop of New York, William T. Manning 
responded, “If war is to be shortened and the world freed from this assault of brutality 
and terror, what substitute can the signers of this protest suggest for the bombing of 
cities which are military objectives, terrible and grievous as we all feel this to be.”172  
In these instances, even prominent members of the clergy provided approbation of the 
bombing campaign and its effects.  Furthermore, these comments also insinuate that 
the bombing effort posed no significant dilemma to contemporary Americans 
regarding civilian casualties. 
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The issue regarding the morality of bombing, for both civilian and military 
alike, was a matter of perception that required each individual to determine its ethics.  
However, for the vast amount of the American population, they harbored no ill will or 
indignation toward their government or the Army Air Force.  The prevailing 
sentiment of the American people favored bombing efforts and lauded the strategic 
campaign.  By reviewing print, media, and other elements of popular culture of both 
the government and private sector, it is obvious that the moral dilemma surrounding 
bombing posed no significant problems for the USAAF.  Through explicit or implicit 
means, Americans gave their approval for the transition to Douhetian applications and 
supported this new dimension and application of warfare. 
____________________________________________ 
Legacy of the European Theater 
The results of the Combined Bombing Offensive were impressive if not stark.  
In the end, Allied airpower dropped approximately 2,700,000 tons of bombs and flew 
1,440,000 bomber sorties.173  While the numbers of Allied aircrew killed or missing 
was comparatively high to other theaters of war, this air armada alone accounted for 
the destruction of 3,600,000 houses, killed 300,000 civilians, wounded 7,800,000, and 
made approximated 7,500,000 homeless.174  Additionally, the infrastructure of the 
German state was razed, its buildings devastated, and its production capabilities 
destroyed or at least severely curtailed.  Given the ratio of the size of bomber force 
compared to the destruction it created, Douhetian applications had become a reality. 
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The widespread destruction wrought by the bombing offensive was a reminder 
that despite American moral and ethical proclivities, the pragmatism and the 
exigencies of war over ruled doctrine, theory, and principle.  Realties of war won out 
over peacetime theory and ideation.  Regardless of the destruction wrought upon 
Germany, the numbers generated by the European bombing effort pale in comparison 
to what followed in Pacific Theater and what was planned in the event of nuclear war. 
The Combined Bombing Offensive in the European Theater of Operations 
provided invaluable experience for the USAAF and had an impact upon the conduct 
of strategic bombing operations in the Pacific.  According to Hansell, the strategy 
underlying the bombing of Japan was similar to that applied against Germany.  The 
Pacific strategy was “to defeat the enemy air force and to weaken the Japanese 
capability and will to fight as to cause capitulation or permit occupation against 
disorganized resistance, failing this, to make an invasion feasible at a minimum 
cost.”175  In conjunction with this strategy, a number of personal legacies from the 
European Combined Bombing Offensive had an impact upon the Pacific Theater 
bombing campaign.  These legacies are not so much from tactics, techniques and 
procedures regarding bombing application; rather these influences are largely from a 
strategic standpoint as the experiences of the European effort provided context and 
perspectives regarding bombing. 
While the stated objectives for the Pacific bombing campaign were reflective 
of those of the Combined Bombing Offensive in Europe, the leadership for the 20th 
Air Force was composed of individuals who had gained their experience from the 
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European Theater of Operations.  General Curtis LeMay, who became the 
Commander of the XX Bomber Command in China and subsequently XXI Bomber 
Command in the Marianas, was largely responsible for the firebombing of Japanese 
cites in the spring and summer of 1945 gained this operational experience in the 
European Theater.  LeMay became a key figure in the American strategic bombing 
efforts and developed many of the concepts utilized by the USAAF in World War II, 
and subsequently by the newly formed USAF.  LeMay’s impact and influence upon 
American strategic bombing methodology is incalculable.  Not only did LeMay 
establish operational precedents during the war, but his ideas and temperament were 
key in the shaping and creation of the strategic bomber fleet during the early years of 
the Cold War. 
Trained as both a navigator and a pilot, and well versed in the skills of a 
bombardier, LeMay was a talented airman who developed the “box formation” for the 
Eighth Air Force in Europe that maximized B-17 defensive fires in order to increase 
bomber protection.  He was also responsible for the establishment of new bomb run 
procedures when the aircraft passed over their initial point (IP) and were enroute to 
the target.  As commander of the 305th Bomb Group in England, he gave standing 
orders that the group was to remain on a straight flight path during the final bomb run 
and avoid any evasive defensive maneuvering.  This tactic was at the potential 
expense of higher aircraft and aircrew loss rates, but promised higher bombing 
accuracy.  LeMay was keenly aware of the destructive potential of mass bombing and 
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he brought his talent skills and experience from Europe to the Pacific, and eventually 
to the U.S. Air Force Strategic Air Command. 
 
 
Figure 9.  General Curtis E. LeMay with his characteristic cigar.  A bout with Bell’s Palsy as a young 
officer damaged the muscles in his face which gave him his ever-present frown.  Source: National 
Museum of the US Air Force, ttp://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/050811-
F-1234P-006.jpg (accessed July 11, 2007). 
 
 
Furthermore, Hap Arnold remained in charge of the USAAF throughout the 
war and his influence over the global air effort remained considerable.  Arnold’s 
priorities regarding the role of airpower and the hope for an independent U.S. air 
force encouraged larger raids that yielded more destruction and death for both 
theaters of the war.  Keen to prove the efficacy of airpower, Arnold continually 
pushed his commanders to make the biggest effects possible with the bombing 
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efforts.  He was not shy about advertising the USAAF’s efforts and hoped to 
publicize the potential of airplanes and airpower.  While cognizant over the potential 
backlash of civilian deaths, Arnold gauged that Americans were more interested in 
the winning the war than they were in conducting it morally.  Furthermore, an 
impatient man, Arnold was not afraid to remove commanders when they failed to 
deliver the results required and chastised them when they fell short of his 
expectations.  Regardless of their locations and own ideas and agendas, both of these 
men understood the capabilities and limitations of strategic bombing and brought 
their insights to the Pacific bombing effort.  Their personal authority and ability to 
shape bombing applications in both theaters cannot be dismissed nor can they be 
addressed without discussing their influence. 
Secondly, the American participation in operations such as CLARION and 
THUNDERCLAP set a precedent for raids falling outside the purview of precision 
bombing.  Wartime expediency over-ruled doctrinal affiliations as bombing 
methodologies became reflective of wartime realities rather than peacetime theories 
and intellectual frameworks.  Once the USAAF had begun a transition to a 
Douhetian-type strategy, subsequent operations that utilized non-precision methods 
became more palatable to Army Air Force leadership.  The targeting of civilian 
populations and urban area bombing was not seen as repugnant as it had been prior to 
1943 and the U.S. Eighth Air Force found itself regularly deviating from USAAF 
doctrinal precepts.  This initial acceptance of non-precision methods over Europe, and 
the establishment of it in the AWPDs, created a placeholder for the eventual use of 
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such applications.  The attacking of German populations in hope of creating a 
psychological effect deviated from established doctrine, but executed for good 
military reasons and tactical necessities.  Eisenhower’s willingness to accept these 
methodologies in the hope of shortening the war gave impetus to a change in 
European bombing methodology.  Adoption of these practices in Europe and their 
doctrinal consideration facilitated the transition to area bombing in the Pacific theater. 
Thirdly, the desire to avoid American casualties continued to have relevance.  
In the European bombing effort, Arnold saw that the American population wished to 
leverage technical advantages in order to reduce U.S. and allied casualties.176  In this 
regard, German deaths were much more palatable than American ones, especially if 
the former facilitated less of the latter.  Consequently, just like in Europe, as the war 
in the Pacific raged, more and more Americans were losing their lives.  Perceived 
fanaticism of the Japanese escalated American fears that an invasion of the home 
islands would be a bloody affair.  Since the utilization of airpower in Europe was seen 
as a potential way to help offset potential Allied casualties, this same line of 
reasoning would be applied to the Pacific campaign.  Just as Eisenhower approved of 
the CLARION raid to hopefully shorten the war, strategic bombing in the Pacific was 
also looked upon as a panacea to American casualties.  Victory for the American 
population not only meant the defeat of the Axis, but also included the requirement 
for a minimum of suffering and casualties on the part of the Allies.177 
The change in USAAF strategic bombing practices in the Pacific war had its 
origins in Europe.  USAAF leadership experiences, precedent from USAAF European 
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area practices, and the overall desire to spare American casualties all had an affect 
upon the Pacific bombing campaign.  These influences combined with the unique 
nature of the Pacific environment provided fertile ground for further changes in 
bombing methods.  With the European bombing experience fresh in mind, the 20th 
Air Force operating out of the Marianas had a departure point for the development of 
more lethal and destructive methods of bombing.  Those experiences in Europe, 
which were paid for at a high price by Allied aircrews, facilitated the devastation that 
was to be experienced by the Japanese nation in 1945.  However, in addition to the 
legacies from the European Campaign, the bombing effort in the Pacific was to have 
its own unique considerations that exacerbated the departure from USAAF doctrinal 
constructs. 
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CHAPTER 3 
45 DEGREES: 
Bombing in the Pacific Theater 
____________________________________________ 
While American forces in late 1944 and early 1945 were penetrating Germany 
and Nazi occupied territory in Europe, the USAAF’s 20th Air Force, flying the new 
B-29 “Superfortress” bomber, was fully engaged in the bombardment of the Japanese 
homeland.  Initially operating from bases in China and subsequently from the 
Marianas Island Chain, American air attacks against the Japanese became remarkably 
effective in destroying large parts of Japan’s urban areas and national infrastructure.  
The strategic effort against the Japanese home islands created horrific scenes of 
carnage that came to resemble the vision proffered by Giulio Douhet years earlier.  
The starkest example of the American air offensive’s effectiveness and the 
embracement of Douhetian tactics was evident in the firebombing of Tokyo on 9-10 
March 1945.  Following the night-time raid over the Japanese capital, accounts of the 
conflagration reported that:  
Most [victims] died horribly as intense heat from the firestorm consumed 
oxygen, boiled water in canals, and sent liquid glass rolling down the streets.  
Thousands suffocated in shelters and parks; panicked crowds crushed victims 
who had fallen in the streets as they surged toward waterways to escape the 
flames.  Perhaps the most terrible incident came when one B-29 dropped seven 
tons of incendiaries on and around the Kokotoi Bridge.  Hundreds of people 
were turned into fiery torches and “splashed in the river below in sizzling 
hisses.”  One writer described the falling bodies as resembling “tent caterpillars 
that had been burned out of a tree.”  Tail gunners were sickened by the sight of 
hundreds of people burning to death in flaming napalm floating on the surface 
of the Sumida River . . . B-29 aircrews fought the superheated updrafts that 
destroyed at least ten aircraft and had to wear oxygen masks to avoid vomiting 
from the stench of burning flesh.1  
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Ironically, Time magazine reported that the raid was “precision area 
bombing,” meaning that the target area was outlined with bombs aimed at just that 
specific district.2  Scenes similar to this one occurred in many Japanese cities as 
waves of B-29s dropped napalm based incendiary bombs upon the wooden frames 
houses of Japan’s metropolitan areas.  In the days following the Tokyo raid, attacks 
against Osaka, Kobe, and Nagoya were equally destructive.  Raids against smaller 
Japanese urban areas followed the bombing of the major cities.  Repeated attacks hit 
Tokyo, and destroying more than half of the city’s urban neighborhoods by May 
1945.3  The effectiveness of the Pacific bombing campaign led to the destruction of 
over 180 square miles of Japanese urban territory, destroyed over 600 factories and 
2.3 million homes, injured between one-half to one million, and killed 330,000 to 
990,000 civilians.4 
The harshness of the Pacific bombing effort and the number of deaths incurred 
led General LeMay, Commander of the XXI Bomber Command on Guam, to quip “if 
we lost the war we would be prosecuted as war criminals.”5  This observation by 
LeMay, who was directly responsible for ordering firebombing practices, speaks 
volumes about the conduct of the Pacific effort and represents a personal 
acknowledgment of the significant departure from USAAF doctrine.  Future 
Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, who served as a member of LeMay’s 
staff in the Pacific, characterized the firebombing campaign years later by stating that 
“he [LeMay] was right, we were acting as war criminals.”6 
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Regardless of the moral interpretations of U.S. efforts in the Pacific campaign, 
and much like its European counterpart, the changes in bombing methodologies 
resulted from a number of reasons and rationales.  The influence of various 
considerations unique to the Pacific effort encouraged the continued departure from 
established bombing doctrine, a shift that was to manifest itself in the conflagrations 
experienced by the Japanese population in the spring and summer of 1945.  While 
building upon the experiences of the bombing effort over Germany, the USAAF 
developed more lethal bombing applications and targeting methods.  The changes that 
occurred in the Pacific bombing campaign came about from a mix of geographical, 
technical, economic, social, and political circumstances.  The engine of war that 
drove these changes and the synergy of these circumstances drove the transformation 
in American strategic bombing methods. 
____________________________________________ 
Geography 
The geographic location of Japan and the unique meteorological conditions 
over the island chain had a direct impact upon the manner in which the 20th Air Force 
executed its strategic bombing effort.  While the technology for high-altitude 
bombing was coming of age before World War II, weather still had significant 
implications for the execution of the strategic campaign.  Meteorological 
considerations affected not only bomb flight dynamics and targeting, but were also a 
factor regarding aircraft formation, performance, flight routes, and bombing run 
procedures.   
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Much as had been the situation in Europe, weather considerations over Japan, 
especially cloud cover, precluded the accurate sighting of targets through an optical 
bombsight.  While weather over Germany allowed for approximately one hundred 
days a year for optical sighting, the Japanese weather patterns were not much better.  
Before launching a bombing force from the Marianas, a daily reconnaissance strike 
mission conducted a one thousand three hundred mile trek just to obtain weather 
data.7  Furthermore, lack of weather data reported from Siberia, northwestern Japan, 
or China made weather forecasting for the USAAF even more problematic and made 
these reconnaissance flights even more important.8 
The Japanese home islands experience two seasonal weather patterns--winter 
and summer.  Both of these patterns adversely affected high-altitude precision 
bombing and precluded the application of existing USAAF doctrine.  The winter 
weather pattern (figure 10) is characterized by cold air from Siberia sweeping across 
to the Japanese islands of Hokkaido and Honshu and picking up substantial amounts 
of heat and moisture as it passes over the Sea of Japan.9  When this cold air mass 
reaches the Japanese coast, it creates clouds and precipitation on the windy 
northwestern slopes of the island.10  As a result, meteorological conditions along this 
coast are not conducive to precision bombing. 
However, the Siberian air, dries out as it rises over the island chain’s western 
mountains and then warms when it descends on the other side of the island.  After 
descending, the air arrives clear and dry over the Japanese plains that face the 
Pacific.11  This weather pattern creates conditions favorable to bombing the eastern 
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Japanese plains and the cities that occupy these regions.12  Despite this promising 
weather pattern, this same air mass continues south eastwardly toward the Pacific 
where it descends under warm, tropical air over the open ocean, which then produces 
a turbulent frontal area with towering cumulus clouds.13  Off the eastern Japanese 
coast, towering fronts sometimes produced solid walls of clouds from one thousand 
five hundred feet to thirty thousand feet between the Marianas and the mainland.14  
This eastern frontal area served as a significant obstacle to B-29s flying north to the 
Japanese islands. 
 
Figure 10.  Japanese Winter Weather Pattern.  Source: “The Weather Problem in Attacking Japan,” 
Impact 3, no. 2 (February 1945): 48. 
 
Additionally, while the winter weather pattern is characterized by clear 
weather over the eastern Japanese plains, the weather over this low-lying area was not 
always conducive to precision bombardment.15  Despite the described winter weather 
patterns and the potential for clear air over the Japanese plains, actual meteorological 
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conditions over the eastern mainland of Japan, at best, presented marginal weather for 
daylight precision bombing.  Weather conditions during the first bombing raids over 
Tokyo and Nagoya, conducted in the early winter of 1944, reported weather problems 
with cloud cover that obscured targets even during this most favorable season.16 
24 Nov., Tokyo. No Clouds 9/10 undercast. 
27 Nov., Tokyo. Jap mainland completely cloud covered. 
29 Nov., Tokyo. Solid undercast at target. 
13 Dec., Nagoya. 1/10 cloud. 
18 Dec., Nagoya. 3 Sqns report CAVU (Ceiling And Visibility  
Unlimited) . . . over target, 6 report 8/10- 10/10 cloud. 
22 Dec., Nagoya. 6/10 to 10/10 cloud. 
3 Jan., Nagoya Primary target CAVU to 2/10 cloud 
14 Jan., Nagoya Primary Target 8/10 to 10/10 cloud.17 
However, the summer weather pattern did not mitigate the weather problem 
for the XXI Bomber Command operating from Guam/Saipan.  During the summer 
months (figure 11) the cloud cover over Japan shifted over to the Pacific side of the 
island chain as a weak flow of cool air, circulating over the Sea of Japan, converged 
with a strong flow of warm air coming westerly from the Pacific.18  Where the warm 
air climbed over the cold air on the western mountain chain of the islands, clouds 
built up to high altitudes and provided a dense overcast for targets on the eastern 
Japanese plains.19  As a result, a blanket of overcast covered much of the lowland 
plains and the major Japanese cities.  Thus, the summer weather pattern too, often 
precluded effective precision bombing. 
Despite general awareness of the existing weather patterns, preliminary 
planning considerations assumed that visual bombing conditions existed over the 
Japanese home islands. 20  Fresh from his experiences in the European theater, 
   
 107 
General Hansell, the first Commander of the XXI Bomber Command, conducted 
operations in accordance with existing USAAF doctrine.  The first strike over Tokyo 
on October 30, 1944, called for a daylight visual bombing from 30,000 feet with 
mostly high explosive (HE) bombs.21  This raid set the pattern for bombing operations 
for the next three months.22  However, high altitude precision raids failed to produce 
the results expected by Arnold and the visual bombing weather assumption proved 
incorrect.23  Hansell understood the implications of Japanese weather on the strategic 
bombing effort and concluded that the preferred strategy of precision optical bombing 
could not be sustained in the face of continuous cloud cover.24 
 
 
 
Figure 11.  Japanese Summer Weather Patterns.  Source: “The Weather Problem in Attacking Japan,” 
Impact Magazine, 3, no 2 (February 1945): 49. 
 
Regarding the weather over Japan, LeMay stated, “The weather at high 
altitude [over Japan] was unquestionably the worst bomber weather in the world.”25  
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From high altitudes cloud ceilings averaging six thousand feet often obscured 
Japanese targets.  During these early raids, B-29 aircrews placed less than 10 percent 
of their bombs within the designated target areas.26  As a result, the damage produced 
by early B-29 raids was hardly worth the expense of the new airplane or the risk to 
the aircrew’s lives.27  In fact, the weather situation during these early B-29 operations 
proved to be more of an obstacle than Japanese fighters or anti-aircraft fire.28  The 
weather phenomenon had significant implications upon U.S. bombing methodology 
in the Pacific. 
Because of meteorological considerations, and after the March 9-10 raid, 
LeMay on April 5, 1945 wrote Arnold: “Weather continues to be our worst 
operational enemy.  During my first six weeks here we had one visual shot at a target.  
This was primarily the reason I lowered the altitude for our incendiary attacks.”29  He 
went on to state: “I am going to try lowering the altitude of our daylight attacks to get 
under the weather.  If necessary, we will go clear down to the deck.”30  The USSBS 
substantiated LeMay’s comment and noted the meteorological problem by stating, 
“weather constituted the most serious obstacle confronting our combat units.”31 
As mentioned earlier, radar-bombing methods developed throughout the war 
allowed bombardiers to “see” through clouds and overcast.  However, as discussed 
previously, these early radars were less than accurate for precision bombing and even 
if a crew had trained with this new equipment, bombing results were usually 
unsatisfactory.  The USAAF continued to develop radar technology and the early 
versions of the B-29 had the APQ-13 radar system installed.  However, much like its 
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European predecessor, this early radar could not provide the definition required to 
accurately sight bombing targets from high altitudes.32 
LeMay, too, concluded that the APQ-13 radar, was inadequate for high 
altitude precision bombing.  However, the APQ-13 was effective against coastal 
targets with proper training of navigators and radar operators.  He found that low-
level incendiary attacks presented an operation well within the capabilities of B-29 
crews and radar equipment.33  In the last few months of the war, the USAAF began 
fielding the APQ-7 Eagle radar that had ten times the power of resolution of the 
APQ-13.34  However, when the weather allowed, high explosive strikes were 
conducted from medium altitudes, but when clouds obscured the target, as was 
usually the case, area tactics using incendiaries with radar targeting methods became 
a common practice.35 
In addition to cloud coverage, 20th Air Force crews had their first experience 
with the phenomena known as the jet stream.  The jet stream, a current of racing air 
that circles the globe, was discovered B-29 aircrews operating at altitudes around 
30,000ft.  These jet stream winds could even reach speeds as high as two hundred to 
two hundred and fifty miles per hour, and created significant problems for the 
American bomber formations over the Japanese mainland.  A first casualty of B-29 
encounters with the jet stream was the doctrine of high altitude precision 
bombardment.  The excessive wind velocities made impossible accurate high altitude 
precision bombing and thus, as LeMay later admitted, proved to be “a stumbling 
block to bombing accuracy.”36  LeMay noted, “wind velocities at 30,000 feet were as 
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high as 230 miles per hour or about three times hurricane intensity.”37  These winds 
posed a number of problems for bombardiers.  When bombing downwind, these 
winds resulted in aircraft ground speeds that climbed as high as five hundred and fifty 
miles per hour, far beyond the parameters in existing USAAF bombing tables.38  By 
flying with the wind, a B-29 would pass over the target at a rate much too fast for 
World War II precision bombing techniques.  Conversely, if a B-29 turned into the 
wind during its bombing run, the excessive headwind would slow the plane’s ground 
speed and result in making the bomber an easy target for Japanese interceptors.39 
If the bombers attempted to bomb crosswind, the high winds forced the B-29s 
to drift in their flight paths up to 45 degrees.40  The Norden Mk XV optical bombsight 
could correct for a 35-degree drift, but the additional 10-degree drift experienced by 
the B-29s decreased the 20th Air Force’s bombing accuracy appreciably.41  As a 
result, aircrews were faced with a choice of bombing inaccurately at a high rate of 
speed, or by crabbing in a crosswind, and exceeding the Norden bombsight’s normal 
operating parameters.  Otherwise, they could fly at an unacceptably low speed and 
place themselves in a situation that compromised the safety of the aircraft and crew.  
These headwinds experienced by USAAF pilots flying in jet stream seriously 
affected fuel usage rates of the B-29.  Fighting the jet stream increased B-29 flight 
times and fuel consumption rates.  By flying in these headwinds, many B-29s ran out 
of fuel on the return trip to their home bases because they consumed the bulk of their 
fuel supply on the outbound trek.42  Additionally, combating these headwinds also 
placed higher stress upon the B-29’s four newly-designed, Wright Cyclone-R-3350 
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air-cooled engines.  These engines, which were initially fraught with mechanical 
anomalies, had a difficult time producing the power required to overcome the 
headwinds experienced at high altitudes.43 
Cloud coverage, the jet stream, and high winds, precluded the USAAF from 
conducting the high altitude strategic bombing that it had attempted to do in the 
European theater.  Meteorological and geographical variables prevented the type of 
bombing the USAAF had proffered in its prewar doctrine.44  However, 
meteorological and geographical conditions were not in themselves the sole reason 
for shift away from prescribed doctrine. 
____________________________________________ 
Japanese Manufacturing Dispersal 
By 1945, the USAAF had gained most of its strategic bombing operational 
experience through its efforts in the European Theater.  German industrial 
infrastructure was organized into manufacturing centers largely concentrated in a few 
areas.  Centers of production in locations, such as the Ruhr Valley and the oil 
refineries and storage facilities in the Caucasus, provided excellent targets for 
strategic bombardment.  Once identified, the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces focused 
their assaults upon these manufacturing clusters.  However, USAAF intelligence 
reported that the Japanese dispersed much of their industry throughout the population 
centers of the nation.  Additionally, this Japanese system, for a time, included the use 
of home labor or cottage type industry directly supporting the national war effort.  In 
this program the Japanese distributed drill presses and other machinery to citizens for 
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home industries.  While the Germans, too, had begun to disperse some of their 
industrial capacity, they did not carry through to the same degree of their Japanese 
counterparts.45 
While at one time believing that they were immune to large scale bombing 
attacks, Japanese manufacturers began to see the merit in the dispersal of factories 
and production centers.46  By dispersing their factories and the means of production, 
the Japanese thought a single raid would not produce a catastrophic effect upon their 
industrial base.  The dispersal of factories would dilute the bombing effort and 
mitigate risk to Japanese production.  USAAF planners were cognizant of this 
decentralization of Japanese production and assumed that this method of production 
was a mainstay of Japanese industry.  As a result, the USAAF began to target entire 
urban areas. 
According to LeMay, the Japanese model of production was intricate and 
complex and described the process in a postwar memoir as: 
In Japan they would be set up like this: they’d have a factory; and then the 
families, in their homes throughout the area, would manufacture small parts. 
You might call it a home-folks assembly line deal.  The Suzuki clan would 
manufacture bolt 64; the Harunobo family next door might be making nut 64, 
65, or 63, or all the gaskets in between.  These would be manufactured right in 
the same neighborhood.  Then Mr. Kitagawa from the factory would scoot 
around with his cart and pick up the parts in proper order.47  
After the victory over Germany, Spaatz was reassigned as the commander for 
Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific.  In this effort the primary objective was to, 
“Complete the present program against industrial concentrations and stores located in 
urban areas.”48  Arnold was aware of this Japanese method of production and 
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explained to the civilian leadership in Washington that, “it was practically impossible 
to destroy the war output of Japan without doing more damage to civilians connected 
with the output than in Europe.”49 
To the USAAF, this integration of the civilian population and their homes into 
the war-making effort expanded the definition of what planners considered a target.  
To military planner, targeting the Japanese civilian population and their homes made 
perfect sense.  Much like Douhet had envisioned in his theories, the separation 
between combatant and noncombatant began to again disappear.  While areas of 
industrial concentration remained primary targets, the concept of workers as 
belligerents had once again resurfaced.50  Both the factory and the home were now 
legitimate targets.  In an interview conducted after the war, Ira Eaker, who eventually 
became Arnold’s deputy during the Pacific bombing campaign, underscored this 
reasoning when he stated that, “it made a lot of sense to kill skilled workers by 
burning whole areas.”51 
Secretary of War Stimson expressed concern over a lack of adherence to 
precision bombardment during discussion regarding the use of the atomic bomb and 
queried Arnold over the issue of precision.  The Chief of Staff responded by 
explaining the nature of Japanese industrial dispersal.  Arnold argued that area 
bombardment was the only way to destroy all those drill presses and that the USAAF 
was trying to keep it “down as far as possible.”52  Stimson passed this same 
information to Truman and told him that he was trying to keep the Air Force honest 
with regard to the precision doctrine.  The Secretary was afraid that area 
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bombardment could portray the perception that the U.S. was “outdoing Hitler in 
atrocities.”53  Despite Stimson’s concerns and Arnold’s assurances of limitations, the 
execution of the bombing campaign laid waste to huge swaths of the Japanese urban 
landscape. 
LeMay understood the moral implications of bombing the urban areas and 
workers homes.  He knew that there was going to be the perception that the USAAF 
was conducting terror raids upon the Japanese.  However, after the war, he responded 
to his critics by stating as follows:  
These operations were not conceived as terror raids against the civilian 
population of Japan.  But we had to be realistic.  The Japanese economy 
depended heavily on home industries, which were carried on in cities close to 
major factory areas.  By destroying these feeder industries the flow of vital 
parts could be curtailed and production disorganized.  By starting 
conflagrations in a city like Tokyo or Nagoya we would have a good chance 
of destroying some of the priority targets in those areas, and therefore make it 
unnecessary to knock them out by separate pinpoint attacks.54  
LeMay felt justified in the application of firebombing upon the Japanese 
nation.  He believed that the whole of the Japanese population, men, women, and 
children were involved in the production and manufacturing process.  “We knew we 
were going to kill a lot of women and kids when we burned a town.  [It] had to be 
done,” LeMay observed.55 
While visiting Yokohama after the war, LeMay noted the remnants of 
Japanese civilian home-based manufacturing.  He was impressed with the number of 
drill presses and machinery he saw in the city.  They looked to him like “a forest of 
scorched trees and stumps, growing up through the residential area.  Flimsy 
construction all gone . . . everything burned down, or up, and drill presses standing 
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like skeletons.”56  This integration of home industry into the Japanese production 
system enabled a pragmatic LeMay to validate his ideas regarding the firebombing of 
Japan and espouse a policy that deviated from established doctrine. 
However, USSBS analysts found after the war that these Japanese home 
industries were not as important as LeMay and the USAAF leadership had originally 
thought.  While the Pacific bombing campaign focused part of its efforts upon 
Japanese home industries, these industries were not as prevalent by the time the 
Americans began the large-scale firebombing of Japan.  According to the USSBS: 
The urban area incendiary attacks eliminated completely the residential and 
smaller commercial and industrial structures in the affected areas and a 
significant number of important plants, but a portion of the more substantially 
constructed office buildings and factories in those areas and the underground 
utilities survived.  By 1944 the Japanese had almost eliminated home industry 
in their war economy.  They still relied, however, on plants employing less 
than 250 workers for subcontracted parts and equipment.  Many of these 
smaller plants were concentrated in Tokyo and accounted for 50 percent of the 
total industrial output of the city.  Such plants suffered severe damage in the 
urban incendiary attacks.57 
While the USSBS minimized the use of home industries into the Japanese war 
effort and addressed the elimination of this effort by 1944, this does not negate the 
notion that USAAF planners classified Japanese residential neighborhoods as 
legitimate targets.  While the Japanese may have eliminated home production by 
1944, USAAF planners assumed that this practice of making components in homes 
was still very much a part of the enemy’s war making effort.  In this regard, logical 
targeting rationales were at the forefront of American planning efforts, although the 
killing of Japanese civilians was viewed at the time as a lauded consequence of the 
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strategic campaign.  Terror raids for the sake of retribution or revenge were not a part 
of the Pacific bombing methodology. 
The location of smaller plants concentrated in urban areas served to validate 
the USAAF targeting rationale.  Because, according to the USSBS, the Tokyo area 
feeder type plants produced 50 percent of Tokyo’s industrial output, these smaller 
factories were still, therefore, considered legitimate targets regardless of their 
location.58  As a result, the location of the targets was largely immaterial to 20th Air 
Force planners.  From their perspective, only military necessity and effect mattered.  
Despite USSBS findings, USAAF planners were aware that the Japanese had, 
at least for a time, used cottage industries and homes in the manufacturing process.  
These cottage industries and homes, combined with smaller factories located in urban 
areas, gave USAAF planners sufficient cause to recommend the deliberate targeting 
of areas occupied largely by civilian populations.  This assumption, erroneous as it 
may have been by 1945, provided a logical and sound military rationale for the 
firebombing efforts.  The known dispersal of Japanese production capability, whether 
in a house or in a small factory located in a residential area, contributed to the change 
in USAAF bombing practices. 
____________________________________________ 
Japanese Urban Construction and the M69  
In 1942, a group of military and civilian experts was put together to conduct 
special studies and analysis for Arnold.  This group included individuals from the 
Office of Strategic Services, Harvard and Princeton Universities, Massachusetts 
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Institute of Technology, as well as a number of persons from the War Department.  
Called the Committee of Operational Analysis (COA), the group consisted of 
individuals with keen analytical skills, knowledge of industrial processes, and was 
well versed in problem solving methodologies.59  These men helped to develop 
targeting lists for the European Theater, and in spring of 1943, began studying Japan 
to determine potential targets located on the home islands.  In their analysis, this 
group utilized existing open-source periodicals, monitored Japanese radio 
transmissions, and conducted interviews with people who had lived in Japan and had 
a part in the development of Japanese infrastructure.60  After collecting and analyzing 
the information, in November 1943 the committee reported that the most vital targets 
in Japan were merchant shipping, aircraft plants, steel, and urban industrial areas.61 
Furthermore, the COA reported that firebomb attacks on urban areas would 
have a significant effect upon Japanese industry.62  In this effort, the COA believed 
that urban firebombing would adversely affect feeder industries, small subcontractors, 
destroy living spaces, public services, and other elements vital to Japanese 
production.63  This vulnerability to firebombing was not necessarily new to officers of 
the USAAF.  In 1939 an ACTS lesson taught that “large sections of the great 
Japanese cities are built of flimsy and highly flammable materials.  The earthquake 
disaster of 1924 bears witness to the fearful destruction that may be inflicted by 
incendiary bombs”64  Throughout its history Tokyo has suffered a number of large 
fires, despite these conflagrations, building materials and construction had changed 
little before 1945. 
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In June 1944, the COA established the Joint Incendiary Committee.  The 
purpose behind this committee was to determine the force required to burn down 
major Japanese urban areas and to estimate the consequence of their destruction.65  To 
determine what was needed to destroy these Japanese urban areas, the USAAF 
constructed small villages representative of Japanese urban architecture at Eglin 
Field, Florida, and at Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah.66  At the Dugway site the 
USAAF employed an American architect, who had lived in Japan for years, to design 
houses embodying exact specifications of the kind of residences found in Japan.67  
The USAAF constructed the houses in clustered units and sought to represent urban 
neighborhoods.  Called “little Tokyos,” these test villages enabled experts to evaluate 
incendiary bombing techniques and their destructive potential.68  As a part of these 
tests, Army fire departments located at nearby posts tried to extinguish the fires set in 
these targeted villages.  In many of the tests, the USAAF used local fire departments 
with equipment similar to their Japanese counterparts.  In most of these cases, these 
American crews were unable to extinguish the fires set in these representative 
towns.69 
In September 1944, the Joint Incendiary Committee submitted its findings to 
the COA.  The committee reported that fire raids in Japan would do far more damage 
than the incendiary raids conducted over Germany because European workers were 
less concentrated in urban areas and their cities were constructed of largely of stone, 
brick, and mortar.70  The findings showed that incendiary attacks on the major cities 
of Japan could destroy up to 70 percent of the housing and kill more than one-half 
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million civilians.  The COA also estimated that the raids would cost Japan 15 percent 
of its total manufacturing output.71  Additionally, the committee concluded that fire 
attacks would disrupt transportation networks, wreck storage and marshalling yards, 
injure one out of ten workers, break civilian will and morale to support the war, cause 
a breakdown in social order, and achieve the cumulative effect of a “major 
disaster.”72 
In concert with the study of damage inflicted upon Japanese cites, American 
industry also began to design more effective and efficient incendiary bombs.  
Research efforts by DuPont, Standard Oil, and the National Research Defense 
Council resulted in the new M69 incendiary bomb.73  The M69 incendiary bomb was 
an assembly composed of 38 smaller 6.2 pound bomblettes that were 3 inches in 
diameter and 20 inches long.  Weighing a total of 500 pounds, the M69’s smaller 
clusters were strapped together inside a metal container, which was fused to break 
open at a specified altitude and scatter the individual bomblettes.74  Three to five 
seconds after the bomblettes would hit, an explosive charge ejected and ignited a sack 
of jellied gasoline.75  The jellied gasoline was a combination of aluminum salts of 
naphthenic and palmitic acids specially combined and became known as napalm.  
The sack held the napalm in one spot thereby producing a hotter fire and one that was 
more difficult to extinguish. 
In Europe, high explosive (HE) bombs were the mainstay of bomber loads.  
Because European cities consisted largely of stone and masonry, many believed that 
incendiaries were not as effective as the HE bomb.  Airmen in the European theater 
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disliked the incendiary bombs and believed that incendiaries were harder to aim, were 
more easily damaged in shipment, and argued that HE bombs offered greater 
destructive potential.76  However, by 1944, the Army’s Chemical Warfare Service 
solved these and other problems associated with incendiaries.77  Because of the 
European Theater’s preference for HE bombs, the full effect of these technological 
developments in incendiaries would not become evident until used in mass by the 
20th Air Force.  By the end of the war, the incendiary had become the bomb of choice 
for the USAAF in the Pacific Theater.  In the later stages of the strategic bombing 
effort in the Pacific, 70 percent of bombing was devoted to incendiary bombing.78  
Only 22 percent of bomb loads comprised HE, while the remainder was committed to 
the aerial mining campaign.79 
In late 1944, the 20th Air Force conducted a number of experimental raids 
against Japanese targets to test the effectiveness of incendiary bombing.  On 
December 18, XX Bomber Command located in the China-Burma-India (CBI) 
Theater launched a raid sending eighty-four B-29s in at medium altitude with five 
hundred tons of incendiary bombs.  The attack left Hankow, China burning for three 
days, proving the effectiveness of incendiary weapons against the predominately 
wooden architecture of Asian cities.80  These early missions did much to develop the 
incendiary campaign, and in March 1945, the results of these experimental raids 
yielded the most horrific air attacks of the war. 
Between March 9 and June 15, a total of 6,960 B-29 sorties delivered 41,592 
tons of incendiary bombs on Tokyo and other targets razing 102 square miles of 
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urban construction.81  During the spring of 1945, LeMay’s command dropped so 
many incendiaries that his bomb dump became devoid of the ordnance.   
 
Figure 12.  A B-29 over Tokyo.  Source: US Air Force Museum Bomber Aircraft Virtual Gallery, 
http://www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/research/bombers/b29-4.jpg (accessed March 14, 2006). 
 
 
Further supplies of the bombs went right to the flight line straight from the seaport.82  
From all B-29 missions, up to 180 square miles of urban industrial area was burned in 
66 major cities, with 600 factories destroyed including 25 aircraft factories, 18 oil 
production centers, and six major arsenals.83  Table 1 indicates the damage to the five 
largest cities:  
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Table 1.  Area Destroyed by the 20th Air Force. 
    City Total Urban Area 
(square miles) 
Planned Target Area 
(square miles) 
Area Destroyed 
(square miles) 
Tokyo 110  55 56.3 
Nagoya 39.7  16 12.4 
Kobe 15.7 7 8.8 
Osaka 59.8 20 15.6 
Yokohama 20.2 8 8.9 
Total 246.2 106 102 
Source: United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), The Strategic Air Operation of the Very 
Heavy Bombardment in the War Against Japan: Final Report (Twentieth Air Force) (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946). 
 
Through an analysis of the table above, one can easily see that the COA, the 
Incendiary Committee, governmental and private corporations, as well as academia 
had all contributed to developing the equipment and technology priorities for 
incendiary bombing.  The employment of incendiary weapons in light of Asian 
construction and city planning methods worked to produce the type of bombing 
originally envisioned by Douhet.  As a result, the Japanese cityscape also provided 
impetus for a change in strategic bombing application. 
____________________________________________ 
Mechanical Limitations 
The strategic bombing of Japan was conducted almost exclusively by a single 
weapon system, the Boeing B-29 Superfortress.  Given the unique circumstances (and 
distances) governing military operations in the Pacific War, the Superfortress was the 
only weapon system capable of striking the Japanese home islands.84  Possessing the 
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range to reach Japan from bases in China and the Mariana Island Chain, the B-29 
came to symbolize American military might and its technological prowess.  Known 
as the “3-Billion Dollar Gamble,” because it was ordered into production while still 
just a design on paper, the aircraft could carry ten tons of bombs and had a range of 
over three thousand miles.85  The B-29 became one of the war’s greatest military 
weapons and its image as the first nuclear bomber is permanently fixed in military 
history. 
However, for all the accolades and praise attributed to the B-29, the aircraft’s 
initial operations suffered from numerous design problems and engine malfunctions.  
These early difficulties precluded the airframe from achieving designed performance 
parameters.  An old Air Force axiom states “never fly the ‘A model’ (first production 
series) of anything,” and certainly in the case of the B-29 this statement rang true.  As 
with most new airframes, the first model of the B-29 required the modification, 
redesign, and reengineering of many systems, subsystems, and components.  
However, the technical problems of the first production models of B-29s had 
consequences that went far beyond the engineer’s T-square and the drafting table. 
At the time, the B-29 was the most sophisticated and complex airplane ever 
designed.  Built in the wake of the B-17 and B-24, the Superfortress included many 
technological innovations that substantially improved the bomber’s capabilities and 
flying qualities.  While pursuit aviation claimed priority of effort in the 1930s, the 
outbreak of World War II renewed interest in large bomber design.  As a result of the 
war, in February 1940 the U.S. Army Air Corps announced a requirement for a 
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“Hemispheric Defense Weapon.”86  Boeing Aircraft Company answered the call and 
its first prototype, the XB-29, made its maiden flight in September 1942.  The 
airframe was powered by four R-3350, turbo charged engines designed to produce 
2,200 horsepower each at take-off.  The aircraft featured self-sealing fuel tanks, 
considerable armor protection, heavy defensive armament, and the ability to carry 
eight tons of bombs.87  The bomber also included a pressurization system for crew 
comfort, remote fire control defensive systems, specially designed four-bladed 
Hamilton propellers, and hundreds of other impressive engineering advances.88  
The idea behind the B-29 came from a requirement for a “Very Heavy 
Bomber”(VHB) (also referred to the as the Very Long Ranger (VLR) bomber) in the 
Air War Planning Document (AWPDs).  The concept of the VHB built upon existing 
bomber designs and engineering advances to produce a bomber that was considerably 
heavier, faster, and more capable.89  According to the Aircraft Commander’s Manual 
for the B-29: “It [the B-29] was built to do one particular job well, fly a long way 
with a big load of bombs.”90 
AWPD-1 originally specified the production for over two thousand VHBs.91  
This requirement included the use of the VHB not only for the Pacific theater, but 
first in the European Theater, which had the priority of effort for the Allies.92  Toward 
this end, planners envisioned that B-29s would strike at the heart of Germany while 
operating out of bases in Asia Minor and the Middle East.93  While B-29s did not 
operate in the European Theater, the desire to have VHBs operate against Nazi 
Germany considerably reduced the time allotted to design, develop, and test this 
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aircraft.  Because of this pressure, development and design modifications were 
conducted concurrently with aircraft production and fielding.  The time constraint 
regarding B-29 development had serious implications for the airplane’s operational 
use.  The VHB concept was so important that the USAAF placed orders for the B-29 
and production lines prepared even before the new design was flight tested.  
Highlighting its importance was the decision to build B-29s at a full rate production a 
year before the first aircraft was airborne.94 
General Arnold supported the tenets of AWPD-1 and enthusiastically 
supported the VHB program.  As a proponent for the VHB he meticulously tracked 
its development.95  Arnold, more than anyone else in the Air Force, took the chances 
on the enormously expensive and unproven B-29 project.96  During the early phases 
of B-29 development, Arnold countered critics in the War Department who objected 
to the huge allocation of funds and resources dedicated to the project.97  Given that 
the B-29 was an unproven design and rushed into production to meet wartime 
requirements, Arnold’s gamble had serious implications for the USAAF.98  Only one 
other aircraft had ever been ordered ‘off the drawing board’ without prototypes built, 
the Martin B-26 Marauder.  However, a major difference with the B-29 was that only 
a single manufacturer built the B-26.  While the B-29 was still just a design on paper, 
it was ordered into production on an industry-wide scale.99 
For Arnold, the commitment to an unproven aircraft design was a pivotal 
decision.  If the B-29 program failed, it could well destroy his life’s work and 
jeopardize the future of an independent U.S. air force.100  The risk to build and 
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employ, what was at the time a paper design, was taken at the potential expense of 
Arnold’s personal and professional reputation.  This calculated risk by Arnold not 
only had a direct effect upon the B-29 design process, but exerted an impact upon 
Arnold’s air commanders to produce quick results with the new weapon.  Arnold was 
anxious to obtain bombing results in Japan that again proved the efficacy of strategic 
bombing, but he also demanded results that validated the expense of the B-29’s 
production. 
The B-29’s complexity and incorporation of so many new design features 
inevitably, as noted, caused technical problems to multiply and threatened the 
employment of the bomber.101  The challenges inherent in producing an airplane as 
complex as the B-29 would have been difficult under the best of conditions, but the 
B-29 was built at a pace to meet the war requirements in Europe.102 
 
Figure 13.  B-29 front cockpit.  Source: US Air Force Museum Bomber Aircraft Virtual Gallery, 
http://www.wpafb.af.mil/mueum/research/bombers/b29-1.jpg (accessed March 14, 2006). 
 
 
B-29s rolled off the production lines in late 1943 and early 1944.  However, 
these early airframes were built before a number of technical problems with the B-29 
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became apparent.  This led to the fielding of aircraft before important engineering 
changes were incorporated.103  In 1944 fifty-four major modifications had to be made 
to every B-29 that came off the assembly line.104  Areas requiring modification 
included the electrical system, tires, the fire control system, and the propeller 
feathering system.105  According to LeMay:  
[The] B-29 had as many bugs as the entomological department of the 
Smithsonian Institution. Fast as they got the bugs licked, new ones crawled 
out from underneath the cowling.106  If you ever saw a buggy airplane, this 
was it.107 
In Wichita, Kansas, where the bombers were produced, efforts to mitigate and 
correct these design problems resulted in what become known as the “Battle of 
Kansas.”  This “battle” was a concerted and collective effort to design, apply, and 
field modifications to the B-29 and address existing engineering problems.  Despite 
efforts during this “battle,” early B-29 operations were continually plagued with 
mechanical maladies.  As a result, flight line modifications and expedient fixes were 
still required in order to make the aircraft ready for combat and airworthy.108 
The biggest problem affecting the performance of the B-29 was her newly 
designed R-3350 engines made by the Curtiss-Wright Corporation.  These powerful 
engines often overheated, had cylinder heads blow out during start up, were equipped 
with faulty ignition systems, leaked oil excessively, and were plagued with fuel 
system problems.109  Because of these, and many other issues, LeMay thought that the 
R-3350 was not worthy of mounting on an operational aircraft until it had gone 
through a long period of trial and testing.110 
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The marriage of an engine into an airframe is one of the most challenging 
engineering problems in the air age.111  To adapt an engine into a functioning power 
plant on an airframe requires the integration of a number of subsystems and 
components.112  This integration adds multiple layers of complexity and can be the 
source of major problems.  The complexity of the B-29 and the R-3350 is a prime 
example.  In reviewing the development of the B-29 and the R-3350, it became 
obvious that both Boeing and Curtiss-Wright were not on the same design page.113  
Regardless, wartime expedience forced the installation of the R-3350 on the B-29. 
When a number of B-29s crashed in the CBI Theater in summer 1944, 
engineers at Wright Field in Dayton Ohio investigated.  After conducting trial runs 
and test flights, Wright engineers found several reasons for these failures.  Engineers 
discovered that the R-3350’s thermo-couplers were often out of calibration, cowl 
flaps were improperly set for take off and taxi, cylinders in the rear rows were 
susceptible to exhaust valve seat erosion, and a leak in the exhaust port in the front 
cylinders would allow white-hot exhaust to blow over adjacent cylinder heads.114 
To correct these and other deficiencies, engineers designed cuffs on the root 
of the Hamilton propellers to improve ground cooling and installed new engine 
baffles and seals.115  In addition cowl flaps were added to each engine nacelle that 
were made operable from the cockpit along with crossover tubes from the intake to 
the exhaust port on the top five cylinders on both the front and rear rows.116  
Engineers also included an inter-rocker box lubrication line that addressed the 
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exhaust valve problem.  These changes provided for a better flow of both cooling oil 
and air around the engine and resulted in improved engine life and reliability.117 
 
 
Figure 14.  B-29 ditched in the Pacific.  Source: US Air Force Museum Bomber Aircraft Virtual 
Gallery, http://www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/research/bombers/b29-28.jpg (accessed March 14, 2006). 
 
 
In addition to the cooling problem, the R-3350 also had a tendency to ingest 
engine valves into the cylinders.  As mentioned above the top three cylinders on the 
back row of the engine were often susceptible to exhaust valve seat erosion with a 
subsequent failure of the valve guide boss.118  This “swallowing” of a valve into the 
cylinder was the most common cause of engine fire in the B-29.119  In this instance a 
valve would burn lose from its mount and then being ingested into the cylinder.  This 
in turn would lead to the entire cylinder coming off and destroying the rest of the 
engine.120 
However, the most dreaded engine problem was an induction fire.  This 
phenomenon was feared because once the magnesium alloy parts in the engine 
induction system started to burn, the fires could not be put out.121  Since magnesium 
burns at a relatively high temperature, the existing fire extinguishing systems in the 
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B-29 were unable to deal with the elevated temperatures and procedures designed to 
counter the flames were ineffective.  Therefore, when the magnesium parts caught 
fire, the fire burned through the engine’s firewall and spread into the wing structure, 
thus causing the entire wing to depart the aircraft with very little time for the crew to 
bail out.122 
The R-3350 also had a habit of losing hydraulic pressure which then 
precluded the ability to “feather” the propeller (“Feathering” is the rotating of the 
propeller blade ninety degrees, parallel to the air stream, thus reducing drag and 
preventing the heat produced by crankshaft friction generated by a wind milling 
propeller.)  This inability to feather a propeller had dire consequences for B-29 
aircrews.  If a B-29 lost hydraulic fluid, the inability to feather the engine could lead 
to the departure of the propeller from the engine.  LeMay noted that a crew would be 
fortunate if just the propeller flew off “because sometimes the whole damned engine 
would seize and would twist right out of the wing.”123  
Because of these and other mechanical difficulties, the R-3350 engine 
required over two thousand engineering changes.124  After the war in November 1945, 
in an address to the Ohio Society of New York and the Alumni of Ohio State 
University, LeMay explained: 
You do not draw a complicated, precision airplane like the B-29 out of a silk 
hat.  The Air Forces had blueprints for [t]he B-29--but no blueprint ever 
dropped a bomb.  So the B-29 was tested in combat.  It is a tribute to the men 
who planned and built it that this great airplane lived up to what was expected 
of it after a few modifications.125 
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The number of problems that the B-29 experienced took years to correct and the Air 
Force was still modifying the plane when withdrawn from service in the late 1950s.126  
As for the R-3350 itself, it eventually became a reliable design and was eventually 
utilized on the Douglas AD-1 Skyraider attack aircraft and Lockheed Constellation 
airliner.127 
The first operational B-29 raid occurred against the Makasan Rail yard in 
Bangkok, Thailand in June 1944.128  Despite the promise of the design, this raid 
yielded disappointing results.  Out of the one hundred B-29s launched for the 
mission, only seventy-six returned to their home station having dropped their 
bombs.129  Eighteen had to turn back due to mechanical failures and six others had to 
ditch or land at alternate airfields.130  During the first XXI Bomber Command mission 
against Japan on November 24, 1944, twenty-six out of the one hundred and eleven 
aircraft launched were forced to turn back or abort enroute due to mechanical 
difficulties.131  Natural phenomenon accounted for many aborts as the temperature 
differential between the tropical conditions on the ground coupled with the freezing 
temperatures at altitude caused considerable problems for both the airframe and 
aircrew.132  During these early operations the number of B-29s bombing the primary 
targets declined as crews either bombed secondary targets or salvoed their bombs 
harmlessly.133   
Most of the aircraft losses during the first B-29 missions were due to 
mechanical failures as the long climb to thirty thousand feet stressed the R-3350 
engine.134  After studying B-29 performance, LeMay decided that he needed to bring 
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the bombing formations down to lower altitudes where the engines and other 
equipment would not be under such constant strain.135  By lowering B-29 cruising and 
bombing altitudes, the stress on engines was significantly reduced.  This reduction in 
stress on the engine lowered operating temperatures of the cylinders that increased 
aircraft operational availability.  The long strenuous climb to high bombing altitudes 
and the fuel weight associated the climb was reduced when B-29 aircrew lowered 
their operating altitudes from thirty thousand to ten thousand feet.   
Through his observation of operational missions LeMay concluded that: 
With the overheating engines, it began to seem that this high altitude stuff was 
strictly for the birds.  The airplanes had been breaking down.  There are 
something like 55,000 different parts in a B-29; and frequently it seemed that 
maybe 50,000 of them were all going wrong at once.  I felt that the majority of 
our losses were due more to our own  mechanical problems than they were to 
the Japanese defensive system.  [The] Main thing to do, it seemed, was to get 
them [the B-29s] down in altitude.  Then we’d get a lot more hours service out 
of each engine.136 
After making mission profile changes, LeMay found that 91 percent of all B-29s 
bombed their primary targets instead of the abysmal 36 percent from previous 
missions.137  Because of the reduction in altitude, maintenance “down time” dropped 
and more bombers became available to conduct bombing raids.  Since the engines 
avoided the stress of climbing to thirty thousand feet, the number of mechanical 
failures dropped and aircraft availability rose.  During the March raids, aircraft 
availability climbed appreciably from 59 to 83 percent.138  Additionally, the decision 
to lower bombing altitudes also went hand-in-glove with the desire to avoid bombing 
through the difficult Japanese weather while also evading the excessive winds of the 
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jet stream.  As well, this drop in operating altitudes was to yield a third and more 
deadly benefit for LeMay and the 20th Air Force. 
In addition to the heat, fire, and valve problems, the R-3350 also did not 
produce the power necessary to fly the new bomber and its advertised payloads.  
Since aircraft performance is dependent upon density altitude (the amount of air 
molecules in a given body of air), the hot weather combined with the weight of the B-
29 had severe consequences for B-29 aircrew.  During CBI operations in October 
1944, LeMay wrote to Arnold, and stated: 
To a large extent our bomb load is limited by gross take-off load.  This is in 
turn influenced by operating technique, runways, high free air temperature and 
power available.  The take-off is a very serious problem with the B-29, and is 
the high point of any flight.  All crews, in discussing a mission, invariably talk 
about their take-off and not about flak, fighters or other enemy opposition.  
Even partial power loss from one engine almost invariably results in a crash 
from which there are very few survivors.139 
Later in the letter LeMay further stated: 
The B-29 airplane is capable of considerable higher performance than the R-
3350 engine now installed will permit, as the maximum gross weight is 
limited by power available for take-off and climb.  Until more power is 
available, we cannot fully capitalize on the capabilities of the airplane.140 
By lowering bombing altitudes, LeMay allowed for increased bomber 
payloads.  Because LeMay was anxious to increase aircraft sortie rates and try to 
work around the uncooperative Japanese weather, the lowering of cruise and bombing 
altitudes allowed the B-29 to carry a larger bomb load.  According to LeMay: 
One of the main advantages in going down to less than 10,000 feet over the 
target was the increased bomb load.  We could increase the bomb load of each 
plane from about two and one-half tons to 10 tons.  This was possible because 
each individual attack required no assembly into formation over the base at 
the start of the mission, and because aircraft would go directly from base to 
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target and return, saving tremendous amounts of gasoline.  Better weather 
would be encountered at lower altitudes and the heavy gas-consuming winds 
of high altitudes would be avoided. The weight of extra crew members, 
armament, and ammunition would go into bombs.141 
The amount of fuel a B-29 used to climb to bombing altitude, given a specified 
weight, could use as much as twelve hundred gallons (weighing seven thousand two 
hundred pounds) when climbing at a gross weight of one hundred and thirty thousand 
pounds.  In order to compensate for this fuel weight, power settings had to be 
increased for the long climb to altitude, creating an additional strain on an engine.142  
When bombing by prescribed USAAF methods, the weight of bombs carried in the B-
29 had to be reduced from ten to three tons because of the fuel needed to climb to and 
fly at higher altitudes.143  An average B-29 used seven thousand gallons of gasoline 
on a mission.  The pragmatic LeMay surmised that using over twenty-one tons of fuel 
to drop three tons of bombs did not make sense.144  He determined that by lowering 
altitudes, and negating the requirement to carry the fuel used for climbing to high 
altitude, bomb loads increased significantly.145 
The B-29’s poor high altitude performance necessitated the lowering of 
bombing altitudes and this is turn facilitated higher aircraft reliability figures while 
simultaneously allowing larger payloads.  In this regard mass became an important 
aspect of the American bombing effort.  Increased number of B-29s equated to more 
destructive and deadly raids.  American industry built bombers and fighters at a rate 
with which the Axis powers could not cope.  This massive air armada overwhelmed 
axis air defenses.  Toward the end of the war in both the Pacific theater as well in 
European, mass itself became an important aspect of the strategic campaign.  As more 
   
 135 
planes and aircrew became available, more bombs were dropped.  This same 
application of mass became ever more important in American strategic methodologies 
in the nuclear atomic age. 
The technical problems of the R-3350 engine and the B-29 mandated that 
mission profiles be adjusted to utilize lower altitudes.  This change in profiles in turn 
facilitated the hauling of larger and more destructive bomb loads of M69 incendiaries.  
By summer 1945 much of the Japanese homeland became a vast wasteland.  
Certainly, one of the primary reasons for this was the substantial rise in the number of 
B-29s over the islands and the greatly increased bomb tonnage dropped on each 
mission.  With lower altitudes, LeMay was able to raise the 2.6-ton load of each 
aircraft to 7.4 and keep more aircraft in the air.146  The ability to carry more bomb 
tonnage meant greater destructiveness. 
Despite the fact that the B-29 was designed for high altitude precision 
bombing, the state of the 20th Air Force and the imperfect design of the airframe 
required a modification to bombing operations.  The USSBS noted that: 
The preceding 9 months had seen the B-29 committed in general to the 
doctrine of very high altitude precision bombing.  Designed specifically for 
this type of operation, it was logical and mandatory that the doctrine be 
thoroughly tried before it was modified.  Many factors militated against the 
achievement of this objective, among the foremost of which were 
insurmountable weather obstacles, strain imposed on equipment by high 
altitude operation, insufficient force, low sortie rate, and low bomb loads.147 
The Survey further noted: 
By lowering the bombing altitude, the effectiveness of each B-29 was 
increased tremendously.  Bomb loads more than doubled; using radar 
bombing methods the weather ceased to be a serious factor; the number of 
aircraft dropping on the primary target soared from 58 to 92 per cent . . . 
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decreasing bombing altitude meant less operating strain which added up to 
more sorties per air craft.148 
However, LeMay’s decision to drop bombing altitudes held deadly 
implications for his own aircrews.  Since the USAAF’s bombing experiences were 
based upon the European Theater, the concerns over enemy fighters and flak while 
bombing at low altitude were a major concern.  Furthermore, to save on weight, 
LeMay ordered removal much of the defensive armament on the B-29s.  Not only did 
crews worried about their chances of survival by flying so low over enemy territory, 
but now they faced an inability to defend themselves from Japanese fighters.  Based 
upon what had happened to B-17s and B-24s by Luftwaffe fighter and flak during the 
early missions over Germany, B-29 aircrew were concerned about a repeat experience 
over the Japanese home islands at the hands of the Imperial Army Air Forces.   
That did occur, but as fire raids continued the USAAF found little opposition 
from Japanese air defenses.  In a November 1945 speech, LeMay commented that: 
“We decided to take advantage of what we thought was the Japs’ unpreparedness for 
low altitude attack and exploited it.”149  Japanese anti aircraft fire was usually 
ineffective and the home islands had few low altitude gun concentrations.  
Furthermore, Japan’s homeland defensive fighter force was too meager and 
technologically incapable of thwarting the American onslaught.150  The inability of 
the Japanese to defeat a threat at low altitude only encouraged the USAAF to 
continue its newly found bombing methodology.  
The early performance of the B-29, the unique nature of the Japanese weather 
patterns, perceived manufacturing organization, city architecture, and the 
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development of effective incendiary weapons contributed to the synergy that led to 
the transition of strategic bombing practices.  The combination of these factors 
collectively facilitated the change in applications that laid waste to the Japanese home 
islands.  For the USAAF, LeMay’s change in doctrine from high altitude precision to 
low-level area bombing, while drastic, was mandated in part due to the 
aforementioned conditions.  The decision for LeMay was a tough one and he recalled 
later, “feeling a level of anxiety I’d not wish to experience again.”151  He was well 
aware that his newly developed tactic for the Pacific bombing campaign ran counter 
to existing doctrine and he accepted the risks in order to prosecute the war against 
Japan.152  However, these conditions and the effect they had upon the operational 
commander were only partly responsible for the change in bombing methodology. 
____________________________________________ 
Human Factors 
Despite all the military, technological, and scientific rationales for the change 
in USAAF strategic bombing practices, several of the most compelling reasons for 
the shift from high- altitude, precision bombing are less pronounced and harder to 
define.  While weather, city design and layout, flight characteristics, and operating 
parameters all had a hand to play in the transition, human fear, frailties, and desires 
were also in play.  The willingness and fervor it took to create the conflagrations 
throughout the Japanese home islands were an overriding imperative towards the 
realization of Douhetian bombing.  This motivation came from not only the military 
   
 138 
and civilian officials overseeing the conduct of the war, but was to be found in the 
American populace and deeply imbedded in popular culture. 
Before World War II, anthropologist Ruth Benedict conducted and published 
an in-depth study of Japanese culture and social organization.  In this work, she found 
that the Japanese culture and social values were vastly dissimilar to those of the west 
and were largely alien to traditional American mores.  While her worked remained 
classified during the war, in 1946 it was finally published.  In the preface to her work, 
she stated: 
The Japanese were the most alien enemy the United States had ever fought in 
an all-out struggle.  In no other war with a major foe had it been necessary to 
take into account such exceedingly different habits of acting and thinking . . . 
Conventions of war which Western nations had come to accept as facts of 
human nature obviously did not exist for the Japanese.153 
The cultural unfamiliarity illustrated by Benedict between the U.S. and the Japanese 
is telling and is related to how the USAAF conducted the bombing campaign.  In this 
vein, throughout the war most Americans held the perception that the Japanese were a 
less-than- human race, worthy of annihilation, and the events at Pearl Harbor needed 
to be avenged.  These ideas were so pervasive in American culture that they again 
gave the military establishment tacit approval to conduct bombing operations in any 
manner necessary.  As a result, Americans were largely unconcerned about the 
morality of the firebombing effort as applied to Japan and, like the European bombing 
offensive, largely lauded its results.  This cultural phenomenon not only facilitated the 
transition of bombing practices, but as the war progressed, served as an impetus to 
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inflict as much damage as possible upon a nation unlike itself and altogether alien to 
contemporary American values. 
The national collective will, along with a number of individual agendas, had a 
significant role to play in the transition to low-level area firebombing.  These human, 
and albeit, less tangible rationales for the change in USAAF bombing practices are 
not quantifiable, nor can they be measured with a level of certitude.  However, 
emotional and ultimately human factors are certainly alluded to, and evident in, 
official documents of the USAAF and the War Department as they suffuse the texts, 
pictures, and other manifestations of American popular culture of the time. 
In 1944, Hollywood released a motion picture depicting the trial of the 
captured “Doolittle Raiders” after their B-25s attacked Tokyo in April 1942.  The 
film entitled The Purple Heart (20th Century-Fox, 1944) ended with this statement 
made by one of the doomed fliers: 
It is true we Americans don’t know very much about you Japanese, and never 
did, and now I realize you know even less about us.  You can kill us-all of us, 
or part of us.  But if you think that’s going to put the fear of God into the 
United States of America and stop them from sending other fliers to bomb 
you, you’re wrong, dead wrong.  They’ll blacken your skies and burn your 
cities to the ground and make you get down on your knees and beg for mercy.  
This is your war.  You wanted it.  You asked for it.  And now you’re going to 
get it, and it won’t be finished until your dirty little empire is wiped off the 
face of the earth!154  
This statement illustrates and represents the American hostility toward the Japanese 
throughout the war in the Pacific and its placement in a feature film is indicative of 
the popularity of such proclivities.  This widespread hostility and animosity 
Americans felt toward the Japanese provided approval, and some impetus for, the 
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realization of Douhetian bombing in the Pacific theater.  Despite U.S. claims that it 
did not deliberately target civilians, the bombing efforts over Japan exposed a 
dichotomy within the U.S. defense establishment and the American population. 
Even before Pearl Harbor the Japanese were often vilified in the press for 
bombing Chinese cities during their 1937 invasion.155  Similar sentiment was 
expressed during the Spanish Civil War and when the Germans initiated offensives in 
the early phases of the war in Europe.  In 1940, Roosevelt went so far as to recall, 
“with great pride that the United States consistently has taken the lead in urging that 
this inhuman practice [of bombing civilians] be prohibited.”156  However, after Pearl 
Harbor there was no public outcry against the firebombing of Japanese cities.  Like 
the bombing of Germany, there was no large-scale public objection.  Popular apathy 
about this issue led USAAF leaders to believe that they had approval by the American 
populace to continue the fire raids without fear of a popular backlash.157  While the 
public’s approval might not have been overt, it was at least implied. 
The lack of revulsion and public outcry over the nature of the bombing 
campaign in the Pacific is generally attributed to racial motivations and overt hatred 
of the Japanese.  Loathing of the Japanese had been growing in America since the 
turn of the century and was exacerbated by the Japanese invasion of China and the 
criminal activity of the Imperial Army.158  Pearl Harbor crystallized this hatred and it 
grew over time as the Japanese continued to publicize and perversely revel in their 
atrocities on the world stage.159  FDR was disturbed by Japanese brutality and used 
the words “uncivilized,” “inhuman,” “depraved,” and “barbarous,” when describing 
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Japanese actions.160  A Gallup poll taken in May 1945 asked: “Which people do you 
think are more cruel at heart-the Germans or the Japanese?”  Overwhelmingly 82 
percent picked the Japanese.161  The mistreatment of Allied prisoners; the widespread 
execution, rape, and random killing of Chinese men and women; forced labor and 
institutionalized murder; combined with a host of other Japanese victories all help to 
create fervent anti-Japanese sentiment.  This sentiment led to unquestioning support 
for the firebombing of Japan. 
Anti-Japanese sentiment was resident in official speeches, publications, and 
government documents.  In much of the official correspondence of the USAAF at the 
time, the term “Jap” is widely used and accepted while congratulatory verbiage is 
used prolifically in applauding LeMay’s firebombing efforts.  All the military 
services shared this same sentiment.  Admiral William Halsey, Commander of the 
South Pacific Fleet, established slogans such as “Kill Japs, Kill Japs, Kill more Japs” 
while the Marines furthered Halsey’s motto by adding “keep ‘em dying!”162  The 
Marine Corps monthly magazine Leatherneck ran a headline reminiscent of the 
nineteenth century American Indian Wars stating that the only “Good Japs are Dead 
Japs.”163 
Indicative, too, of widespread American sentiment was the large amount of 
fan mail LeMay received congratulating him and his command’s efforts.  People 
requested autographed photos of the General, 20th Air Force patches, and in some 
cases offered him expensive presents and gifts of appreciation.  Many of the letters 
were similar to one submitted by Mr Julius Kelly of Ardmore, Oklahoma who wrote 
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to “congratulate you General on the fine way you are conducting the present air 
offensive . . . it is through your excellent planning that our air offensive is being so 
successful.”164  Additionally, in a V-mail from Army Chaplin Randolph Gregory, this 
member of the clergy wrote, “from all the reports you are really giving the Japs 
HELL . . . after seeing what you did to Germany I can well visualize what the tinder 
cities of Japan look like . . . we have a deep admiration for your splendid work.”165  
LeMay received many similar letters, including, ironically, at least one note from a 
Japanese-American named Tom Kamikido.  Mr. Kamikido’s congratulatory letter 
ended by bidding “goodbye to a great guy who we the Amerasians look to as a great 
guy [sic].”166  In fact, LeMay had so many requests for signed photos that his supply 
of them at one point ran out.167 
Historian John Dower, in his landmark work addressing the issue of race 
during the Pacific war, surmised that this popular sentiment among Americans was 
also fostered by the federal government’s embarking upon an “annihilationist policy” 
toward the Japanese.168  This anti-Japanese rhetoric and sentiment was due in large 
part to overt racism, the surprise nature of the Pearl Harbor attack, and by the 
continued reports of Japanese atrocities.169  On February 19, 1942, Executive Order 
9066 authorized the forced removal of Japanese-Americans to internment camps in 
the western U.S.  This domestic policy is indicative of the large American sentiment 
regarding the hate and loathing for the Japanese and their culture.  In regard to the use 
of airpower, Dower noted that fire raids were widely accepted as retribution and as 
sound strategic policy, and raised few arguments.170  To many, the burning of cities, 
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such as Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, and Yokohama was “just desserts” for the Japanese 
people who started the war and expanded their empire under the auspices of the East 
Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.  For the Americans, Japan was now “reaping what it had 
sowed.”171 
In July 1945, Major General Claire Chennault, commander of the famed 
“Flying Tigers” and subsequently the 14th Air Force, sent a letter to LeMay in which 
he suggested that the strategic bombing effort include the deliberate poisoning of the 
Japanese rice crop with fuel oil.  Chennault estimated that this effort could kill 20 
percent of Japan’s rice crop and “millions of Japanese [would] face starvation.”172  
While LeMay ignored the suggestion, its malevolent overtones cannot be ignored and 
are indicative of the hatred harbored by American leaders.  For Arnold, Japanese 
military brutality proved to him that they had crossed a moral line that in turn 
justified the firebombing methodology.173  General Spaatz remarked that he did not 
hear any complaints from the American public concerning the mass fire bombing of 
Japan.174  Thus, the USAAF leadership assumed correctly that the vast majority of 
their countrymen approved of a  revenge-fueled strategy.175  California State 
University Professor Ronald Schaffer notes that in the minds of the USAAF 
leadership, the moral attitudes were weighed against American public opinion 
favoring harsh treatment of the Japanese, and in this comparison public opinion was 
the victor.176  After the March 10 raid over Tokyo, Arnold sent congratulations to 
LeMay and stated “this mission proves your crews have the guts for anything.”177 
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In concert with official disdain for the Japanese, a significant portion of 
American public opinion approved of the extermination of the Japanese people or at 
least the country’s “thoroughgoing defeat.”178  Public opinion polls reflected that 10 
to 13 percent of Americans supported the “annihilation” or “extermination” of the 
Japanese as a people.179  In a 1944 poll asking “What do you think we should do with 
Japan as a country after the war?”  13 percent of Americans surveyed wanted to “kill 
all Japanese,” and 33 percent were in favor of destroying Japan as a political state.180 
Comparable sentiments were reflected in the American popular media and 
press.  Time, Life, Colliers, and The Saturday Evening Post magazines freely used the 
term “Jap.”181  When Time magazine reported on the March 1945 fire bombings, the 
magazine lauded these raids, called the results “miraculous,” and admired LeMay’s 
ingenuity.182  (Interestingly the same article referred to these raids as “precision-area 
bombing” in order to differentiate the U.S. effort from that practiced by the RAF.183)  
Colliers magazine ran an article regarding the unique development of the M69 and 
entitled the piece “Tokyo Calling Cards.”184  Furthermore, a 1943 best seller 
Singapore is Silent also insinuated that a war with Japan would continue, “until not 
only the body but the soul . . . is annihilated, until the land . . . is plowed with salt, its 
men dead, women and children divided and lost among other people.”185 
Just as Eaker and Spaatz had been on the cover of Time magazine during the 
European bombing effort, on August 13, 1945, after the dropping of the atomic bomb, 
LeMay was given a cover story on the periodical with the a sub heading that read, 
“Can Japan stand twice the bombing that Germany got?”  The accompanying article 
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addressed the many challenges LeMay faced as the commander of the XXI Bomber 
Command.  Like the pieces on Eaker and Spaatz, the story again painted a very 
positive and upbeat portrait of LeMay as a man who was “a crack pilot with an 
exceptional feel for mechanics work” and is “already the youngest major general in 
the Army who could probably look forward to getting his third star.”186  When 
addressing the firebombing effort, the article even went as far as calling the decision 
“one of the great military decisions of the war.”187  The story concluded by calling the 
General a “level headed, devoted airman.”188 
Popular culture also reflected this overt hatred of Japan and the Japanese 
people and the governments’ annihilationist stance.  A few of the songs during this 
period included titles such as “You’re a Sap, Mr. Jap,” “Take a Rap at the Jap,” and 
“We’re Gonna Have to Slap the Dirty Little Jap,” along with many others, were 
popular with the American public and indicative of the national sentiment.189  All this 
official and popular anti-Japanese rhetoric further fuel the common depiction of the 
Japanese as less than human or subhuman.190  Racial stereotypes and animosities 
were key psychological tenets to the American war effort as the Japanese were 
normally depicted as monkeys, reptiles, insects, and vermin.191  Racially charged 
comments, such as “yellow rats,” “yellow monkeys,” and “yellow bastards,” further 
demonstrated American popular sentiment.192 
In motion pictures, whereas the portrayal of Germans had some leeway 
between good and evil, Japanese were given no such latitude.  Their characters were 
represented as a largely barbarous, evil, and sub-human species.193  While American 
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still struggled with issues regarding race and racial stereotypes at home, the existing 
virulent anti-Japanese prejudice was easy to capitalize upon by movie studios.194  A 
spate of movies reinforced anti-Japanese racial depictions with derisive images.  
Frank Capra’s film Know your Enemy-Japan (U.S. War Department, 1945) repeated 
this theme and reinforced the negative image Americans had developed regarding the 
Japanese.195  While OWI preferred to focus upon the anti-fascist theme rather that 
racism, Hollywood continued to push racial related messages when addressing the 
Pacific war.  Hollywood readily depicted the popular sentiment regarding the 
Japanese as a lesser people.  Reflective of the rest of America, studios capitalized on 
the racial issues and used many of the same derogatory terms in the movies.196  By 
1944 racially laced, anti-Japanese, themes were a mainstay in Hollywood-produced 
movies and added to the popular anti-Japanese sentiment.  While this anti-Japanese 
racial attitude went as far back as the Philippine Insurrection, racial overtones helped 
to make the war in the Pacific more violent and tragic.197 
According to Dower: 
At the simplest level, they (the animal depictions) dehumanized the Japanese 
and enlarged the chasm between “us” and “them” to the point where it was 
perceived to be virtually unbridgeable. . . . The enemy in Europe “were still 
people.”  The Japanese were not, and in good part they were not because they 
were denied even the ordinary vocabularies of being human.198 
Both the official anti-Japanese sentiment and the popular American cultural 
tones provided the “engine of war” for the Pacific theater.  While motivated by both 
anger and outrage over Japanese actions in the Pacific, racial overtones exacerbated 
the existing condition.  All of these factors created an environment that allowed for 
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the transition to incendiary bombing and provided the USAAF carte blanche to 
conduct whatever practices it deemed necessary.  This authority provided LeMay and 
the USAAF unprecedented license to destroy an enemy that was viewed as less than 
human and unworthy of existence in the civilized world. 
As addressed earlier, the desire to reduce American casualties was an implicit 
and over-riding concern on the part of U.S. leadership.  By March 1945, the U.S. had 
been engaged in World War II for just over three years.  While the U.S. served as an 
economic and industrial base for the Allied cause, it had not suffered, statistically, the 
number of casualties other nations involved in the war faced.  Relatively speaking, in 
comparison to Soviet experience on the Eastern Front and British losses in Western 
Europe and North Africa, American casualties were considerably less.199  Despite this 
fact, Americans were keenly aware of the casualties generated in both the European 
Theater and in the Pacific and took notice with the number of gold stars hanging in 
the front windows of some U.S. homes.  
By 1944, the U.S. had scored a number of victories over the Japanese.  Indeed 
since the Guadalcanal and Midway battles in 1942, the Japanese were on the strategic 
defensive with the myth of their invincibility effectively destroyed.  On the other 
hand, these defeats did not mean that Japan was ready to capitulate.  The American 
people were aware of the potential of Japanese resistance and in July of 1945, 86 
percent of Americans believed that the war would continue until 1946 and beyond.200  
Despite their defensive military predicament, the Japanese continued to fight in 
anticipation that continued resistance would undermine American public support for 
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the war.  Through dogged resistance, the Japanese hoped to secure for themselves 
favorable terms for the termination of hostilities.201  This desire to secure better terms 
had a direct impact upon the Japanese measures for the defense of the home island.  
To assist in this goal, at the behest of the Emperor, the Japanese planned to mobilize 
the entire civilian population and turn it into an army.202   
This desperate last gasp effort can be viewed as a fanatical and unrealistic 
request.  However, given Japan’s cultural heritage and values, it is likely that the 
Japanese populace would have continued to fight and resist as mandated by 
Hirohito.203  Benedict validated this belief in Japanese fanaticism by writing that: 
Honor was bound up with fighting to the death.  In a hopeless situation a 
Japanese soldier should kill himself with this last grenade or charge 
weaponless against the enemy in a mass suicide attack.  But he should not 
surrender. Even if taken prisoner when he was wounded or unconscious, he 
“could not hold up his head in Japan” again; he was disgraced; he was dead to 
his former life.204 
This devotion to the emperor was also inextricably linked to the Japanese 
belief in the spirit and its power over materialism.  By 1945 the industrial capacities 
of Japan were shrinking, not just because of the incessant firebombing, but also from 
American sea interdiction efforts and the decimation of the Japanese merchant fleet 
by the U.S. Navy.  During the Pacific war, the U.S. Navy sunk or seriously damaged 
8,900,000 tons of Japanese shipping.205  Most of this effort is attributed to the 
American submarine forces that accounted for over 54 percent of Japanese merchant 
vessel losses.206  Lack of military goods and materials was a constant for the Japanese 
armed forces by this time, but this lack of material was not necessarily seen as an 
impediment to Japanese victory.  The Japanese had a strong belief in the spiritual 
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over the material and thought that combat was merely an issue of mind over matter.  
For the Japanese, according to Benedict: 
The spirit was all and was everlasting; material things were necessary, of 
course, but they were subordinate and fell by the way. . . . This reliance on 
spirit was taken literally in the routine of war; their war catechisms used the 
slogan--and it was a traditional one, not made for this war--“To match our 
training against their numbers and our flesh against their steel.”  Their war 
manuals began with the bold typeline, “Read this and the war is won.”207 
Based upon the Japanese devotion to the emperor and the belief in the spirit over 
material superiority, the defense of the Japanese home islands could be accomplished 
with the proper mind set.  With this concept accepted by the Japanese civilian 
population, the results from an amphibious invasion would have yielded massive 
casualties for both sides.  
For the Americans the concern was the casualty estimate of an invasion of the 
home islands.  However, while confronted with the idea of assaulting the home island 
through a ground invasion, American planners hoped to achieve victory with the 
fewest casualties as possible.208  Because Japan had never surrendered to a foreign 
power, Americans had no way of knowing how the Japanese would react to surrender 
or a home invasion.209  American planners feared that fanatical  Japanese resistance 
might cause the Japanese people to die in mass for their Emperor.  This concern over 
Japanese fanaticism and the mobilization of the Japanese populace for home island 
defense led one 5th Air Force intelligence officer to declare: “There are no civilians 
in Japan.”210  In the same statement, this officer went further to state: “We are making 
war and in making it in the all out fashion which saves American lives, shortens the 
agony which war is and seeks to bring about enduring peace.  We intend to seek and 
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destroy the enemy wherever he or she is in the greatest possible number, in the 
shortest possible time.”211  While a single individual officer made this Douhetian 
statement, the fact that it is published in official USAAF history validates the notion 
that this idea was a prevalent thought resident throughout the USAAF and much of its 
leadership. 
As Americans conducted their offensives, battle casualties increased as the 
Pacific war progressed.  The average monthly rate of losses quadrupled to nearly 
thirteen thousand, and the casualty rates from the assaults on Iwo Jima and Okinawa 
during the spring of 1945 foretold the potential consequences of a homeland 
invasion.212  Casualty estimates for the invasion of the home islands of Japan for the 
first month alone were predicted at thirty one thousand.213  While debate continues 
regarding potential casualty rates, American planners at the time no doubt believed 
that an invasion would have been a bloody affair regardless.  As a result, the 
avoidance of generating American casualties was at the forefront of American 
military concerns.   
At a June 18, 1945 meeting along with the Secretaries of the War and the 
Navy, Admirals Leahy and King, as well as Generals Marshall and Eaker, President 
Truman authorized the invasion of Kyushu.  At the meeting, discussion ensued 
regarding the efficacy of the aerial bombardment campaign over the amphibious 
invasion.  Marshall briefed that “we are bring to bear against the Japanese every 
weapon and all the force we can employ and there is no reduction in our maximum 
possible application of bombardment and blockade.”214  Marshall went on further to 
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point out he did not believe that airpower alone could put the Japanese out of the war.  
Eaker, who was attending at the behest of Arnold, agreed with Marshall’s statement.  
Despite Eaker’s agreement with Marshall regarding the inability of airpower to knock 
Japan out of the war, the blockade combined with a strategic air assault was seen by 
many in USAAF as the best way to force a Japanese surrender without the need for an 
amphibious assault.  LeMay was a proponent of such a strategy and he fully believed 
that airpower alone could force the capitulation of Japan.215  In order to make his 
point LeMay traveled to Washington and briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to include 
General Marshall.  While LeMay flew from the Pacific to Washington DC, the 
briefing was poorly received and according to LeMay, General Marshall had slept 
through most of the brief.216  In defense of this idea LeMay stated: 
Most of us in the Army Air Force had been convinced for a long time that it 
would be possible to defeat Japan without invading their home islands.  We 
needed to establish bases within reasonable range; then we could bomb and 
burn them until they quit.  That was our theory, and history had proven that 
we were right.  The ground gripping Army, and the Navy, didn’t agree.  They 
discounted the whole idea.217 
LeMay went on further to state that: 
The number of American casualties which would be incurred by an actual 
invasion of the islands of Kyushu and Honshu was well up in the imaginative 
brackets and then some . . . I think we would have won the war anyway, 
merely by sticking to our incendiary tactics.  But we were given the [atomic] 
bombs and told to go ahead and drop them.218 
The USSBS later observed, “General LeMay believed that all out air attacks 
could force Japan to surrender prior to the planned invasion and, at the calculated risk 
of exhausting all available crews, he committed the command accordingly.”219  Based 
upon his own statements and sentiment, history can conclude that LeMay felt no 
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remorse over the bombing of Japanese civilians because he saw it as a way to avoid 
American casualties.  The avoidance of a ground invasion was worth the expense of 
American lives and was paid for by Japanese civilians.  He expressed similar views 
regarding the use of atomic weapons on the Japanese and viewed it as a question of 
military expediency and not so much as a moral issue.220  In the end LeMay could 
argue that his tactic saved many thousands of Japanese lives, who would have been 
killed in an invasion, in addition to the American soldiers who would have died 
facing Hirohito’s mobilized civilians. 
Arnold, while a believer in the potential of the strategic air effort, favored a 
land invasion of at least one home island.  Despite LeMay’s ideas, Arnold saw the 
potential of capturing the southern home island of Kyushu (Operation OLYMPIC) 
and using it as base for B-17s and B-24s to attack the main island of Honshu.  In this 
regard, the seizure of Kyushu would allow the Eighth Air Force to transfer from 
Europe to the Pacific, thereby increasing offensive airpower.  This power would then 
be used against the main island of Honshu and make the invasion of the larger island 
(Operation CORONET) unnecessary.221 
However, Arnold’s official concurrence, via Eaker, had pivotal implications 
for the future of an independent air force.  His submitted recommendation was placed 
in order to avoid the potential alienation of Marshall, who advocated the use of 
ground forces for an invasion, but who was also warming to the idea of an 
autonomous U.S. air force as previously mentioned.  However, in his quest for an 
independent air arm, Arnold did not want to risk the alienation of Marshall.222   
   
 153 
Regardless of LeMay’s failure to change the minds of the Washington 
leadership, the conduct of the strategic campaign prior to the dropping of the atomic 
bomb was no doubt influenced by the idea of defeating Japan in an expedient manner 
that precluded the generation of massive American casualties through a ground 
invasion.  While not necessarily directed by Washington or by the Joint Chiefs, 
LeMay was given wide latitude to conduct bombing operations as he saw fit.  
LeMay’s superiors never questioned the issue of his burning large swatches of 
Japanese cities and killing thousands of civilians.  Even Marshall’s previously 
mentioned statement regarding the use of “every weapon and the force we can 
employ” hints that at the national level, the bombing effort had Washington’s full 
endorsement.  Despite Stimson’s concerns over area bombardment, the civilian 
leadership’s silence regarding firebombing equated to an approval. 
Much as he had in Europe, Arnold again played a significant role in the 
bombing campaign.  However, this significant achievement did come at a price, and 
part of that price was to be paid by the citizens of Imperial Japan in 1945.  As noted 
previously, for Arnold the desire to validate the strategic bombing concept and 
airpower as a viable tool for the subjugation of an enemy was an overriding 
imperative for the USAAF.  There was no doubt that Arnold’s main goal was to have 
the USAAF contribute to winning the war to the largest extent possible while 
ensuring that the Air Force received full due credit.223   
Much like in the European effort, Arnold’s desire to secure the future of the 
Air Force was tied directly to the success of the bombing campaigns and especially 
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the B-29.  As discussed previously, it was Arnold who took the chances, cut the 
corners, and ordered an airplane into production before the prototype was even 
built.224  Because of the risks he took with the B-29 project and the concerns he had 
regarding its success, Arnold personally selected the commanders for each B-29 
bomb group.225   
In late 1944, when the XXIst Bomber Command was not producing the results 
he expected with the B-29, Arnold sent his Chief of Staff , Lauris Norstad, to Guam 
in January to remove the commanding officer, Major General Hansell (who had been 
a key figure in the development of AWPD-1) and replaced him with LeMay.  This 
replacement came on the heels of the relief of another commander, Brigadier General 
K. B. Wolfe from the XXth Bomber Command in the CBI theater.  This ability to 
replace commanders who were not producing up to the standards Arnold required 
sent reverberations throughout the USAAF.226  However, condemnation of Hansell 
was subdued.  The only disparaging words said about Hansell was that he was too 
inflexible regarding high altitude bombing doctrine and not pragmatic enough to 
adjust the environment over Japan while compensating for the shortfalls of the B-29 
design.227   
This desire to ensure the success of the B-29 went even further as it resulted in 
his personal oversight of B-29 operations.  The 20th Air Force was created in April 
1944 and functioned directly under the JCS.  The headquarters was established in 
Washington, DC, with Arnold in command.  However, when the B-29s were sent to 
the Pacific and CBI theaters, they remained under his direct control.228  Arnold 
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retained control believing that placing the B-29 under a theater commander was a 
mistake.  After the war he declared “while everybody wondered why I kept personal 
command of the B-29s there was nothing else I could do, with no unity of command 
in the Pacific.  I could find no one there who wanted unity of command.”229 
Furthermore, his retention of the Twentieth Air Force precluded some 
commander to be tempted to divert the strategic bomber from its intended purpose 
and use it for tactical missions.230  Neither Nimitz, MacArthur, nor Stilwell were 
strong advocates of strategic airpower, and the lack of unity of command in the 
Pacific theater concerned Arnold as he retained control in order to ensure the strategic 
use of the B-29.231  This fear over the misuse of the Superfortress was further 
validated when the Navy requested B-29s to conduct antisubmarine duties.232  Thus, 
Arnold’s retention of B-29 operations was intended to ensure that the weapon system 
was used to conduct the types of missions for which it was designed. 
Arnold saw the B-29 and its mission as its own theater of war.  Toward this 
end, even the name of the 20th Air Force reflected this significance.  With fifteen 
numbered air forces already in place, the next number for the new air force should 
have been sixteen.  However, Arnold himself decided to call the new air force the 
Twentieth because he saw the strategic bombing of Japan as a separate endeavor in 
the war, and the obtuse numerical designation helped to illustrate this fact.233  
In a March 1945 letter from Arnold to his subordinate, the Air Force Chief of 
Staff wrote; “Under reasonably favorable conditions you should then have the ability 
to destroy whole industrial cities should that be required.”234  This ability to destroy 
   
 156 
whole cities, combined with Arnold’s desire for results and LeMay’s initiative, 
helped set the stage for the widespread destruction of Japanese infrastructure.  For 
LeMay, the B-29 and the capabilities it possessed created a unique opportunity in the 
annals of war.  LeMay summed up his attitude in a message to Brigadier General 
Lauris Norstad, Chief of Staff for the 20th Air Force: 
I am influenced by the convictions that the present stage of development of 
the air war against Japan presents the AAF for the first time with the 
opportunity of proving the power of the strategic air arm.  I consider that for 
the first time strategic air bombardment faces a situation in which its strength 
is proportionate to the magnitude of its task.  I feel that the destruction of 
Japan’s ability to wage war lies within the capability of this command, 
provided its maximum capacity is exerted unstintingly during the next six 
months, which is considered to be the critical period.  Though naturally 
reluctant to drive my force at an exorbitant rate, I believe that the opportunity 
now at hand warrants extraordinary measures on the part of all sharing it.235 
LeMay himself best describes his relationship with Arnold in light of the B-
29: 
General Arnold, fully committed to the B-29 program all along, had crawled 
out on a dozen limbs about a thousand times, in order to achieve the physical 
resources and sufficient funds to built those airplanes and get them into 
combat. . . So he finds that they’re not doing well. He has to keep juggling 
missions and plans and people until the B-29’s do well. General Arnold was 
absolutely determined to get results out of this weapon system. The turkey is 
around my neck.  I’ve got to deliver.236 
Despite the fact that LeMay had initially used the same tactics that were 
employed by Hansell, the desire to achieve significant results with the B-29 created 
yet another impetus for a change in strategic bombing practices.  LeMay once replied, 
“I never felt that they [the USAAF leadership] were looking over my shoulder.  I 
knew what was expected of me and why I was there.  I had to produce some 
results.”237  While Arnold did not directly order the firebombing, especially since he 
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was unaware of LeMay’s initial change in mission profiles for the March raids, his 
influence and desire for the proof of bombing’s effectiveness and the validation of 
funds for the B-29 had considerable influence.  In the final analysis, LeMay’s ability 
to turn from established procedures, once they proved to be ineffective, and try a new 
approach was a key aspect to his success.238  This ability of LeMay not only served 
Arnold well in his desires, but also got the most effective use out of the B-29 while 
creating favorable conditions for the surrender of Japan.   
The moral reservations about Douhetian bombing as conducted by the 20th 
Air Force during the war remained muted for many reasons.  In the minds of 
American policy makers, the desire the end the war quickly with the lowest possible 
casualty figures took precedence over moral considerations about the indiscriminate 
bombing of civilian populations.239  Furthermore, animosity, revenge, and racial 
prejudice toward the Japanese provided additional rationales to the firebombing 
effort.  While LeMay, Arnold, and the rest of the USAAF did not necessarily justify 
their bombing operations with these reasons, the American public gave its implicit 
approval based upon these largely human emotions.  
To the typical American citizen today, the hatred and loathing Americans held 
toward the Japanese during the war is largely forgotten and is an antithetical to 
contemporary values.  While Japan is now one of the U.S.’s largest trading partners 
and a keystone in America’s nation defense posture in Asia, the truth is that 
Americans in World War II were united by their visceral hate of the Japanese during 
the Pacific War.  This abhorrence of Japan seems as alien to present day Americans 
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as Benedict saw Imperial Japanese empire values to American ones.  Historical 
relativism distorts the past as today’s historians often overlay 21st century values and 
mores and superimpose them on top of past events.  The error of imposing current 
mores upon historical events provides a false picture of past events and distorts the 
contemporary zeitgeist of the World War II period.  In this regard, it is important to 
remember that at the time of the Pacific bombing campaign, the detestation 
Americans felt toward Japan was of paramount importance to the generation that 
worked to defeat the Axis powers.  Furthermore, the passage of time ought neither 
diminish nor to trivialize the importance of these concerns and the role that they 
played in the prosecution of the war. 
____________________________________________ 
Summary 
The Japanese home island presented unique challenges and opportunities for 
the proponents of airpower and strategic bombing.  Faced with unique weather 
patterns that thwarted the use of high altitude precision-bombing methods, the 
officers of the USAAF had to develop other methods of dropping bombs on the 
Japanese home island.  Further complicating the matter was the fact that Japanese 
industry was a widespread affair that was not neatly clustered like its Nazi 
counterpart.  Because the Japanese had included, for a time, home industry, USAAF 
planners felt that targeting entire urban areas was required.  Included with this was 
the fact that smaller “feeder” factories were located in urban areas and this too 
contributed to the area bombing practices of the 20th Air Force.  Also, because large 
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areas had to be bombed instead of centralized locations, use of fire was seen as an 
effective and efficient weapon.  East Asian architectural practices were conductive to 
incendiary bombing and the fires they produced became the primary weapon for the 
USAAF.  
In addition to the natural barriers, technological issues also drove changes in 
bombing practices.  Design flaws and mechanical failures of the B-29 and its many 
components and subsystems further exacerbated existing problems with precision 
bombing practices.  Problems with the engines provided significant challenges to the 
20th Air Force and resulted in the loss of both aircraft and aircrews.  Pragmatic fixes 
to these engineering problems combined with the natural environment mandated a 
change in bombing methodologies. 
In the political realm, the use of firebombing held the promise for a potential 
victory without need for a large-scale amphibious assault of the home islands.  In 
regards to the political objective of “unconditional surrender,” strategic bombing in 
the Pacific served political ends much the same way it had in Europe.  LeMay and 
select officers of the USAAF thought that airpower alone might bring about 
capitulation despite Marshall’s and others belief in the requirement for an invasion.  
In this consideration, widespread fear over large U.S. casualty counts resulted in the 
inflicting as much damage upon the Japanese and the use of firebombing fit that 
requirement. 
Lastly, war is a human endeavor and conducted through the passions, hatred, 
and irrationality that are a part of human emotion.  These fallible human 
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characteristics, combined with analytical and systemic reasoning, facilitated and 
probably expedited the transition to low-level area bombing.  The desire to end the 
war quickly without a land invasion, racism toward and hatred of the Japanese 
people, combined with various individual agendas were all variables that affected 
USAAF operations.  These emotions and feelings were resident in the national 
political leadership, the military officers, and in the American population as a whole.  
Sufficient enmity existed throughout the U.S. that gave both explicit and implicit 
approval of area firebombing of Japanese cities.  While the 20th Air Force did not 
necessarily have to seek approval for its newly found methodology, the tacit 
concurrence from the U.S. government and the American people allowed USAAF to 
develop applications that would have been seen as inhumane and repugnant just a few 
years earlier. 
While these human variables were conventional, advances in science and 
technology now made it possible to employ “exterminationist practices” that were 
wholly unconventional.240  Toward this end, racism, dehumanization, and hatred 
combined with technological advances became inextricably linked to cause the kind 
of widespread carnage experienced by the Japanese Empire in the spring of 1945.  
This marriage of technology and human nature made it possible for the first time in 
history to conceive of deliberate annihilation of an entire race of people in a relatively 
short period.  This recipe for conflagration and disaster moved to another level when 
atomic and thermonuclear weapons made their appearance on the world stage. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
RIGHT ANGLE: 
Nuclear Warfare 
____________________________________________ 
 
At 0230, July 16, 1945, a storm hit New Mexican desert in a downpour 
delaying the test of the world’s first nuclear explosion.  Located adjacent to the 
Oscura Mountains in a plain called the “Jornada del Muerto” and sitting atop a 103-
foot steel tower was a nuclear device weighing 10,000 pounds with a cast aluminum 
external shell.1  Inside the shell was a core of gunmetal black plutonium surrounded 
by two layers of yellowish, precisely shaped and placed blocks of Composition B and 
Baratol high explosives.2  On the exterior of the device lay a morass of wires and 
conduits connected to a precise and exacting triggering mechanism that would initiate 
a force causing an implosion and start a nuclear chain reaction.3 
The weather was so severe that the two B-29 bombers scheduled to observe 
the explosion from the air were unable to fly over the test site, code named Trinity.  
As the early morning hours passed, it seemed that the test might be scrubbed for the 
day, much to the chagrin of the chief scientist of the Manhattan Project, J. Robert 
Oppenheimer and the officer in charge, Major General Leslie Groves.  Working six 
days a week, for the past few months both men and their subordinates experienced a 
spartan-like existence in the austere desert environment and were under tremendous 
pressure to produce results with the $2 billion of taxpayer’s money they spent.  
Overcoming scientific and mathematical problems posed numerous hurdles, but the 
physicists at the Los Alamos Scientific Lab (LASL) were also saddled with the 
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additional challenge of successfully detonating “the gadget” during the conduct of the 
Potsdam Conference being held in occupied Germany from July 17 to August 2, 
1945.4 
 
 
Figure 15.  “The Gadget,” The Trinity bomb fully assembled atop the test tower.  Source: White Sands 
Missile Range, http://www.wsmr.army.mil/pao/TrinitySite/tpixind.htm# (accessed October 16, 2007). 
 
 
By 0400 the rain began to dissipate and hopes revived that the test could be 
conducted in the early morning darkness.  A nighttime detonation was specifically 
planned so that the ensuing explosion would attract less attention and the resulting 
fireball, observed against a dark background, would provide a better contrast for 
photographs.5  Waiting out the storm at the base camp were Oppenheimer and 
Groves.  Oppenheimer, who chained smoked his own hand-rolled cigarettes and 
drank prodigious amounts of coffee, was clad in his usual khaki trousers and grey 
“pork-pie” hat.6  The meteorological department determined that a two-hour window 
of clear weather approached and gave the favorable forecast to Oppenheimer.  Based 
on this promising report, the chief scientist gave the order to conduct the test by 0530. 
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After Oppenheimer made the decision and its subsequent announcement, the 
arming party closed various circuit switches and departed the tower area for the 
control center some ten thousand yards south of the shot tower.  At 0510, the public 
address system announced the initiation of the countdown.7  As the countdown passed 
the one-minute mark, classical music seeped in the background noise of the 
loudspeaker.  Because a Voice of America radio transmission operated on the same 
frequency as the Trinity public addresses system, the sound of Tchaikovsky’s 
Serenade in Strings provided an ironic setting to the event.8  Forty-five seconds from 
the explosion, the automatic timing switch energized and triggered electrical circuits.  
Fifteen seconds later the voltmeter indicted that the firing unit was fully charged.9  
After charging, an automated timing sequence took over leaving the scientists nothing 
to do but wait. 
The bomb went off at exactly 0529.45 when the firing circuits engaged 
simultaneously at thirty-two separate points on the sphere.10  The detonators set off 
the first layer of composition B and then triggered a second set of explosives creating 
a shock wave compressing the gadget’s plutonium core.11  When the shock wave 
reached an initiator in the core, free neutrons released from a polonium and beryllium 
mixture at the center of the sphere starting a nuclear chain reaction.12  The free 
neutrons collided with the plutonium atoms and began splitting the atomic structure.  
The chain reaction began to multiply itself through eighty generations in a millionth 
of second, creating phenomenal amounts of pressure along with a corresponding rise 
in temperature.13  Light filled the skies. 
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Regarding the explosion, General Groves reported: 
For a brief period there was a lightning effect within a radius of 20 miles 
equal to several suns in midday; a huge ball of fire was formed which lasted 
for several seconds.  This ball mushroomed and rose to a height of over ten 
thousand feet before it dimmed.  The light of the explosion was clearly seen at 
Albuquerque, Santa Fe, Silver City, El Paso, and other points generally to 
about 180 miles away.  The sound was heard to the same distance in a few 
instances but generally 100 miles away. . . . A massive cloud was formed 
which surged and billowed upward with tremendous power, reaching the sub 
stratosphere at an elevation of 41,000 feet . . . in about five minutes, breaking 
without interruption through a temperature inversion at 17,000 feet which 
most of the scientists thought would stop it.14 
Even with welders’ goggles on, eyewitness accounts report that the bright flash from 
the explosion was several times brighter than the sun.15  All of southern New Mexico 
felt the explosion, as did parts of Arizona and Texas.  Many people in this large 
geographical area wondered if an earthquake had taken place.16 
After the explosion, Groves and other members of LASL staff conducted an 
inspection of the test site.  Vaporizing the entire tower, the only remnants of the 
structure left were parts of the concrete footings and thick metal rebar that at one time 
helped hold the tower in place.  According to Groves: 
A crater from which all vegetation had vanished, with a diameter of 1200 feet 
and a slight slope toward the center was formed.  In the center was a shallow 
bowl 130 feet in diameter and 6 feet in depth.  The material within the crater 
was completely pulverized dirt.  The material within the outer circle is 
greenish [from the formation of Trinitite. A glassy residue made from silica 
and feldspar melted together during the blast] and can be distinctively seen 
from as much as 5 miles away. The steel from the tower was evaporated.  
1500 feet away [from the center] there was a four-inch iron pipe 16 feet high 
set in concrete and strongly guyed.  It disappeared completely . . . One half 
mile from the explosion there was a massive steel test cylinder weighing 220 
tons.  The base of the cylinder was solidly encased in concrete.  Surrounding 
the cylinder was a strong steel tower 70 feet high, firmly anchored to concrete 
foundations . . . Forty tons of steel were used to fabricate the tower. . . The 
blast tore the tower from its foundations, twisted it, ripped it apart, and left if 
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flat on the ground.  The effects on the tower indicate that, at a distance, 
unshielded permanent steel and masonry buildings would have been 
destroyed.17 
The most interesting comment regarding the result of the explosion made by Groves 
referenced his most recently completed engineering project, the building of the 
Pentagon.  This massive concrete building was a marvel for the time because of its 
solid construction and massive size.  However, upon witnessing the force of the 
Trinity explosion and the potential power of nuclear blasts, Groves admitted, “I no 
longer consider the Pentagon a safe shelter from such a bomb.”18 
Aside from the technical innovation and scientific achievement made possible 
by the Manhattan scientists, the moral and ethical dilemmas created by their work 
continue to trouble man.  The development of nuclear weapons and the effects they 
produce only exacerbated the dichotomies regarding precision bombardment, 
American values, and the goal of total victory.  Existing doctrine at the time still 
advocated precision application of bombing.  The introduction of nuclear weapons 
drastically changed American bombing strategies.  The use of mass had begun to 
replace precision and with it, an acceptance of large numbers of civilian casualties.  
Despite the pre-war goal of avoiding the targeting of civilian populations, the 
generation of massive casualties became implicit in bombing operations.  While the 
USAAF killed thousands of civilians during World War II based upon operational 
practices and necessities, the introduction of the atomic bomb represented a deliberate 
change in bombing applications.  Notably, the decision to use atomic weapons was 
not made by operational commanders dealing with the limitations of their planes and 
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crews or in light of a determined air defense.  Rather the adoption of nuclear warfare 
and the generation of massive casualties was a deliberate and conscious choice made 
by the civilian political leadership in conjunction with leaders in the War Department.  
With the introduction of nuclear weapons, the tenets behind precision bombardment 
appeared to be archaic and obsolete. 
The dichotomies between the advancement of scientific knowledge, the 
generation of massive casualties, and the moral implications of harnessing nuclear 
technology for military purposes was best captured in a quote expressed by Trinity 
Test Director Kenneth Bainbridge to Oppenheimer following the July explosion.  
After the successful detonation and initial celebrations, Oppenheimer was leaving the 
control center and returning to base camp.  Still basking in the hubris of the moment, 
Oppenheimer went to shake hands with Bainbridge, who softly told the chief 
scientist, “Now we’re all sons of bitches.”19 
____________________________________________ 
The Strategic Imperative 
The ability to harness atomic energy and then to use it against an enemy came 
to fruition on August 6 and 9, 1945 over the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  While 
USAAF aircrew and personnel delivered atomic bombs, the choice to use weapons of 
mass destruction was not necessarily a military decision based upon operational needs 
or tactical consideration.  Rather, the decision to use these weapons derived from 
strategic political deliberations made at echelons largely above the USAAF.  It was 
not the USAAF’s decision to employ these weapons, but the use of such power was in 
 173 
contrast to existing doctrine.  Despite American claims of abhorring the killing of 
innocent civilians, the political leadership at the federal level, along with members of 
the War Department, saw that the best way to achieve the aims of the U.S. in the 
Pacific War was to employ strategic bombers with nuclear weapons and destroy large 
parts of an entire city. 
Regardless of the USAAF’s concepts concerning precision bombardment, 
political necessity and the exigencies of war overrode moral imperatives and existing 
doctrinal constructs.  Since the Casablanca Conference and the Cairo Declaration in 
1943, the political ends of the U.S. mandated the “unconditional surrender” of the 
Axis powers.  Not willing to back off this requirement for the termination of the war, 
the use of nuclear weapons provided a promising way to force the Japanese to 
capitulate, with the USAAF providing the means to deliver and employ them. 
The use of atomic weapons brought about a new dimension in warfare.  A 
single aircraft with a small bomb load, now accomplished what once required a fleet 
of heavy bombers.  Some envisioned that nuclear weapons meant an end to large 
bombing raids comprised of several hundred planes.20  American technological 
prowess significantly changed the calculus of war, akin to a revolution in military 
affairs.  The effects generated by the development of nuclear weapons were two-fold.  
Not only did they physically destroy structures and kill adversaries, but they also had 
an important psychological effect that was just as potent.  The mere threat of their use 
provided a non-kinetic weapon aimed at an enemy psyche, which proved to be just as, 
if not more effective.  However, the harnessing of atomic energy and its 
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indiscriminant destructive power posed potential moral and ethical issues for the U.S. 
threatening to make the idea of precision bombardment irrelevant. 
By the spring of 1945, the U.S. was on the march in the Pacific.  Japanese 
forces were strategically on the defensive since their crushing defeat at Midway in 
June 1942.  The loss of her carrier fleet and most of its aircraft and pilots at the battle 
prevented the Japanese from conducting further large-scale offensive action.  Since 
Midway U.S. forces had the strategic initiative and taken a number of islands 
throughout the Pacific slowly shrinking the Japanese Empire.  American assaults 
during the “Island Hopping” campaign combined with MacArthur’s Philippine 
strategy forced the Empire of the Rising Sun to wane.  Furthermore, through the U.S. 
Navy’s efficient destruction of the Japanese merchant fleet, the home islands suffered 
from a lack of vital war materials and the natural resources from the East Indies.  This 
effort, combined with LeMay’s firebombing raids, created a desperate situation for 
the Empire’s armed forces. 
By late 1944, the Imperial Japanese forces were falling short of everything but 
manpower.  By western standards, the Japanese military was unable to conduct large-
scale offensive battle and could only undertake delaying actions against the Allied 
onslaught.  Estimates made during 1945 placed the Japanese Army at roughly five 
million men.21  With no hope of defeating the Americans, the Japanese established a 
defensive approach aimed at postponing or at least frustrating the American offensive 
march.  Entitled “Sho Go” (Victory Operations) the Imperial Japanese Headquarters 
in 1944 developed this defensive strategy with two thoughts in mind.22  The first 
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intent, specifically designed to frustrate the American advance, planned to create as 
many American casualties as possible.  The Japanese ordered “Sho Go” attrition style 
of warfare in hopes that the Americans would sue for some kind of negotiated peace 
to avoid the continuous blood letting of its Pacific offensive.  Secondly, these 
delaying actions on the fringes of the Empire could buy time for the establishment of 
effective defensive positions on the home islands.23 
The American experiences on Iwo Jima and Okinawa were glaring examples 
of the tenacity of Japanese defenders.  The battle of Iwo Jima resulted in over 25,000 
American casualties (dead and wounded) and over 20,000 Japanese deaths.  Figures 
from Iwo Jima paled in comparison to casualty figures on Okinawa a few months 
later when some 60,000 Allied troops were casualties, with Japanese deaths estimated 
around 100,000.24  Tragically, over 150,000 Okinawan civilians, one-third of the 
civilian population, caught in the middle of the fight also perished.  Both of these 
battles indicated to American planners that an even bloodier experience would occur 
on the Japanese home islands once the Allies invaded Kyushu and Honshu. 
Despite the casualty figures, and what they foretold for an assault of the 
Japanese home islands, the Allied goal of “unconditional surrender” mandated the 
thoroughgoing defeat of the Japanese Empire.  When FDR died on April 12, 1945, 
Harry Truman ascended to the presidency.  In his first address before a joint session 
of Congress on April 16, 1945, Truman reiterated his predecessors policy by 
announcing “our demand had been, and it remains-Unconditional Surrender!  We will 
not traffic with the breakers of peace on the terms of peace.”25  He repeated his 
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adherence to FDR’s policy weeks later during his VE-Day speech by stating, “Our 
blows will not cease until the Japanese military and naval forces lay down their arms 
in unconditional surrender.”26  Truman was committed to more than just the 
unconditional surrender mandate and sought to continue all efforts established by 
FDR.  Shortly after taking office, the new president hung a picture of FDR in the 
Oval Office and stated, “I’m trying to follow FDR’s policies as much as possible.”27 
The unconditional surrender stipulation, experts acknowledged, carried with it 
the potential for a very bloody price tag regarding the Pacific War.  Just as it had been 
a worry in the European Theater against Germany, casualty rates were a great concern 
in the Pacific War.  With the Iwo Jima and Okinawa experience fresh in mind, an 
amphibious assault of the Japanese home islands would be a blood bath for both 
sides.  At the same June 18 meeting at the White House that addressed the ability of 
airpower to single handedly knock the Japanese out of the war, the President, the 
Joint Chiefs, and the service secretaries discussed the unconditional surrender 
mandate.  During this meeting Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President for the 
Army and the Navy, expressed the concern that insistence on unconditional surrender 
“would result only in making the Japanese desperate and thereby increase our 
casualty lists.”28 
The attendees discussed recent casualty figures from Pacific battles and ratios 
between American dead to enemy dead.  During the meeting General Marshall stated 
that American casualty numbers on Pacific battlefields was so diverse that he 
“considered it wrong to give any estimate in [casualty] numbers” regarding the 
 177 
invasion of the Japanese home islands.29  Despite this vague answer, the magnitude of 
expected casualties was a topic of discussion at the meeting and Truman heard figures 
that would at least give him an idea of how many would die.  Admiral Leahy drew the 
conclusion that the casualty figures for the invasion of Japan would be comparable to 
the 35 percent experienced during the battle of Okinawa.  30Marshall pointed out that 
the total assault troops planned for the Kyushu campaign was 766,700 while the 
Japanese forces numbered some 350,000 with more troops coming.31  Based upon the 
35 percent figure and the numbers provided by Marshall, American casualties could 
have been around 270,000.  Admiral King, Chief of Naval Operations, added to the 
discourse and estimated that casualties would be between the numbers experienced in 
Luzon and Okinawa.32 
After the war, discussion ensued regarding Japanese efforts to end the war 
prior to the atomic bombings and of their attempts to reach some sort of negotiated 
peace.  Messages between Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Shigenori Togo and 
Ambassador Naotake Sato in Moscow address the potential use of Soviet help to 
negotiate and end to the war.  In this effort, they attempted to arrange a meeting 
between Japanese Prince Konoye and Soviet officials to mediate some kind of 
resolution.  While certain elements of the government saw the futility of continuing 
the war, other segments adhered to traditional Japanese values and wished to fight to 
the bitter end.  Even after the dropping of the Nagasaki bomb, military elements of 
the Japanese government were still opposed to the idea of surrender and attempted to 
subvert the capitulation effort.33  On the eve of defeat, elements of the Japanese 
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military attempted to confiscate the Emperor’s surrender recording and prevent its 
broadcast.  While much debate occurred regarding the pro-surrender Japanese 
officials and efforts to stave off an invasion, the public pronouncements of the 
government, legislative actions, and the preparations underway on Kyushu reinforced 
the perception that Japanese intended to resist and would not capitulate without a 
fight on the home islands.  Based upon these Japanese public declarations and martial 
actions, the U.S. had no choice but to continue making decisions based upon a 
determined Japanese defense. 
In order to avoid the large number of casualties, but still reach American 
objectives in the Pacific, there were efforts made to curtail the unconditional 
surrender requirement and be less stringent in its application.34  In early June, former 
President Herbert Hoover sent a memorandum to Truman that outlined the 
requirements for a Japanese surrender that was less than unconditional.  The 
document specified conditions Japan could meet that would still satisfy overall 
American war aims.35 
From the War Department, Marshall advised Stimson that the U.S. needed to 
be more subtle and nuanced in its requirements and that unconditional surrender be 
looked upon as a slogan and not necessarily a policy.36  Despite these efforts to tone 
down the unconditional surrender mandate or ameliorate its harsh terms, at the June 
18 meeting Truman finally replied that it was up to Congress to change the 
unconditional surrender requirement and that “he did not feel that he could take any 
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action at this time to change public opinion on the matter.”37  This retort effectively 
ended further discussion on the matter. 
During the same meeting, Stimson voiced concern over the potential ferocity 
of Japanese resistance.  He expressed an opinion that there were Japanese who were 
not in favor of the war, but if attacked on their own ground, they would “fight 
tenaciously.”38  Given the Japanese ideas of honor and the samurai tradition, the very 
idea of surrender was abhorrent to the Imperial Army and the national population.39  
Bushido and the warrior code required an individual to fight until death with 
unswerving loyalty to the Emperor.  Furthermore, to the Japanese the idea of 
surrender was even more repugnant in light of their ideas regarding racial superiority 
compounded with the fact that no invader or foreign power ever occupied the 
Japanese home islands.40 
Following Samurai tradition and social structures, every Japanese family fell 
under the authority of a patriarch and under his rule; everyone else had a role to play.  
For the Japanese, they saw themselves as the patriarch to the people of Asia and the 
imposition of their will on other nations and races was both correct and proper.41  The 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere established by the Japanese purported 
equality in this area of the world, but in reality the organization merely reflected the 
self-aggrandizing attitude of the Japanese.  Indicative of the Japanese idea of racial 
superiority is a 1943 publication outlining the demographic impact of the war in light 
of Asian history.  This multivolume work of over three thousand pages was entitled 
“An Investigation of Global Policy with the Yamato Race as Nucleus.”42  Based upon 
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this egocentric view of the world, the Japanese looked upon Americans with the same 
contempt as other nations.  Even in the face of LeMay’s relentless firebombing 
efforts, Japanese ideas regarding racial superiority still existed.  In an August 1945 
radio response to the American aerial assault, the Japanese announcer stated, “Japan 
simply will not submit” and despite the heavy bombing Germany was subject to, “the 
severe pounding it received was no criterion as far as Japan is concerned. Orientals 
are made of sterner stuff.”43 
On July 26, the Potsdam Declaration reiterated Allied resolve regarding 
unconditional surrender and gave the Japanese government full warning regarding use 
of military force against the home islands.  Although two of the “Big Three” players 
had changed, Clement Atlee for Churchill and Truman for FDR, the Allies were still 
in agreement regarding the conditions for the conclusion of hostilities.  Addressing 
their terms for surrender the Allies specified, “We will not deviate from them. There 
are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.”44  Even the concluding lines of the 
Potsdam Declaration hinted at an assault similar to what Douhet envisioned as the 
Allies promised the “prompt and utter destruction” of Japan.45 
In response to the Potsdam Declaration, Time magazine reported that the 
Japanese Premier Kanto Suzuki renounced the declaration by stating, “So far as the 
Imperial Government of Japan is concerned, it will take no notice of this 
proclamation.”46  Suzuki went on to further state that he would treat the declaration 
with “mokusatsu,” which was interpreted by many to mean silent contempt.47  
However, the term mokusatsu has other translations to include to “take no notice of” 
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or to “remain in a wise and masterly inactivity.”48  Debate exists regarding context of 
the Premier’s comments.  Some believe that he used the mokusatsu term in the latter 
context and actually meant “no comment” while waiting to see if some of Japan’s 
peace efforts with the Soviet Union would be successful. 
Taking the more negative interpretation of mokusatsu, the New York Times 
reported, “Suzuki called the Potsdam ultimatum a mere repetition of the Cairo 
Declaration and said Japan would ignore it as unimportant.”49  While U.S. papers 
decried the rejection of the declaration, Japanese papers reiterated stubborn resolve 
and the refusal to surrender.  The Japanese Mainichi daily newspaper called the 
Potsdam declaration a “laughable matter.”50  Adding to the more negative 
interpretation regarding the use of the word mokusatsu was the Ashai Shimbun 
newspaper.  As Tokyo’s largest news daily, it called the Potsdam Declaration “a thing 
of no great value” and at a press conference held on July 28, Premier Suzuki declared 
that the Potsdam declaration was only a “rehash” of the Cairo Declaration and 
reiterated the Ashai Shimbun’s statement while repeating the government’s 
determination to sustain the war effort.51 
Regardless of interpretations and perspectives regarding the Potsdam 
Declaration, as far as the Allies were concerned, Japanese inaction regarding 
unconditional surrender or the Potsdam declaration set the stage for the continuation 
of hostilities and the invasion of Japan.  Historian Robert Maddox points out that 
even in light of the Sato-Togo discourse there is no evidence that supports the 
contention that the Japanese Government as an entity would surrender to the Allies 
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unconditionally or in any manner that resembled these terms.52  An official Japanese 
edict announced in June 8, 1945, stated that they would “prosecute the war to the 
bitter end in order to accomplish the objectives of which we went to war.”53  In light 
of this edict, the fact that the Togo-Sato messages were secret and not in the public 
domain, and since the Premier made his intent clearly regarding the Potsdam 
declaration, Truman had every reason to think that the Japanese meant to continue the 
war regardless of their military disadvantage or national condition.54 
The first objective for the attack on the Japanese homeland was the southern 
home island of Kyushu.  The OLYMPIC plan, called for multiple amphibious assaults 
of the island beginning November 1, 1945.  OLYMPIC was a precursor to a second 
amphibious assault on the larger island of Honshu.55  The Kyushu assault would be 
part of the existing blockade effort against the home islands and would serve as an 
important staging point for Operation CORONET, the planned assault upon Tokyo 
and the Kanto plain on Honshu.56  According to an account published after the war, 
General Marshall believed that the Japanese would have 2.5 million people fighting 
to the death to protect their home and Emperor.  Regardless of LeMay’s firebombing 
efforts and the effect it had on the populace, Marshall believed that the Japanese 
refused to accept defeat and would fanatically defend their homeland during an 
invasion.57 
At the June 18 meeting, General Marshall argued that the invasion of Kyushu 
should be conducted before the Japanese had sufficient time to prepare defenses and 
before the winter weather became a factor.58  Additionally, Marshall expressed 
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concern that if the invasion was not conducted by this date that the war could extend 
up to another six months.  Despite LeMay’s ideas regarding bombing the Japanese 
into surrender, all of the service chiefs, to include Arnold, represented by Eaker at the 
meeting, concurred with the decision to invade Kyushu.  Before the meeting 
adjourned, and despite wanting to avoid a repeat of the Okinawa experience on the 
home islands, Truman gave his consent for the invasion.59 
Unbeknown to the Allies, the Japanese Army had already established 
extensive defensive positions on the island of Kyushu and were increasing the force’s 
fighting capability.  The loss of Okinawa led the Imperial General Headquarters to 
believe that an assault upon Kyushu was in the offing and that the tentative invasion 
date was in June.60  After the fall of Okinawa, the Imperial Japanese Headquarters 
published the directive for “Ketsi Go” (Decisive Operation) which outlined the 
strategy for mobilization, command and control, and general guidance for the defense 
of the home islands.61  Despite Japan’s shortage of war material and the loss of 
thousands of soldiers, the national psyche had yet to accept defeat.  In preparation of 
the American assault, the Japanese staged supplies, material, and men to conduct yet 
another delaying action.  Some estimates place up to nine hundred thousand men on 
Kyushu staged in caves and on terrain favorable to the defense.  Additionally, the 
Japanese marshaled a civilian militia throughout the country estimated to include 
some 28 million men and women.62  The legislation establishing this militia passed 
unanimously in the Japanese Diet.63  While armed with bamboo spears, muzzle 
loaded rifles, and other simple weapons, these forces would no doubt create 
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thousands of American casualties on the home islands.  Given the terrain, the influx 
of Japanese men and material, and the mobilization of the civilian masses, an 
American assault faced a difficult challenge.64 
The mobilization of the Japanese nation produced a significant land force that 
would have caused further problems for the Americans.  MacArthur, who would have 
been the invasion force commander, received reports from his G-2 Intelligence staff 
that the Japanese sent troops to Kyushu and built a sizeable defensive force.  After 
reading Japanese radio intercepts, in August 1945 MacArthur was under the 
impression that the Japanese Army in Kyushu was 560,000 strong, some 400,000 less 
than the aforementioned 900,000 estimate.65  Conversely, the planned American 
invasion force for OLYMPIC was roughly 750,000 men, some 150,000 less than 
high-end defensive force estimate.  Given the widely accepted force generation ratio 
of 3:1 for successful offensive action (meaning it takes a force three times larger to 
defeat and enemy force in the defense), the American landings would have been 
decimated.66  Using this conventional planning ratio, even if MacArthur’s lower 
estimate was correct, the American force would still not have had sufficient forces to 
dislodge the defenders.  After the war, one Japanese General reported, “we would 
have succeeded in driving you off the beaches.”67 
In addition to the military situation facing the Allies and the invasion of Japan, 
a domestic concern was also resident.  After the fall of Germany in May, America 
could now fight a one-front war.  While Germany had the priority of effort for the 
Allies, the defeat of the perceivably more formidable Nazi foe held promise for the 
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beginning of demobilization of the American military.  While American war 
sentiment and support was strong, with the victory over the Nazis, many in the U.S. 
began to push for the start of demobilization and a return to a peacetime economy.  
Support for the war effort was a commodity that was consumable, and with Germany 
defeated and the Japanese on the defensive, this commodity was fast becoming 
scarce.  Shortly before the fall of Germany, Marshall asked the American people for 
patience regarding demobilization and a future invasion of Japan by stating, “The 
attitude of the American people at home would be of the utmost importance to the 
Army’s morale and efficiency.  They must be brought to understand the urgent 
requirement of the situation.  They must be persuaded to support us in a last great 
effort to hasten the end of this war.”68 
In 1945, American manpower resources were increasingly stretched thin.  
What the military said it required to maintain the ranks ran in contrast with the desire 
for demobilization and civilian production requirements.  Victory over one foe raised 
hope for a return of men, however, military necessities precluded the partial 
demobilization of the Army.  Domestic economic and social forces were no doubt a 
concern for the national leadership as well as a way to expedite the end of the war.  
These domestic concerns of the American constituency had a direct influence upon 
the nation’s political and military leadership and this influence was to manifest itself 
in ways unforeseen. 
Fred Vinson, head of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion told 
the Joint Chiefs that “there was overwhelming public pressure to increase the 
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production of consumer goods.”69  He expressed fears about “unrest in the country” 
as a result of “end-of-the-war psychology” that was beginning to permeate throughout 
American society.70  Indicative of this sentiment, Secretary of the Interior, Harold 
Ickes warned, “unless the Army released men for work in coal mines, civilians would 
be short of fuel this winter.”71  Also reflective of this demobilization sentiment, 
Congressman Edwin Johnson called the Army’s measured demobilization plan 
“blind, stupid, and criminal” and charged that the Army was unnecessarily holding 
men.72  Adding to the demobilization argument, the New York Times reported in May 
1945 that steel, textile, lumber, and aluminum plants had an immediate need of 
189,000 workers.73 
Conversely, Secretary Stimson worried about manpower shortages for the 
military at the same time.  Understanding the requirement for men in the upcoming 
invasion of Japan and faced with pressures for demobilization, he directed a study to 
determine Army manpower accession requirements.  The results of the study reported 
that the Army needed to maintain its current accession rate to support the war in the 
Pacific.  The study published its findings in June 1945, and stated that the Army 
policy of producing replacements be based “against maximum requirements rather 
than against continually revised estimates of minimum needs.”74  With the invasion of 
Japan looming for the latter part of 1945 and continuing on into 1946, the 
requirement for a large Army still existed despite the victory over Nazi Germany. 
Up until July 1945, the strategic plans for the Pacific did not include the use of 
the atomic bomb, as it was a highly classified project and still only a theoretical 
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application.75  The political, social, and military objective of the U.S. during this time 
was the destruction of Japanese military power and her complete surrender in a rapid 
manner.76  Given the ultimate Allied objective of unconditional surrender that 
required the assault of the Japanese home islands, Truman faced a Hobson’s choice.  
He could either settle for something less than unconditional surrender, which was 
politically, socially, and militarily unacceptable to the Allies and the American 
population, or continue with the planned amphibious assaults and subsequent, drawn 
out, costly ground campaigns.  By conducting the OLYMPIC and CORONET 
operations, America would suffer large numbers of casualties, as well as their 
Japanese adversaries, in a struggle that would go well into 1946 and have 
reverberating effects upon the American domestic and economic horizon.  However, 
the events in New Mexico and the efforts of the Manhattan Project scientists were to 
provide a third option for the president. 
____________________________________________ 
Manhattan 
The genesis of the U.S. government’s interest in nuclear technology began 
with Albert Einstein’s letter to FDR on August 2, 1939.  Written in the eve of World 
War II and less than a month before Hitler’s assault into Poland, Einstein worried that 
Nazi Germany’s advances in nuclear technology could provide them with a weapon 
the Third Reich might be willing to use.  With developments in this new technology 
during the 1930s, Einstein theorized, “it may be possible to set up a nuclear chain 
reaction in a large mass of uranium, by which vast amounts of power and large 
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quantities of new radium like elements would be generated.”77  He wrote further that 
“this new phenomenon would also lead to the construction of bombs . . . a single 
bomb of this type, carried by boat or exploded in a port, might very well destroy the 
whole port altogether with some of the surrounding territory.”78  Ironically, the 
scientist also postulated, “such bombs might very well prove too heavy for 
transportation by air.”  He ended the letter by warning the president that the Germans 
had already began hoarding Czech stores of uranium and that the Kaiser-Wilhelm 
Institut was repeating American scientific advances in nuclear physics. 
Two months passed before FDR acted upon Einstein’s letter.  However, on 
October 11, the President met with Wall Street economist, and personal friend 
Alexander Sachs, and discussed the famous physicist’s letter.  From this meeting 
FDR directed that Sachs create a group, to include representatives from the Army and 
Navy, to begin studying uranium and its possibilities for the release of the energy that 
Einstein described. 79  The group, which became entitled the “Advisory Committee on 
Uranium,” headed by Lyman J. Briggs, the Director of the National Bureau of 
Standards, met for the first time on October 21, and submitted their first report twelve 
days later. 
The committee’s report recommended that the U.S. government procure four 
tons of graphite and fifty tons of uranium oxide to support experiments conducted by 
Columbia University.80  While the ideas behind nuclear fission were speculative at 
best in 1939, the committee believed that it was well worth the expenditure of funds 
to finance such research.  With no promise of any kind of return, the U.S. government 
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began supporting these experiments.  The theoretical ideas regarding nuclear fission 
were a long way from actual application or even the development of a useable atomic 
weapon, but the threat of an Axis monopoly of nuclear technology required action.  
Even one of the leading physicists working the issue of nuclear fission in the 1930s, 
Enrico Fermi, stated, “there was little likelihood of an atomic bomb, little proof that 
we were not pursing a chimera.”81 
In 1941 the Uranium Committee was renamed the Office of Scientific 
Research and Development Section on Uranium with the codename “S-1.”82  A study 
published in May from the National Academy of Sciences reported uranium research 
was worthwhile, but that current efforts would not produce a bomb prior to 1945.  
The study clearly stated that much more research was required before any weapons 
could be detonated and considered practicable.83  However, in July the U.S. National 
Defense Research Committee received a report from British scientists, entitled the 
“MAUD Report.”  This report specified British advances in nuclear technology and 
announced that U 235 might be useful through use of a gun-type assembly that “could 
bring together two pieces of the active material each less than the critical size but 
which when in contact form a mass exceeding it.”84  The report further speculated 
that the gun assembly held promise and “would certainly be within the carrying 
capacity of a modern bomber.”85  The British, who were already engaged in a war 
with the Axis powers, recommended, “a uranium bomb was both practicable and 
likely to lead to a decisive result in the war . . . that the work be continued on the 
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highest priority . . . [and] that the present collaboration with America should be 
continued and extended especially in the region of experimental work.”86 
The MAUD Report encouraged the American efforts as it outlined plans for a 
uranium-based bomb.87  Emboldened by the British report, on October 9, former 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Vannevar Bush, now head of the 
National Defense Research Committee, went to FDR and briefed him on the MAUD 
findings.  During the meeting Bush, who was an early advocate of civilian-military 
partnerships for defensive purposes, was directed to contact the Army for support.  
Furthermore, FDR directed Bush to move as quickly as possible in the atomic effort 
in terms of research and study, but not to proceed in the production of a bomb.88  
Eleven days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Bush forwarded a report to FDR that 
provided American confirmation of the British findings in the MAUD Report.  FDR 
did not reply to Bush’s November submission until January 1942, after Pearl Harbor 
and the American declaration of war against the Axis powers, only then did the 
president give him full approval to move forward with the atomic project.89 
When FDR approved of Army involvement with the S-1 project, it set the 
direction for the atomic effort.  After FDR gave his guidance to Bush, the project 
eventually fell under the purview of the Army Corps of Engineers.  The American 
declaration of war served as a catalyst for a military lead in the atomic project.  
Before FDR gave his guidance to Bush, on December 16, 1941, the Top Policy 
Group, lead by Vice President Henry A.Wallace, determined that certain scientific 
efforts might be leveraged and that the Army would take the lead when, or if, the 
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production stage might be reached.90  This arrangement changed the nature of the S-1 
project as the Army became the leading advocate for atomic research and would 
employ academics and scientists as part of the supporting effort.  This arrangement 
put the military in charge instead of the previous arrangement that had civilians 
leading the way.91  During the summer of 1942, the S-1 project was established in 
New York City initially commanded by Colonel James Marshall.  Marshall’s office 
was located in New York City under auspices of the Manhattan Engineering District.  
As time passed, the New York genesis of the effort served as the impetus behind the 
bomb’s more recognized and popular name the “Manhattan Project.”92 
While not the first director of the Manhattan Project, in September newly 
promoted Brigadier General Leslie Groves became the head of the effort and quickly 
began a number of initiatives to get the project moving.93  Groves was a competent 
and efficient administrator with an excellent engineering background and possessed 
an impressive professional resume.  A West Point graduate, 4th in his class, Groves 
was abrasive, abrupt, demanding, and possessed an ego to match his ever-growing 
waistline.94  One military subordinate referred to Groves as the “biggest SOB I ever 
worked for,” but went on further to quantify that the General was the right man for 
the job.95  Groves had no reservations or moral qualms over the project, justified it 
based upon the potential of a German atomic threat, and saw an American atomic 
bomb as the best insurance against a nuclear attack upon the U.S.  Furthermore, he 
believed that this new weapon would be an important tool in ending the war as 
quickly as possible.96  For Groves, the use of the weapon was not just a theoretical 
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engineering effort, but also the development of a weapon that would ensure the safety 
of the nation and held the promise of a shorter war and advancing U.S. Security.97 
Furthermore, a group of visionary scientists known as “the luminaries” joined 
the S-1 effort.  Chief among “the luminaries” was J. Robert Oppenheimer a physicists 
from the University of California.98  Oppenheimer possessed a superior intellect with 
vast array of interests in the arts and the humanities.  Comfortable with many 
languages and with a penchant for oriental philosophies, Oppenheimer was a fast and 
prolific reader and provided effective leadership for the “long hair” civilian 
scientists.99  He had completed his undergraduate studies at Harvard in only three 
years, graduated summa cum laude, and Phi Beta Kappa.  After graduation, he 
worked in physics labs at universities in Cambridge, Gottingen, and Leiden and 
established a highly respected reputation within the physics intellectual 
community.100  By the time the war broke out, many considered him one of the top 
theoretical physicists in the world.101  With Oppenheimer eventually becoming the 
chief scientist, the Manhattan Project was gaining momentum.  Equally important, the 
relationship between Oppenheimer and Groves provided a unique synergy for the 
Project.  The relationship between these two men served as the glue in this Army led, 
civilian intensive project, and both men’s roles were paramount to the success of the 
endeavor. 
In the summer of 1942 scientist determined that the Manhattan project needed 
better coordination and required a central location for atomic research.102  
Oppenheimer was the chief advocate of such a facility and sought to build a lab 
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staffed and equipped according to modern scientific protocols.103  Oppenheimer 
received Grove’s approval to establish such a lab but security requirements mandated 
that the facility be located in a remote location.  Familiar with northern New Mexico, 
Oppenheimer convinced the Army to obtain the location that became the home of the 
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL).104  While the conditions at LASL were 
austere, the intellectual and theoretical work done there was world class and cutting 
edge. 
On December 2, 1942, Enrico Fermi successfully achieved a self-sustaining 
chain reaction under the west football stands at the University of Chicago.  Combined 
with Fermi’s success and the many other positive steps in 1942, on December 28, 
FDR gave the approval for full-scale development of atomic weapons that eventually 
cost over $2 billion dollars.105  At the beginning of 1943, the Manhattan Project was 
fully funded, had the complete support of the national leadership, the military, the 
federal government, attracted the nation’s most distinguished civilian scientist and 
engineers, was building a first rate and research facility, and had effectively leveraged 
segments of American industry.106  By the time the war had concluded, the Manhattan 
Project employed approximately six hundred thousand Americans.107  Driven by 
wartime exigency and fully supported by American resources and leadership, the 
development of atomic weapons accelerated at a rate unimaginable just a few years 
earlier.108 
Much like the British had speculated in the MAUD Report, scientists in the 
Manhattan Project saw uranium as the best source for creating a nuclear chain 
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reaction and development of a bomb.  Physicists at the University of Minnesota 
confirmed that when correctly concentrated, Uranium 235 (U 235) had all the 
properties required for fission and for use in a nuclear weapon.  An obstacle to the 
development of uranium bombs was that U 235 was in short supply.  While it was 
difficult to make U 235 at the time, finding suitable uranium for even starting the 
process was difficult as less than 1 percent of uranium mined out of the ground was 
seen as suitable for weapons.109  Once suitable ores were found, Manhattan scientists 
had to extract U 235 from its heavier parent element U 238.  However, the separation 
process was a slow and tedious one.110  In order to conduct this difficult refinement 
process, the Manhattan Project built the huge K-25 Gaseous Diffusion Plant at Oak 
Ridge Tennessee that took two years to construct and employed up to 12,000 
workers.111 
Regardless of the difficulty in creating U 235, by 1943 the uranium gun type 
assembly was seen as the most practical approach toward a making an atomic 
bomb.112  While this design had the best chance for success, it still had limitations.  
One of the chief concerns with the gun type assembly was how to fit this design into a 
bomb casing for delivery.  Another issue was how to fire the nuclear projectile in the 
gun at the accompanying nuclear target element with sufficient precision to cause a 
chain reaction.113  Eventually Manhattan scientists were able to overcome such 
challenges and the “Little Boy” bomb design became finalized in February 1945 with 
the actual developed that summer.  The bomb was some 9,000 pounds, 10 feet long, 
and 28 inches wide and consisted of a naval gun barrel with the uranium target placed 
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in the nose and accompanying projectile and other components near the tail 
assembly.114  After the bomb’s release from the aircraft and upon it reaching a 
predetermined altitude, the firing mechanism would engage and send the uranium 
slug down the barrel toward the nose target.115  When joined, the two U 235 bodies 
created a nuclear detonation occurring as an air burst over the target area. 
Through 1944 and early 1945, Manhattan scientist continued with their gun 
assembly plans and encountered few problems.116  Experiments validated the 
criticality of U 235 and the correctness of their scientific hypotheses.  At an April 
1945 conference, scientists concluded that the uranium gun assembly would work if 
the engineering plans were fully followed.117  No full-scale test on the “Little Boy” 
design occurred, as Manhattan scientists were confident of the gun’s design and the 
bomb’s chances of success.118  Furthermore, this absence of full testing was also 
related to the difficulty in making U 235 from the refinement of U 238.  The amount 
of U 235 produced from the refinement process was barely enough to create a 
fissionable event.  In fact, the making of “Little Boy” depleted the American 
stockpile of U 235 so much that there was little of the material left for a second bomb.  
According to Hans Bethe, Head of the Theoretical Division at LASL, it would have 
taken another six months to produce enough U 235 for a second “Little Boy” type 
bomb.119 
While developing one bomb was hard enough, planners came up with the 
requirement for additional bombs.  According to Groves, the idea of dropping two 
atomic bombs came from Navy Rear Admiral William Purnell, who in 1944 was part 
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of the Military Policy Committee that served as an advisory panel to the Secretary of 
War.120  After discussions, these men concluded that the first bomb be a warning to 
the Japanese regarding the power of the new weapon, while the second bomb was to 
prove that the U.S. had the capacity to build more, thus keeping the Japanese off 
balance.121  Knowing the Japanese disposition regarding surrender, bushido, and the 
samurai tradition, the dropping of a single bomb may not have been enough to 
convince the Japanese to capitulate.  The second bomb would provide the “one-two” 
punch to convince the Japanese to quit.  Furthermore, assuming production could 
keep up with demand, there was no limit on the number of bombs that Groves could 
provide to the USAAF for subsequent delivery.122  In this thought, the U.S. 
government was tacitly subscribing to a Douhetian philosophy of morale bombing 
that leveraged the psychological aspects of atomic warfare. 
In conjunction with the experimentation and development of the uranium 
based gun assembly, scientists in the Manhattan project were also developing a 
second method of nuclear fission.  Instead of slamming two sub critical masses 
together and creating a supercritical state and explosion, this second method focused 
upon implosion.  The idea behind implosion was that a sub critical mass might 
become critical if symmetrical shockwaves compressed the mass while free neutrons 
became available.  Furthermore, this method of fission would yield a potentially more 
powerful blast and with a different type of material. 
For the implosion design, LASL used plutonium as the base element.  
Plutonium (Pu 239) is a man made element that also comes from Uranium.  However, 
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the method for making Pu 239 is easier than the method for extracting U 235.  While 
there were risks involved, Pu 239 did not require the three step refinement process 
needed for U 235.123  Irradiating U 238 in a reactor could create the plutonium needed 
for fission and produce it in faster quantities.  In order to produce Pu 239 another 
facility was required as space was limited at the Oak Ridge site.  As a result, DuPont 
and the Manhattan Project built another large and expansive refinement plant in 
Hanford, Washington.124 
Furthermore, in addition to the simpler process of creating Pu 239, implosion 
required smaller amount of fissionable material.  Adding to the attractiveness of the 
plutonium implosion design was the fact that lesser quantities of Pu 239 can create a 
nuclear chain reaction when compared to a larger amount U 235.125  For U 235 to 
become critical 110 pounds of the material is required.126  However, for a plutonium 
based bomb, 35.2 pounds of Pu 239 is required, and that figure can be reduced further 
to 22 pounds.127 
The efficiency of Pu 239 over U 235 was obvious to Manhattan scientists and 
added to the attractiveness of the implosion theory.  Not only did it require smaller 
amounts of fissionable material, the supply of the relatively easier made plutonium 
coming from Hanford also held promised for a growing supply of atomic bombs.  
While scientists were reasonably sure that the U 235 gun assembly would work, the 
scarcity of fissionable uranium precluded the stockpiling of this type of bomb design.  
While two bombs may have been the minimum requirement, the viability of the 
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plutonium/implosion design held the promise an ever-growing stockpile of nuclear 
weapons for the current conflict and any wars following. 
One of the most challenging aspects to a plutonium-based design is the 
implosion upon the core and the symmetry of the shock wave.  Implosion work 
comprised ninety percent of the work conducted at LASL and the Trinity detonation 
was the validation of this effort.128  This type of explosion is what occurred in the 
New Mexican desert on July 16, and served as the base design for the “Fat Man” 
bomb dropped by “Bockscar’s” and Major Sweeney’s crew on August 9, 1945.  
Furthermore, the implosion design is the same type of bomb that became the mainstay 
of America’s nuclear force in the years immediately following World War II.  From 
1945 to 1955, America’s nuclear arsenal grew from the paltry two weapons in the 
spring/summer 1945 to over 2,000.129 
The development of these weapons posed no appreciable ethical problem for 
the scientist at LASL during the war.  Despite efforts and letters written by Leo 
Szilard and Albert Einstein during 1945, most of the men working at LASL saw their 
effort as a contribution to the over all war effort and did not suffer moral pangs of 
guilt.  Most were too busy with the work at LASL to think about the morality of their 
work and did not concern themselves with the discussions going on elsewhere.130  
Emilio Segre,’ who measured gamma rays for the Trinity project, was still unmoved 
by the moral question years after the war and stated “as far as having helped to make 
it [the atomic bomb], if I go to hell, it will be for something other than that.”131  
Stafford Warren, who was part of the security detachment at LASL stated “Friends 
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were dying in the war . . . with so much killing going on, we didn’t worry about the 
ethics of killing anymore.”132  Harvard Physicist, Percy Brigman, articulated the 
quote most indicative of the scientist’s sentiment regarding development of the 
atomic bomb.  This mentor of Oppenheimer opined, “Scientists aren’t responsible for 
the facts that are in nature.  It’s their job to find the facts.  There is no sin connected 
with it-no morals.  If anyone should have a sense of sin, it’s God.  He put the facts 
there.”133 
Oppenheimer also harbored no moral dilemma regarding the atomic effort, he 
saw the bomb as a useful tool and other scientist involved with the project at LASL 
justified their actions upon empirical arguments.134  For these men, the bomb was 
merely a means to an end and was a technological solution that exploited laws and 
principles existing since the beginning of time.135  Even after the Nazi surrender, 
LASL scientist believed that the Pacific War would have a bloody ending and their 
work might be able to mitigate such an occurrence.136  Furthermore, Oppenheimer 
proffered that “even had the Japanese surrendered, we would have continued testing 
and would have developed the bomb. . . . The assumption was that this weapon would 
be used in war.”137  When interviewed twenty years later, Oppenheimer had no 
remorse over the Manhattan Project and when queried if he would do it again, even 
knowing about the effects upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he replied in the 
affirmative.138  His response to the question went on further “It wasn’t a pretty world.  
After the Tokyo fire raids, what possible moral reason should we have for not using 
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the bomb?139  This justification was present in other elements of the government as 
well. 
Both the “Little Boy” and “Fat Man” bombs were the result of a concerted 
national effort from the federal government, the military leadership, corporate 
America, combining with the civilian scientific community.  No one single element 
created the American nuclear monopoly of 1945 nor the change in American 
bombing methodology.  Through the synergistic effect of various sectors of American 
public and private entities, atomic warfare became a reality.  Strategic nuclear 
bombing was not the brainchild of the USAAF, nor by its successor the U.S. Air 
Force, rather the idea of destroying whole cities came out of wartime exigency and 
political aims combined with significant advances in technology and science.  As war 
by the mid-20th century became an increasingly larger affair, so too did the lethality 
of the weapons used by the belligerents and the planned effects of their use. 
____________________________________________ 
The Interim and Targeting Committees 
The development of the nuclear bombs and growth of atomic technology 
posed a number of questions for U.S. policy makers during the 1940s.  Not only did 
questions arise regarding the use of atomic weapons in the current conflict, but what 
would be America’s policy regarding nuclear technology after the war?  What was to 
happen to the atomic production facilities built under the aegis of the Manhattan 
Project built?  Should American share its newfound technology with the rest of the 
world?  What did future strategy look like now that atomic energy was possible, and 
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what controls were needed?  To begin deliberations regarding these questions 
Secretary Stimson chaired a group at the behest of the President and entitled the 
“Interim Committee.”  The title of “interim” was used because it was expected that 
when the atomic program became public information, a permanent organization 
would be needed to deal with the issues surrounding nuclear policies.140  However, in 
the spring of 1945 this committee served as the primary advisory body to the 
President regarding wartime control, public announcements, legislation, and post-war 
organization of the American nuclear effort.  The committee’s mandate included 
“making recommendations to the president on this project [Manhattan] with particular 
reference to its military aspects.”141  The committee thus served as the president’s 
primary advisory committee regarding the dropping of the atomic bomb. 
Meeting for the first time in May 1945, the committee eventually included 
such scientists as Vannevar Bush, James Conant (Chairman of the National Defense 
Research Committee), Karl Compton, (Chief of the Office of Field Service, Office of 
Scientific Research and Development), Oppenheimer, and Fermi.  Other members 
were military representatives Generals Marshall and Groves, Undersecretary of the 
Navy Ralph Bard, and Special Consultant to the Secretary of War, George Harrison.  
Representing the State Department was Assistant Secretary of State William Clayton, 
and soon to be Secretary of State James Byrnes (who at this time served as a 
presidential advisor).  Also included in at least one meeting of the committee were 
representatives from DuPont, Westinghouse, Union Carbide, and Tennessee Eastman 
Chemical Company who had all assisted in the development of the bomb and worked 
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in support of the Manhattan Project.  The committee met eight times during between 
May and July and formulated the American policy and actions regarding the initial 
use of the atomic bomb. 
During a committee meeting held on Thursday May 31, discussion ensued 
over the use of the atomic bomb and its possible effect upon the Japanese national 
morale and their will to fight.  During this discussion, members pointed out that the 
potential effects of the bomb “would not be much different from the effect caused by 
any Air Corps strike of present dimension . . . but that the visual effect of an atomic 
bombing would be tremendous.”142  The atomic bomb promised devastation along the 
same order of magnitude, but now a single plane and a single bomb could achieve the 
same amount of destruction.  This was the comparison used by Oppenheimer to 
justify the atomic bombs as he saw little differentiation between the firebombing 
efforts of LeMay and the atomic bomb. 
During this same meeting, discussion ensued regarding giving the Japanese a 
warning of the destructive potential of atomic weapons.  Stimson, who saw the 
atomic bomb as more than just a kinetic weapon of destruction, proffered the notion 
that “we could not give the Japanese any warning; that we could not concentrate on a 
civilian area; but that we should make a profound psychological impression on as 
many of the inhabitants as possible.”143  To Stimson, the primary target of the bomb 
was not necessarily the Japanese cities and infrastructure, but the attitudes of the 
Japanese bureaucrats, military leaders, and the civilian populace.  The use of the 
atomic weapons was largely psychological with focus on the Japanese will to fight.  
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To Stimson, providing any advance warning or notification of the atomic weapon 
would lessen its psychological effect and thus reduce the effectiveness of the bombs.  
In conjunction with Stimson’s suggestion, Dr. Conant argued, “the most desirable 
target would be a vital war plant employing a large number of workers and closely 
surrounded by workers’ houses.”144  Other members of the committee agreed that this 
was the best way to employ the weapon and then proposed that multiple strikes 
occurring simultaneously might provide a better affect. 
General Groves objected to the proposal for simultaneous multiple strikes.  He 
argued the U.S. would lose “knowledge concerning the weapon at each successive 
trip [and that] such a program would require a rush job on the part of those 
assembling the bomb.”145  His arguments carried the day.  Whether they realized it or 
not, by suggesting the targeting of “workers’ houses” and seeking to make “a 
profound psychological impression,” the members of the committee had just 
advocated terror bombing with nuclear weapons.  The targeting of a “vital war plant . 
. . closely surrounded by worker’s house’s” was eerily similar to ideas expressed by 
Douhet decades earlier.  Despite USAAF doctrine of the time, leadership in 
Washington was no longer merely giving tacit approval to morale bombing, as had 
been done during the European bombing campaign, but was now advocating bombing 
strategies that departed from published doctrine. 
The next day the committee met again, in this session the Secretary of War 
praised the efforts of the industrialist present and thanked then in advance for 
suggestions they might have regarding the continued development of the new 
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technology and its implications in international relations.  After initial discussions the 
topic eventually returned to the use of the bombs upon the Japanese.  To this Jimmy 
Byrnes, the future Secretary of State, argued that the atomic bomb “should be used 
against Japan as soon as possible,” but that the target “was essentially a military 
decision.”146  In the same discussion Byrnes reiterated that the weapon “be used upon 
a war plant surrounded by workers homes.”147  The same sentiment concerning terror 
bombing was advocated by other members of the committee.  No dissenting voices 
were recorded in the meeting notes. 
During June, Stimson tasked the scientists of the committee to consider the 
use of the weapon against the Japanese and the potential effects such an attack would 
have upon the international community.  Called the Scientific Panel, this group 
included Oppenheimer, Fermi, and included Nobel Prize winning physicists Ernest 
Lawrence and Arthur Compton.  On June 16, a month before Trinity, the Scientific 
Panel submitted its report and repeated earlier sentiments regarding the use of the 
atomic weapons.  In addition, these scientists reported that it was “our obligation to 
our nation to use the weapons to help save American lives in the Japanese war.”148  
To these learned men of science, sparing American lives overrode any moral 
arguments against the bomb’s use and the U.S. aversion of generating civilian 
casualties. 
In the same report, the Panel discussed the execution of a “purely technical 
demonstration” to encourage the Japanese to surrender.149  During this time, other 
members of the American scientific community, mostly from Chicago, submitted the 
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Franck Report that renounced the potential use of the atomic bomb and suggested that 
the U.S. invite the world community to see the explosive power of the technology.  
This effort hoped to lay a framework for international agreements regarding the 
control of the weapons.150  This demonstration was seen as a way to educate the 
world about the long- term danger of nuclear war despite its possible effectiveness in 
the current war with Japan.  Those scientists who suggested the demonstration held 
the belief that if the U.S. were to use nuclear weapons, it would be acting immorally 
and would be “sacrificing public support throughout the world.”151 
In support of this same contention, Einstein again wrote to FDR.  This time 
Einstein penned a letter of introduction for Dr Leo Szilard, a well-respected physicist 
who made significant contribution to the development of nuclear technology.  Szilard 
would argue against the use of the bomb and the proliferation of nuclear technology.  
However, FDR never saw the letter as he died eighteen days later.152  Despite the 
suggestion of a demonstration and the concerns over the use of nuclear weapons, the 
panel rejected the idea of a nuclear display and felt a staged explosion would not 
compel the Japanese to surrender.  Furthermore, the panel did not feel that the U.S. 
was lowering itself to the level of the Axis and their crimes against humanity.  These 
men felt that military expedience and necessity trumped other moral considerations at 
the time.  To the idea of scheduling a nuclear event for the Japanese to observe the 
committee wrote, “We can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end 
to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use.”153 
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In an interview after the war, Groves commented that any demonstration to 
the Japanese of the bomb’s power would have only impressed their scientists and 
would have no impact on the military and government leaders of the Empire.154  
Additionally, the scheduling of a demonstration would also include the risk of a 
misfire or failure.  Given the experimental nature of the technology, if the 
demonstration bomb proved to be a dud, it would not only embarrass the U.S., but 
might have emboldened the Japanese to resist even more.155  While these 
deliberations were going on during June and July of 1945, the gun assembly was the 
only design that theoretically had a good chance of working.  The gun type bomb was 
based upon uranium and that fissionable material was still in very short supply with 
only enough of it for “Little Boy”.  Expending this cache of uranium for a 
demonstration would leave nothing left to use as a weapon.156 
As well, during this same period, the implosion device still needed validation 
as a viable design.  Even when the Trinity explosion occurred, the event did not fully 
test all the bomb’s mechanisms.  The Trinity test, conducted from a tower, did not test 
the triggering mechanism of an air dropped bomb because those components were 
still in the design phase.157 
The decision to forgo a demonstration surfaced again during the June 21 
Interim Committee meeting.  Members again recommended that the atomic attack be 
conducted “without warning” and that it “be used on a dual target . . . a military 
installation or a war plant surrounded by or adjacent to homes or other buildings most 
susceptible to damage.”158  The committee members, which included no one from the 
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USAAF, specified that the attack commence without any advance notice and the idea 
of nuclear demonstration was discounted.  While the committee deemed it a military 
decision as to what target to hit, for the committee members dropping the bombs was 
fait accompli.  The issue was not if the bombs should be dropped on the Japanese, but 
the outstanding questions were; would it work, and if so when and where should we 
drop it?159 
To address the question of targets, Marshall tasked Groves to create a 
committee of officers to determine suitable Japanese cities for atomic attack.  Known 
as the Targeting Committee, the group initially met at the Pentagon but did most of its 
work at LASL and consisted of hand picked men by both Arnold and USAAF 
General Lauris Norstad.160  The committee began meeting on April 27, and in the 
opening remarks, Groves tasked the committee to pick four targets vital the Japanese 
war effort.161  In addition to choosing cities, the committee also determined the best 
means of employing the weapons and outlined specific conditions for their use.  In a 
second meeting conducted on May 10 and 11, the Committee determined that the 
weapon be dropped visually, and if weather precluded visual sighting, then the 
mission was to be aborted.162  However, if the bomber was damaged, unable to return 
to base, and could not locate the target visually, the committee determined that the 
bomb be dropped using the “Eagle” radar installed on the latest version of the B-29 as 
it had the best resolution of any available radar at the time.163  Furthermore, the 
committee specified that the bomber avoid blind bombing techniques that might 
result in a less-than-accurate drop.164 
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The 20th Air Forces’ firebombing efforts were so effective that the USAAF 
expected that most, if not all, of Japan’s major industrial cities would be burned by 
January 1946.165  As a result, the number of Japanese cities deemed suitable for 
nuclear attack was rapidly dwindling.  Members of the committee considered five 
Japanese cities as excellent candidates for a nuclear attack.  In a May 10 report, the 
committee suggested that targeting criteria for an attack include, “a large urban area 
of more than three miles in diameter, [the capability] of being damaged by a blast, 
and [were] unlikely to be attacked by [LeMay’s bombers] by next August.”166  Each 
of the cities discussed had a large urban and industrial area with two that included an 
army depot and one having significant psychological and cultural significance.  The 
criterion used by the Targeting Committee was similar to that specified by the Interim 
Committee even though the targeting sessions occurred before the President’s 
advisory body had even convened. 
The first of the proposed cities was Kyoto and had a population of 1 million.  
Not only was this city the cultural and intellectual center of Japan, but was considered 
big enough that the power of the bomb would remain contained within the city itself, 
thus lending to a better understanding of the weapons destructive capability.167  Next 
was Hiroshima as it housed an army depot and headquarters in an industrialized area 
with a large population surrounded by hills that “are likely to produce a focusing 
effect which would considerably increase blast damage.”168  Located by the sea it 
provided an excellent return on the B-29s radar screens if bombing occurred non-
visually.  Yokohama housed important production facilities and oil refineries, and as 
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Tokyo burned from attacks, many industries relocated to this city.169  Kokura 
included one of the largest arsenals in Japan and was adjacent to various industry and 
metal works.  Kokura’s factories made anti-aircraft guns and beachhead obstacles that 
would no doubt assist in the defense of the home islands.  The city also housed a 
railway and various machine shops and power plants.170  Lastly, Niigata was an 
important seaport on the northwest coast of Honshu and contained oil refineries and 
machine tool industries.  Discussion also ensued regarding the bombing of the 
Emperor’s Palace, but postponed a decision on that target pending further guidance. 
The committee met again on May 28, and during the meeting Colonel Paul 
Tibbets, Commander of the unit designated to drop the bomb, conferred with the 
members.  During the meeting, participants addressed delivery methodology and 
various mission-planning considerations.  The committee acknowledged the necessity 
of selecting targets that would produce the most damage and would have the biggest 
effect upon Japanese morale.171  Additionally, densely populated areas not targeted 
previously, or having experienced little damage from conventional firebombing 
efforts, figured to the best targets.172  This targeting rational stemmed from the idea 
that cities not damaged from other raids provided a better chance to measure the full 
effects of the atomic bombs.173  Following these discussions, the committee omitted 
Yokohama and determined that the first four choices for atomic bombing were:       
(1) Kyoto, (2) Hiroshima, (3) Niigata, and (4) Kokura.  Groves approved the list and 
planned to submit it to Marshall.  However, before briefing the Army Chief of Staff, 
the Manhattan Chief stopped to brief Stimson on an unrelated matter on May 30.  
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According to Groves, this meeting resulted in Stimson inquiring about the targeting 
list.174  Despite Grove’s efforts to avoid giving the list to the Secretary without 
Marshall having yet viewing it, Stimson replied, “This is a question I am settling 
myself.  Marshall is not making that decision.”175 
Upon seeing the listing of Kyoto, Stimson objected to its targeting based upon 
the city’s significance to Japanese culture, heritage, and the Shinto religion.176  
Despite the morale value of targeting Kyoto, Stimson who had visited the city as 
Governor General of the Philippines, directed that Groves remove the city from the 
list with a replacement target added.  Despite Stimson’s rejection of Kyoto as a target, 
Groves continued to press for its inclusion into the target set.  Eventually Stimson 
took the matter to Truman who sided with his Secretary of War.  In response to the 
targeting of Kyoto, Truman reportedly quipped that, “even if the Japs are savages, 
ruthless, merciless, and fanatics, we as the lead of the world for the common welfare 
cannot drop this terrible bomb on the old capital or the new.  He [Stimson] and I are 
in accord.  The target will be a purely military one.”177  In a July 24 letter from a 
Colonel John Stone to Arnold, the final targeting list included the city of Nagasaki in 
place of Kyoto.178  While Kyoto was eventually removed from the list, Arnold 
directed that the 20th Air Force cease bombing operations against this city and the 
other identified targets in possible preparation for atomic attack.179 
After the success of the Trinity explosion and while at Potsdam, Truman 
conferred with Stimson, Marshall, and Arnold regarding the decision to employ the 
new weapon.  While the decision whether to use the weapon belonged solely to the 
 211 
President, Arnold requested that local air commanders receive wide latitude for 
employment of the weapon based upon tactical considerations.180  On July 25 , 
Marshall submitted a draft message directing the USAAF to conduct the atomic 
mission.  One also should note that the directive to Spaatz to drop the weapon was 
drafted by Groves on July 23, and published on the 25th, days before the Potsdam 
Declaration and the subsequent Japanese rebuffing of the document.181  According the 
U.S. Air Force historians, once the Trinity test succeeded, Groves immediately sent 
technicians to Tinian to help assemble “Little Boy” for delivery without actual orders 
to drop the bomb.182  Air Force historians after the war asked the president to define 
the time line for the decision.  To this request, Truman responded, “it was necessary 
to set the military wheels in motion, as these orders did, but the final decision was in 
my hands, and was not made until we were returning from Potsdam.”183 
Historian James Maddox has captured the essence of the decision to drop the 
bomb given the organizational inertia the program had by 1945.  In a 1995 work 
regarding the use of the bomb Maddox stated, “It may be fairly concluded that the 
only decision made at Potsdam was not to stop the machinery that went into motion 
immediately after the Alamogordo test.”184  In a post war Harpers Magazine article, 
Stimson reported that as one of the principal war advisors, for both FDR and Truman, 
he never heard arguments against the use of the atomic bomb.185  According the 
Groves, Truman’s choice was a one of “noninterference-basically a decision not to 
upset the existing plans.”186  With large amounts of manpower and resources 
committee to the Manhattan Project, the use of the bomb was always presumed.  Both 
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FDR and Truman had a responsibility to the American populace to use whatever 
weapons available to reduce American casualty lists.  In the Truman White House, 
there are no records yet found of any moral arguments against the bombs use and 
given Truman’s inclination to continue FDR’s policies and goals, the use of the 
atomic bomb, once it proved practicable, fits that pattern.187 
While Truman may have set the “wheels in motion” prior to the Japanese 
response to the Potsdam Declaration, many other factors facilitated the use of atomic 
weapons and the continued departure from established doctrine.  Given Japanese 
tenacity and resolve to continue fighting in the face of defeat, an invasion would have 
created unimaginable casualties at a time when war-weariness was beginning to 
permeate.  Furthermore, domestic concerns regarding manpower and the economy 
were an issue on the home front and were well known to the national leadership.  
Additionally, the advice given to the president and the effort and expense required to 
build such a weapon, combined with the desire to continue the organizational 
momentum of FDR’s policies provided further impetus for the bombs use.  A total 
lack of condemnation from other advisors regarding the moral implications of the 
bomb added to the mix.  As a result, the president’s decision to use the bomb had 
been in the making for years prior to July 1945, and was not a decision based solely 
upon recent events.  The synergy between policy goals and organizational momentum 
made the use of the bomb not merely a feasible but, arguably, the only possible 
course of action. 
____________________________________________ 
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Hiroshima and Beyond 
Despite Einstein’s assertion in his 1939 letter to FDR that an atomic weapon 
may “prove too heavy for transportation by air,” the USAAF, and subsequently the 
USAF, came to have the primary role in the delivery of nuclear weapons.  Until 1944, 
few outside of the Manhattan Project knew about the program with Hap Arnold only 
scantly aware.  This situation changed in spring 1944 when Groves approached the 
Air Chief and informed him of the potential requirements for delivery of the 
weapon.188  Once Arnold was briefed upon the latest developments regarding the 
project and the role the USAAF would play, he became a strong supporter of the 
program.189 
Having the USAAF deliver the bomb fit perfectly with Arnold’s overarching 
vision of validating airpower and proving the value of an independent air force.  The 
delivery of the atomic bomb would serve as the crescendo to the USAAF’s bombing 
of Hitler’s Germany and the firebombing of Japan and would add to the importance 
of airpower.  Arnold promised to provide Groves’ with what he needed, specifically 
aircraft to carry the weapon and crews that could satisfactorily deliver it.190  Arnold 
realized the importance and significance of the atomic bomb and was determined to 
support the effort as much as possible despite its doctrinal deviation.  Based upon 
Arnold’s support, the USAAF designated one unit with specially modified B-29s to 
carry the newly developed ordnance.191  This use of the B-29 also played into 
Arnold’s desire to validate the “3 Billion Dollar” gamble he took with the 
development of the superfortress years earlier in 1942. 
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Based upon mission parameters and lift requirements, the B-29 was the only 
U.S. airplane that met the mission specification.  However, stock B-29s coming out of 
Boeing factories required modification to carry and deliver atomic weapons.  The 
USAAF initiated a program to produce specially modified B-29 to conduct atomic 
missions.  These atomic capable B-29s, known as “Silverplate” bombers, had fuel 
injected engines, pneumatic bomb bay doors (instead of electrically operated ones) 
that opened and closed faster, had all the defensive turrets removed, were 7,200 
pounds lighter than other superfortresses, could easily fly over 30,000 feet, had a 
range of 2,000 miles, and redesigned bomb bays to accommodate the new bombs.192  
These aircraft became the mainstay of America’s nuclear delivery capability for years 
following the war until phased out of service in 1950 by the larger more capable B-36 
and B-47 bombers. 
To operate the Silverplate bombers the USAAF created a special unit whose 
sole function was nuclear delivery.  In September 1944, the 393th Bomb Squadron 
located in Fairmont, Nebraska was detached from its parent organization, the 504th 
Bomb Group, and served as the core organization for the newly created 509th 
Composite Group.  The 509th was specifically designated as America’s nuclear 
delivery organization.  For security reasons Wendover Airfield, in a remote section of 
Utah, became the first home for the unit.  The base had the added feature of being 
adjacent to a practice bombing range and was a short flight from the LASL.  The 
509th was a mix of both bombers and troop carrier aircraft and had a full compliment 
of support personnel making it a self-sustaining unit.193  Commanded by Colonel Paul 
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Tibbets, an experienced and respected bomber pilot, he told few in his command of 
the unit’s specific mission and strictly enforced security regulations.194  Upon 
receiving their modified B-29s in October 1944, for the next ten months, the unit 
developed and practiced targeting and egress procedures for dropping the atomic 
bomb. 
The 509th deployed overseas in April 1945 and chose Tinian as their base of 
operation.  While their mission was still secret, the unit was placed under command 
of Curtis LeMay’s XXI Bomber Command for operational employment while the 
decision for nuclear weapons still rested in Washington.  According to Groves, it was 
LeMay’s idea to have the atomic bomb delivered by a single ship flying at high 
altitude.  LeMay’s rationale stemmed from his operational experience and figured that 
the Japanese would pay little attention to a single ship at high altitude and think it 
only a reconnaissance or weather plane.195  Groves acquiesced to LeMay’s 
suggestion, but pointed out that the mission required observation planes to record the 
event and collect scientific data. 
Once in theater, the 509th continued to practice long-range navigation and 
bomb dropping procedures.  The Group practiced atomic mission profiles against 
actual Japanese targets, but used special orange-colored bombs similar in shape to 
“Fat Man” that contained various amounts of conventional explosives.196  The orange 
bombs, called “Pumpkins,” served as a training tool for the aircrews preparing for 
atomic deliveries.  Despite the large blast effect that atomic weapons have, the 
dropping of the bomb required careful aiming.  In order to develop a high level of 
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targeting proficiency, the 509th dropped pumpkin bombs from 30,000 feet using the 
Norden sight and targeted increasingly smaller areas.197 
Regardless of the large-scale demolition and mass destruction inherent with 
the application of atomic weapons, bomb placement and aiming was still important in 
order to achieve the effects planners envisioned.  Despite the USAAF’s area fire 
bombardments over Japan, accuracy was still a lauded attribute.  Being able to place 
the bombs on target was still a goal, but as the war progressed, and as discussed, 
accuracy was less important.  Concurrently, what became more acceptable is the 
widespread damage created by the bombing and not necessarily the pinpoint targeting 
of a single building or rail yard.  The emphasis on bomb placement and accuracy was 
to continue once LeMay commanded Strategic Air Command after the war regardless 
of the widespread effects created by atomic and thermonuclear weapons. 
“Little Boy” was ready for employment on July 31 and the 509th was 
awaiting favorable weather before it conducted the mission.  Written guidance to 
Spaatz on July 25 directed that, “The 509th Composite Group, 20th Air Force will 
deliver its first special bomb as weather will permit visual bombing after 3 August 
1945 on one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, and Nagasaki.”198  Despite 
the authority to launch after  August 3, favorable weather conditions did not occur for 
several days.  As the days passed, the components for “Fat Man” arrived and the 
bomb assembled. 
At 0245 on August 6, Colonel Paul Tibbets rolled his B-29 down the runway 
with “Little Boy” secured in the bomb bay of the bomber entitled Enola Gay.  
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Heavily loaded with the 9,000-pound bomb and 7,000 gallons of gas, the pilot held 
the plane on the runway as long as possible to ensure his airspeed was sufficient to 
become airborne.199  Once safely airborne, the onboard weaponeers, Lieutenant 
Morris Jeppson and Navy Captain William Parsons, completed the assembly of the 
bomb by placing a slug of U 235 in the gun mechanism of “Little Boy” and a 
conventional explosive charge that would trigger the weapon’s detonation.200  While 
the primary target of the attack was Hiroshima, weather observation planes, launched 
three hours earlier were to confirm visual bombing conditions over the city.  If clouds 
precluded visual bombing over Hiroshima, the cities of Kokura or Nagasaki were on 
the secondary target list.201 
 
 
Figure 16.  The Enola Gay on Tinian.  Source: U.S. Air Force Museum web site, 
http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/060712-F-1234S-021.jpg (accessed 
December 8, 2007). 
 
Around 0830 the weather plane over Hiroshima sent a coded message 
reporting visual weather conditions over the city.202  As a result, the Enola Gay 
continued to its primary target.  When the plane reached its initial point (IP) for 
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commencement of the bomb run, the pilot made a heading correction as bombardier 
Major Thomas Ferebee began looking for his aim point, the distinctive “T” shaped 
Aioi Bridge crossing the Ota River in the center of the city.203  Flying at 285 knots 
with 8 knots crosswind, Ferebee made the proper adjustments to the Norden sight and 
engaged the autopilot for the bomb run.204  At 0915 (Tinian Time, 0815 Hiroshima 
Time), the automatic sequence opened the pneumatic bomb bay doors and the 
weapon dropped from the plane.205 
To avoid the blast effects of the bomb, Tibbets placed the Enola Gay in a 
preplanned 155-degree diving turn with a 60-degree angle of bank and lost 1,700 feet 
of altitude.206  The evasive maneuver, practiced many times by pilots of the 509th, 
was designed to put the crew and plane approximately ten miles away from the 
impact point when detonation occurred.  Scientists with the Ballistics Group at LASL 
determined that the ten miles distance would provide an adequate level of protection 
for the airplane and crew from the ensuing shock wave by a factor of two.207   
The bomb exploded at 1,890 feet and the detonation produced a blinding 
flash, 53 seconds after it dropped from the plane.208  Luis Alvarez, a scientist aboard 
the bomber described the resulting flash as the most spectacular part of the event and 
estimated the light to be seven times brighter than the sun even after the plane was 
several miles away.209  At the same time, Tibbets experienced the distinct taste of lead 
on his tongue because of electrolysis from the bomb releasing radioactivity and 
interacting with the fillings in his teeth.210  Two shock waves hit the plane, the first 
from the detonation itself and the second from a reflection wave that bounced off the 
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ground.211  Tibbets had to grip the yoke tightly in order to maintain control.  As the 
Enola Gay left the target area, tail gunner, Staff Sergeant George Caron, saw a giant 
purple cloud rising up to 45,000 feet, approximately 15,000 feet above the bomber’s 
altitude, and on the ground below, fires began to emerge and grow.212  The resulting 
fire and dust cloud was so expansive and thick that four hours later observation planes 
found the view of the city still obscured by smoke.213  
Tibbets later described his feelings of one of shock and horror, but as the crew 
headed home, they felt relieved that their mission had been successful.214  While 
various accounts of the event have put words in the commander’s mouth, Tibbets 
dismissed many of these assertions.  According to the mission commander, once the 
tension ebbed, he calmly tamped some tobacco in his pipe, lit it up and told his co-
pilot, Captain Bob Lewis, “I think this is the end of the war.”215  Tibbets then gave the 
radio operator, eighteen-year-old Private Dick Nelson, a message to transmit in code 
back to Tinian that reported the success of the mission and that the plane was 
returning to base.216  The Enola Gay landed at 1458 after a mission time of 12 hours 
and 13 minutes.217  
While enroute home from Potsdam aboard the U.S.S. Augusta, President 
Truman received a message from Stimson reporting: “Big bomb dropped on 
Hiroshima 5 August at 7:15 P.M. Washington Time.  First reports indicate complete 
success which was even more conspicuous than earlier test.”218  Upon hearing the 
news, Truman claimed the Hiroshima bombing as “the greatest thing in history.” 
 220 
Weeks earlier, the Interim Committee determined that a public statement 
regarding the event needed to be prepared if the weapon proved to be a success.  In 
support of this effort, the Manhattan Project hired William Laurence, science editor of 
the New York Times, to assist in drafting the White House press release.  Following 
the attack the White House released a prepared announcement.  The statement 
publicized that a bomb “more powerful than 20,000 tons of T.N.T” destroyed 
Hiroshima’s “usefulness to the enemy.”219  The statement went on to affirm that the 
weapon was an atomic bomb and that the U.S. was producing new ones in “more 
powerful forms.”220  Regarding future use, the release stressed, “Let there be no 
mistake, we shall completely destroy Japan’s power to make war,” and followed up 
by telling the Japanese that if they did not accept the Potsdam terms, “they may 
expect a rain of ruin from the air, the likes of which has never been seen on this 
earth.”221 
Following the Soviet entry into the war and after the Nagasaki bombing of 
August 9, a second “Fat Man” bomb was prepared for a drop upon Japan.  The only 
missing component on Tinian was the bomb’s plutonium core.222  While Washington 
waited for a response from the Japanese, Groves held up shipment of the fissionable 
components until August 13.223  If the Japanese did not respond by that date, the 
plutonium core would be flown to Tinian for a third atomic mission.  Additionally, 
LASL continued bomb production in the event that more atomic weapons were 
required.224  Spaatz contact Norstad on August 10 proposing to drop the third bomb 
on Tokyo, but the same day the Japanese, communicating through the Swiss, 
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accepted the Potsdam Declaration.225  There can be no question that the U.S. was 
fully prepared to wreak more nuclear induced havoc upon the Japanese had they not 
capitulated after the second atomic attack. 
The public statement from the White House regarding the bomb is telling.  
The promise to conduct “a rain of ruin” and the development of “more powerful 
bombs” certainly harkens to a change in bombing methodology and application and 
an acceptance of mass casualties aimed at enemy morale.  This statement is far 
removed from approved USAAF policies and widely accepted views regarding 
bombing prior to the war’s beginning.  However, given the frame of mind of most 
Americans during this time, there was comparatively little outcry over the atomic 
attack.  Apart from Szilard’s group in Chicago and objections by pacifist, American’s 
were overwhelmingly supportive of the action.  Leveraging the enmity developed by 
the attack on Pearl Harbor and other Japanese atrocities, American political and 
military leaders were free to execute nuclear bombing without large-scale dissention 
from the national populace.  In late August 1945, 85 percent of Americans polled 
approved of the use of the atomic bomb on Japanese cities, with only 10 percent 
dissenting, and another 5 percent having no opinion.226  In September, 69 percent of 
polled Americans thought that it was a “good thing” that the bomb was developed 
with only 17 percent dissenting.227  Even four months after the attacks and well after 
the war had ended, 22.7 percent of Americans polled wished that the U.S. had the 
opportunity to drop many more atomic bombs before the Japanese had surrendered.228  
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While popular sentiment supported the bombing, a duality of sentiment 
existed within the national leadership.  A message sent to Truman from U.S. Senator 
Richard Russell lauded the bombing and advocated more atomic missions.  In an 
August 7 telegram, the Senator told the President that “we should continue to strike 
the Japanese until they are brought groveling to their knees.  We should cease our 
appeals to Japan to sue for peace.  The next plea for peace should come from an 
utterly destroyed Tokyo.”229  However, in response to this message, the President 
demurred and stated that he did not believe in “wiping out a whole population” and 
that he had “humane feelings for the women and children of Japan.”230  Similarly, 
when Groves and Arnold met with Marshall after the Hiroshima bombing, the Army 
Chief of Staff cautioned against being too elated by the attack because it had caused 
so much death and destruction.231  After Marshall’s comment, Groves responded that 
he was not too concerned about the Japanese deaths considering the suffering of 
Americans at the hands of the Japanese.232  Once outside of Marshall’s office, Arnold 
reportedly turned to Groves and stated, “I am glad you said that, it’s just the way I 
feel.”233 
Based upon the poll data and other evidence, most Americans at the time 
would have agreed with the President in a response he sent to Sam Cavert, General 
Secretary of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in American, regarding the 
attack on Hiroshima.  The President wrote on August 11, 1945, “the only language 
they [Japanese] seem to understand is the one we have been using to bombard them.  
When you have to deal with a beast, you have to treat him as a beast.  It is most 
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regrettable but nevertheless true.”234  Evidence of Truman’s duality regarding the 
bombing is also evident in a memo sent to Dean Acheson on May 7, 1946.  In the 
memo, Truman tells Acheson about a visit by Oppenheimer to the White House that 
occurred months earlier.  In the opening passages of the memo Truman begins by 
calling Oppenheimer a “cry baby” and goes on further to write, “He came into my 
office some five or six months ago and spent most of his time ringing his hands and 
telling me they had blood on them because of the discovery of atomic energy.”235  
While accounts of Truman’s response to Oppenheimer may be apocryphal, he 
supposedly offered the scientist his handkerchief from his pocket and replied, “Well 
here, would you like to wipe your hands?”236 
____________________________________________ 
Summary 
As a result of both atomic bombings, the USSBS estimated that up to 120,000 
people were killed or missing, over 110,000 were injured, and 6.5 square miles of 
urban landscape destroyed.237  The collective numbers of these raids are slightly 
higher than what occurred on the single March 9-10 fire raid over Tokyo that killed 
over 83,000, injured 102,000, and razed 15.8 square miles of the city.238  Ironically, 
the individual atomic attacks accounted for less death and destruction than the earlier 
conventional Tokyo firebombing raid.  In light of these statistics, Oppenheimer’s 
aforementioned argument regarding the morality of the atomic bomb is particularly 
relevant.  The only appreciable difference between the atomic raids and the March 
firebombing mission was the source of the conflagration. 
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Regardless of the statistical comparisons between atomic attack and 
conventional firebombing, the Hiroshima and Nagasaki missions were largely morale 
bombings aimed at the psychological rather than the physical dimension of Japan’s 
war effort.  The psychological and political effect of atomic attack was a catalyst that 
forced the Japanese government to capitulate.  The entry of the Soviet Union into the 
Pacific war cannot be dismissed as another motivation for the Japanese surrender.  
The sheer size and power of the Red Army in the Pacific no doubt was a factor in 
Japan’s final acceptance for capitulation.  Apart from which event carried more 
weight in the Japanese decision, the end of the war came in only a few days of the 
atomic attacks because of Japan’s psychological defeat.  Even though she was 
defeated militarily prior to 6 August, the Japanese were far from being defeated 
mentally.  The bombs and the Soviets entry served the purpose of destroying Japanese 
resolve. 
Even Stimson, who largely abhorred the bombing of civilians, agreed that the 
bomb was a psychological weapon.239  Not only did the weapon destroy a large part 
of two individual cities, but also shocked the Japanese government into finally 
accepting the Potsdam Declaration.  While the average Japanese citizen’s resolve was 
not diminished by the atomic attacks, the very threat of nuclear annihilation finally 
illustrated to the Japanese government the futility of resistance that led to an 
acceptance of the military situation.  While the targeting of the bombs was based 
upon military considerations, the decision to employ them was primarily politically 
and psychologically motivated.  Discussions of the Interim Committee bear this out.  
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Stimson’s May 31, meeting comment regarding a “profound psychological 
impression” unmistakably characterize these missions as morale bombings and these 
discussion clearly show that morale bombing was accepted as a feasible course of 
action at the national level.  In the end, Stimson believed that it was not one atomic 
bomb that finished the Japanese, but the threat of what more atomic bombs would do 
to the nation that forced capitulation.240  
The USSBS argues that Japan would have surrendered by November or 
December 1945, even if the atomic bombs were not used.241  The Survey bases its 
conclusions on mostly quantitative analysis, and does include some interviews with 
Japanese leaders, but failed to measure the resolve resident in all elements of the 
Empire’s leadership.  In the end, no analysis could accurately measure the Japanese 
populace’s level of resolve.  While morale bombing was not, by itself, effective in 
breaking the Japanese populace’s spirit, it was effective in coercing the Emperor and 
the government to accept defeat.  While a number of measurements of the USSBS 
prove the untenable position the Japanese were in by 1945, the national will remained 
unbroken and steadfast.  The bomb finally broke it.  By affecting the will of the 
leaders of Japan, the population followed.  Had the bomb remained unused, the 
Japanese would have continued to resist.  The bombs served as a means to a political 
end with the USAAF serving as merely the tool.  In this case, the military was clearly 
expressing national goals and policies “by other means.” 
Apart from the international strategic political implications, American 
domestic concerns were also in play.  The organizational momentum of Manhattan 
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and its expense cannot be discounted.  The legacy of FDR’s policies carried into the 
next presidential administration that established goals and objectives that Truman felt 
compelled to continue.  In addition, American war-weariness and the domestic 
anxieties were also a factor as Americans began to look beyond the war and into a 
post war economy.  Lastly, and most important, were the anticipated casualty figures 
regarding the invasion of the Japanese homeland.  Given the Japanese plans of Ketsi 
Go, thousands of American, and Japanese, would be killed.  As commander in chief, 
Truman had the obligation to spare as many American service members’ lives as 
possible and it would have been negligent on his part had he allowed the bloody 
invasions to occur knowing that he had a powerful alternative.242  As Groves saw it 
“to any experienced soldier, it was obvious that once an advantage had been gained 
over an enemy as dangerous as Japan, no respite should be given.”243 
Truman repeatedly defended his decision to drop the bomb, and because the 
invasions never occurred, historians have the luxury to second-guess his choice.  One 
may observe, Truman was facing a lose-lose situation.  Had CORONET and 
OLYMPIC been executed with the atomic bomb in hand, history would chastise 
Truman for a war possibly drawing out until 1946 and creating thousands more 
military and civilian casualties.  The August missions killed 120,000, probably less 
than the casualty rate of a full-scale invasion.  The destruction of the two cities 
seemed the lesser of two evils.  Regarding Japanese attempts to surrender prior to 
1946, actions taken by elements of the military even after the atomic attacks, clearly 
show that a high level of resolve still existed among Japanese leaders.  Strong 
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evidence argues that the Japanese population would have, no doubt, echoed this level 
of resolve. 
American bombing applications during the war were increasingly more 
effective and destroyed great swaths of Japan’s cities and infrastructure.  The effects 
of the Pacific firebombing raids and the atomic bombs were commensurate with the 
havoc already experienced globally.  Over time, the USAAF gradually moved toward 
Douhetian practices for a number of tactical, operational, and strategic reasons.  
Domestic pressures provided impetus, validation, and approval for USAAF bombing 
applications.  Not only did the USAAF eventually embrace this doctrinal revolution, 
but the American people and the U.S. government gave its approbation, accepting 
such methods as an inevitable manifestation of modern warfare.  In the case of atomic 
weapons, morale bombing and the threat of nuclear annihilation became part of 
American bombing strategies and would remains so for decades. 
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CHAPTER 5  
 
AT THE OBTUSE: 
Nuclear Strategies and the Primacy of Air 
____________________________________________ 
The National Security Act of 1947 significantly changed the landscape of 
America’s military establishment.  The Act single-handedly created the National 
Military Establishment and merged the Department of the Navy with the War 
Department, while finally realizing Hap Arnold’s goal and established an independent 
U.S. Air Force (USAF).  Under the new structure, all the military services were 
organized under what eventually became known as the Department of Defense (DoD) 
headed by a single Secretary of Defense.  Under the Secretary of Defense were 
Secretaries of the Navy, Army, and Air Force with each military service chief 
subordinate to his respective civilian superior.  However, bitter arguments ensued 
between the services over troop strengths, roles, mission, and more importantly, 
budget allocations. 
With the advent of atomic warfare and perceived global threats, members of 
the newly formed Air Force envisioned an increasingly larger role in national 
defense.  By dropping the atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, many believed 
that Douhet’s vision had come to fruition and that the day of the land-based 
intercontinental bomber had truly arrived.  Air Force leaders envisioned the newly 
designed, six-engine B-36 “Peacemaker,” B-50, and the swept wing B-47 “Stratojet” 
bombers as the standard-bearer of America’s military and the most important part of 
national defense.1  Furthermore, with the leaps in technology, the arrival of jet power, 
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advances in electronics, metallurgy, and aerodynamics many believed in the primacy 
of airpower as the dominant military force. 
In the Air Force’s opinion, the inherent offensive capability of the airplane 
and its ability to deliver nuclear weapons made other forms of warfare appear 
obsolete.  For the new service, aviation and atomic technology gave America a 
“Sunday Punch” capability to knock out a potential adversary with a single massive 
airborne nuclear strike.  In this effort, airmen thought the USAF single-handedly 
could end any war in a matter of a few days, if not hours.  As early as 1945, Spaatz, 
who soon became the first Air Force Chief of Staff, argued that the nature of war had 
changed and wrote, “it must be total in every way, designed to destroy an enemy’s 
home base and spare him nothing.”2  In light of this vision, the USAF viewed the 
other military services as inconsequential appendages and expected the other military 
services relegated to secondary/supporting roles.  Given this view of potential conflict  
LeMay surmised, “[that the only thing] conventional forces do is delay the inevitable 
nuclear confrontation.”3 
The other services, chiefly the Navy, took a dim view of this Air Force vision 
for future conflict.  While initially afraid of losing their sea-borne air armadas to the 
Air Force, naval aviators believed that aircraft carriers with their accompanying air 
wings provided a unique capability that could not be matched by land-based aircraft.  
The Navy thought that large land-based bombers were vulnerable to enemy air 
defenses and argued that wholesale nuclear attack had severe moral implications 
counter to American ideals.  As the Air Force pushed for more bombers, the Navy 
envisioned a new larger aircraft carrier to meet America’s future defensive needs.  
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The new aircraft carrier design had a flush deck, an array of fighters, and included 
eighteen attack aircraft capable of delivering nuclear ordnance.4  To the Air Force, 
this naval platform offered an inferior and less effective means of striking the enemy.  
More importantly, the budget and role of the ship posed a threat to the building of an 
Air Force nuclear bomber fleet in an era of fiscal military frugality. 
 
 
Figure 17:  Air Force vision regarding the relevance of the military services in future conflict.  Source: 
“A Decade of Security Thru Airpower,” USAF Pamphlet, Box 96, Papers of General Curtis E. LeMay, 
Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 
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The differences between these two visions of the future came to a head in the 
halls of Congress during the fall of 1949 and eventually known as the “Revolt of the 
Admirals.”  The larger question was not so much a matter of inter-service rivalry over 
roles and missions, but the direction of America’s grand military strategy in the post 
war world.  Was the U.S. going to base its defensive posture upon a large, land-based 
strategic bomber fleet capable of delivering nuclear munitions or look to an equal 
array of naval, air, and land forces for defending itself and the free world?  
Additionally, the issues discussed during the 1949 “Revolt” tacitly included the 
official approbation or rejection of nuclear bombing and continued departure from the 
bombing theory as framed by ACTS.  In this forum, members of the U.S. government 
debated the efficacy and effectiveness of nuclear weapons and associated bombing 
methodologies.  In this discourse, it was obvious that USAF strategic planners sought  
to target not just factories, but was looking to destroy entire cities, and possibly a 
whole nation. 
Naval officers had their own opinions regarding national defense and the 
USAF’s vision of future conflict.  However, based upon the Truman Administration’s 
post war policies, the advent of nuclear warfare, the emerging threat of the Soviet 
Union, and advances in technology, the overall strategy for America’s defense 
radically changed.  These varied agendas and influences facilitated the USAF’s 
continued departure from ACTS foundations. 
____________________________________________ 
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The Post War World 
Following World War II, America found itself as the preeminent power in the 
world.  With the defeat of the Axis, most of Europe was a smoking ruin from over six 
years of war; England teetering on financial chaos, and the Soviet Union facing a 
huge rebuilding and recovery effort, the U.S. was the sole economic and industrial 
power in the world.  After the war, America still had its entire infrastructure intact, 
possessed easy access to an abundance of natural resources, and could expect an 
adequate labor pool to operate the nation’s industries.  While serving as the “arsenal 
of democracy” for the Allied powers, the war stimulated the American economy with 
U.S. exports by 1944 exceeding $14 billion.5  Furthermore, the U.S. arguably 
possessed the most potent war machine on earth.  In addition to having cracked the 
code on nuclear fission and developed atomic weapons, as the war ended in 
September 1945, the U.S. military had 97 Army and Marine ground divisions, 
approximately 230 Army Air Force groups, over 85,000 aircraft, 1,166 Navy combat 
ships, and over 12 million in uniform.6  From every measure of national power in 
1945, the U.S. stood as the most dominant state on the globe. 
However, with the end of the war, most of those in uniform looked forward to 
returning to civilian life and a job in the post war economy.  With loud cries “to bring 
the boys home,” the military services were pressed to demobilize as fast as possible, 
keeping with the American tradition of maintaining a relatively small peacetime 
military.  While debate ensued regarding the speed, or lack thereof, in the 
demobilization process, the armed services began releasing men from active duty.  
The Army alone had approximately 8 million men in uniform at the end of August 
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1945, and a year later that number dwindled to 2 million.7  In a four-month period, 
from September to December 1945, the demobilization process began in earnest with 
an average of 1 million men leaving the Army each month for civilian life.8  The 
Army Air Force alone had its strength overseas cut by over half during the same 
period and dropped from 1 million men to only 385,000.9 
While some complained of lethargy in the demobilization process, others 
thought the drawdown too quick and haphazard.  According to one Air Force leader, 
“Demobilization was not demobilization; it was a rout.  We just walked away and left 
everything.”10  To support this observation, by September 1946, the Air Force 
consisted of only 55 groups, down from the previous 230, with only two groups listed 
as operationally effective.11  Less than two years after the war, by April 1947, the 
U.S. Army (to include the Army Air Force) was but a shell of its former self with 
approximately 1 million men left in uniform.12 
As U.S. forces demobilized, Americans starting becoming accustomed to the 
existence of nuclear technology and the atomic bomb.  A December 1945 issue of 
Time magazine named Harry Truman the “Man of the Year” largely because of his 
decision to use the atom bomb.13  American’s became familiar with this new 
technology despite the initial shock of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  The use of this 
“wonder weapon” was largely viewed in a positive light by Americans.14  Indicative 
of this American sentiment was a December 1945 song “When the Atomic Bomb 
Fell” that included the verse “when it all cleared away, there the cruel Japs did lay, 
the answer to our fighting boys prayer.”15  Many Americans in the post war era 
envisioned atomic energy serving a very useful purpose not only for military 
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applications but also for civilian uses.16  This new energy source held the promise for 
a better future with atomic planes, ships, and for new advances in nuclear medicine.17  
Many American’s saw atomic energy ushering in a new hopeful era that would 
change everyday life.18 
Leveraging this atomic optimism and indicative of popular sentiment, 
manufacturers jumped on the bandwagon as companies utilized the word “atomic” in 
many every day products with the mushroom cloud signifying a bold new era.19  
Using “atomic” in the title of any product or service during this time was to imply 
that it was exciting and exhilarating.20  By 1947 the Manhattan phone book listed 
forty five companies with the word atomic somewhere in the title, bars offered 
“atomic cocktails,” General Mills offered an atomic ring in Kix children’s breakfast 
cereal, a Los Angeles burlesque show featured the “Atomicbomb Dancers,” and by 
1949 a comic book was published based upon the popular cartoon strip “Blondie” 
entitled, “Dagwood Splits the Atom.”21 
This same trend continued well into the 1950s and Americans purchased 
uranium mining kits, read articles published on how to find the element, U-235 lab 
kits were sold, board games with nuclear war as the theme were produced.  Even 
children comic books characters were created with titles like “Atomic Mouse,” 
“Atomic Rabbit,” and “Atomic Bunny.”  One 1952 comic book title ominously 
warned “Only a Strong America Can Prevent Atomic War.”  In the same year, the 
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) published a newspaper insert entitled “Today: 
atoms work for you” and extolled the peaceful used of the atomic technology.  The 
insert stated that “the atomic age is coming to make your life better.”22  The AEC also 
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published another pamphlet that included a listing of “45 ways you can use isotopes” 
and how they were practical in civilian production methods.23 
Schools also played a role in this endeavor.  Educating students in atomic 
energy was promoted by the National Education Association who in 1948, along with 
the AEC, published the book Operation Atomic Vision that highlighted the peaceful 
uses of the new technology.24  During the late 1940s, education journals advocated 
teaching the “positive aspects of atomic energy.”25  In 1949, the Journal of Education 
Psychology referenced General Groves as he stated, “the average American must 
learn that nuclear energy, like fire and electricity, can be a good and useful servant.”26  
Taking this position to an extreme, one farmer from Arkansas wrote Oak Ridge 
looking for atomic bomb support to blow tree stumps from his property.27 
This cultural infatuation with nuclear technology served as sort of a social 
safety value and did not necessarily mean that Americans were altogether cavalier 
about the existence of the atomic bomb or its dangerous potential.28  Two years after 
Hiroshima, in October 1947 when asked if development of the atomic bomb was “a 
good thing or a bad thing” 55 percent of Americans answered in the affirmative with 
38 percent in the negative.29  The number answering in the affirmative was 
significantly less than the 85 percent who approved of the atomic bombings in August 
of 1945 and was 14 percent less than a December 1945 survey asking the same 
question.  The promise of this new technology went hand in hand with its destructive 
potential and the fear of nuclear war remained an underlying theme in American 
social fabric.30  Regarding atomic weapons, in December 1945 Time magazine 
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reported that when “listening to the people talk, [to street pollsters they] found awe, 
fear, cynicism, and hope-but mostly confused fear and hopeful confusion.”31 
When covering American feelings regarding the bomb, the same article 
reported, “Never before since the pollsters set up shop had one topic evoked such 
prolonged intense public concern.  Nothing-not the homecoming of the heroes, not 
the strikes nor reconversion, the Pearl Harbor investigation, the housing shortage not 
this week’s Big Three meeting, not even Santa Claus had been able to drive the bomb 
from the topmost place in the U.S. mind.”32  However, along with this fear, many in 
the U.S. anticipated that the nuclear monopoly would lead to a kind of “atomic pax 
Americana.”33  The Time article concluded, “Americans precariously holding the 
bombs precarious [sic] secret, were more afraid of it than any have-not nation had 
reason to be.”34 
As the U.S. military downsized and atomic culture began to flourish, the 
priority of effort for both the nation and the Truman Administration turned to the 
economy and post war prosperity.  Both citizens and corporate American alike saw a 
bright future ahead and looked to the government to reform many of the essential 
wartime economic policies.  Industry sought an end to price controls and Americans 
looked forward to the end of rationing with the hope that the peacetime economy did 
not yield a huge rise in inflation.35  As the basis of the economy shifted from wartime 
to peacetime, fears over inflation and another depression served as reminders to 
Truman that a balanced federal budget, and the amelioration of the wartime national 
debt, was the necessity.36  Truman was so concerned with balancing the federal 
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budget that whenever Congress forwarded a proposal for a tax cut, he consistently 
vetoed it.37 
Instead of depending upon a large standing army, Truman saw that economic 
solvency provided the best bet for national security in the post war world.  In his 
annual State of the Union address in January 1946, he stated, “National security does 
not consist of an army, a navy, and an air force.  It rests on a much broader basis.  It 
depends on a sound economy of prices and wages, on prosperous agriculture, on 
satisfied and productive workers, on a competitive private enterprise free from 
monopolistic repression.”38  As the military shrank in size, so too did its budget.  
Because of the nation’s victory in the war, and for the good of the economy, Truman 
cut defense appropriations from 40 percent of the Gross National Product (GNP) to a 
mere 4 percent.39  During the same January address, he outlined a plan for a reduction 
in defense expenditures dropping them from a planned figure of $70 billion for fiscal 
year 1946 to $49 billion.  For the following year he planned to reduce the figure again 
to a mere $15 billion and sought to keep military spending around this level during 
his term.40  
In his effort to secure the economic solvency, Truman also sought to balance 
the federal budget for the next four years.  The planned reductions in military 
spending were one of Truman’s primary methods of cutting federal expenditures.  
While holding the opinion that the military always requesting more money than it 
needed, after the war Truman began applying the “Remainder Method” of fiscal 
policy with regard to the defense budget.41  This methodology considered all expected 
civilian governmental expenses and balanced them off the federal government’s 
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projected income.42  Once the civilian expenses were subtracted from the federal 
revenue, the “remainder” served as the budgetary limit for the military.43  This system 
of budgeting obviously placed defense funding as the lowest priority and the 
immediate post war Army, Navy, and Air Force reflected such frugality.  The idea of 
fiscal conservatism not only affected the military but also served as the foundation for 
many Truman administrations policies and actions.  Ironically, this same frugality led 
Truman to rely more upon atomic weaponry for defense than large standing 
conventional armies.44 
Along with a president concerned largely with fiscal solvency, Americans 
began to look inward.  Following the war, Americans were much more concerned 
with domestic issues rather than foreign ones and placed the emphasis with the 
economy over national security.  A poll taken in October 1945 asked Americans the 
following question, “What do you think is the most important problem facing the 
country during the next year?”  The answers of jobs, strikes, and reconversion were 
by far the three prevailing responses.45  A little over a year later in 1946, polls again 
queried Americans after the November mid-term elections and asked this question, 
“What is the first problem you would like to see the new Congress take up?”  The 
four most frequent responses were: control of strikes, prices and the high cost of 
living, tax reform, and the housing shortage.46 
Despite a spike in inflation in 1946 and a large number of strikes that affected 
major industries, the nation enjoyed increased economic prosperity and by 1947, 
many Americans began to experience a rise in discretionary spending with national 
incomes growing 60 percent.47  Consumerism became the norm as Americans spent 
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their growing incomes on the purchases of household furnishings, luxury items, and 
appliances.48  Sales of items such as cars, stoves, televisions, and refrigerators in 
America easily numbered into the millions and found their way to U.S. homes.49  
Unlike generations before, Americans began spending more and saving less.  The 
postwar economy provided a new standard of living for most Americans and a 
welcome respite from the war and the depression that preceded it.  Commensurate 
with this growth in income and discretionary spending, the number of American 
families also began to rise with this pattern of economic prosperity continuing well 
into the 1950s.50  By 1960, 75 percent of Americans owned a car, 86 percent a 
refrigerator, and 75 percent had a dishwasher.51 
However, even with the domestic prosperity enjoyed by most Americans 
during the post war period, events overseas provided an ominous warning.  As 
Americans started families, bought cars, and began establishing suburbs, Europe lay 
prostrate from the war with little or no economy and communist parties vying to fill 
political power vacuums.  Soviet forces were loath to withdraw from Iran, and in 
1947 communist insurgents in Greece and Turkey threatened democratic 
governments.  Adding to the danger, a coup in Czechoslovakia ensured that country 
remained under the Soviet sphere of influence and in June 1948, the Soviets 
established the Berlin blockade by stopping all surface movement from West 
Germany to the city of 2 million.  Exacerbating the concerns of communist incursions 
and the threat to America, in 1949 Mao and his “Red Army” soundly defeated the 
Nationalist Chinese on the Asian mainland forcing Chiang Kai Check to withdraw to 
the island of Formosa.  Furthermore, in September an American WB-29 
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reconnaissance plane taking air samples over the Kamchatka Peninsula found 
evidence of a Soviet nuclear detonation. 
The American relationship with the Soviet Union had always been one of 
suspicion and mistrust.  The U.S. loathed the establishment of communism in Russia 
beginning with the October Revolution in 1917 and attempted to thwart the effort 
with the ill-fated Archangel and Vladivostok expeditions of 1918-1919.  Following 
World War I, fervent anti-communist sentiment became part of the national fabric 
and remained a foundation of American patriotic ideals.  As a result, the pattern of the 
U.S.-Soviet relationship was already well established before World War II and 
continued after the Allied victory.52  Despite U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the war 
against Hitler, neither side completely trusted the other and the shotgun marriage of 
convenience quickly deteriorated after V-J Day.  While there is no definitive start 
date to the beginning of the “Cold War” many largely accept the end of World War II 
as the event precipitating the ideological struggle.53 
With Truman succeeding FDR, the anti-Soviet sentiment within the U.S. 
government would continue in earnest.  Truman held deep-seated hatred of both 
communism and the Soviet Union and reportedly argued that “Russians were as 
untrustworthy as Hitler and Al Capone.”54  Adding to the political dichotomy was 
Truman’s steadfast belief in American “moral superiority” and the observation that 
Russians mistook generosity as a sign of weakness.55  Furthermore, he believed that 
the USSR needed to be “taught how to behave in the civilized world” and that the 
world depended upon American economic, political, and liberal values.56  The 
establishment of the “Truman Doctrine” on March 12, 1947, clearly drew the line 
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between the two powers as the president stated, “it must be the policy of the United 
States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed 
minorities or by outside pressures.”57  When addressing “outside pressures” there was 
no doubt in anyone’s mind to whom Truman was referring. 
Throughout the post-war period and well into the 1950s, the issues regarding 
the apparent appeasement of Soviet expansion served as rhetorical fodder for 
domestic discussion and for the political positioning between the Republican and 
Democratic parties.  Charges of being “soft on communism” served largely political 
ends in domestic arenas as both parties used this accusation to sway voters.  In this 
same vein, political leaders argued that the high standard of the American way of life 
proved the superiority of capitalism over communism.  The contemporary zeitgeist in 
American wove economic prosperity with patriotic overtones and connected 
consumerism and the conventional values of the family unit as part of a safeguard 
against communism.58  The ideological and political lines between the superpowers 
had clearly been drawn.  Hanson Baldwin, the military editor for the New York Times, 
argued in 1947, “the United States and Russia are face to face in a struggle for the 
world, a conflict short of war, but a conflict non-the-less.”59 
Eager to offset the Republican gains in the 1946-midterm elections, Truman 
set out to firmly establish his anti-communist stance and bolster the Democratic 
Party’s public image as champions of democracy.  In 1947 to partly offset Republican 
claims regarding Democrats “being soft on communism,” and in line with traditional 
American fear over communist infiltration, Truman signed Executive Order 9835 that 
established the Employee Loyalty Program that held hostage anyone with a 
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communist connection.60  This program allowed federal civilian employees to be 
dismissed from their jobs if “reasonable grounds” were found.61  This program 
facilitated the subsequent communist witch hunts of McCarthy and the House Un-
American Activities Committee (HUAC).62  In addition to the Truman Doctrine, on 
April 3, 1948, Truman initiated the Marshall Plan in Europe as another effort to stem 
growing communist influence.  As the Soviets exerted their influence in Poland, 
Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia, America sought to establish 
capitalist trading partners in Western Europe.63  The Marshall Plan not only provided 
reconstruction opportunities to a worn-torn Europe for humanitarian purposes, but 
also served as an economic bulwark against further communist gains.  By 
encouraging capitalism and sewing the seeds for future markets, the Marshall plan 
was a direct attempt to prevent further communist influence in Western European 
political arenas.  The Marshall Plan served in concert with the Truman Doctrine as 
the president claimed they were “two halves of the same walnut.”64  
On the domestic front, Truman’s policies were bearing some political fruit.  In 
his close election with Thomas Dewey in 1948, the challenger stated that he lost 
because “the [Russian] bear got us.”65  Dewey concluded he was not sufficiently 
critical regarding Truman’s “tough on communism” stance, but historian Arnold 
Offner argues, “Truman appeared to be doing what the public wanted him to do, 
namely, sustain a tough policy-short of war in Berlin and elsewhere.”66  The domestic 
political agenda not only shaped American post war foreign policies and agendas, but 
helped to drive defense policy and practices. 
 250 
Perhaps the best starting point for the American perspective regarding the 
post-war international environment is George Kennan’s famed “Long Telegram” 
message from Moscow on February 22, 1946.  In this transmission, Kennan, the 
Deputy Head of the U.S. mission in Moscow, provided the intellectual cornerstone 
for American military and political policy for the next few decades.67  In his message 
Kennan outlined the mistrustful nature of the Soviet Union and explained, “At the 
bottom of the Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs is the traditional and 
instinctive Russian sense of insecurity.”68  Further he claimed, “world communism is 
like a malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue.”69 
The message was popular reading in the Truman Administration and 
eventually published in the academic journal Foreign Affairs in 1946 under the name 
penname “Mr. X.”  The most important aspect of the Kennan “Mr. X” article came 
from one of the last passages as it suggested that the U.S. embark “with reasonable 
confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with 
unalterable counter force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon 
the interests of a peaceful and stable world.”70  Kennan’s ideas quickly gained 
traction in post war America and national foreign policy strategy obtained a new 
name: “containment.” 
Post Cold War scholars have refuted such nefarious intentions on the part of 
the Soviet Union and see Stalin much more in a defensive mode.  Cold War historian 
John Lewis Gaddis identified Stalin’s post war goals specifically as, “security for 
himself, his regime, and his country and his ideology precisely in that order.”71  
Furthermore, Gaddis believes that Stalin was betting that another capitalist crisis 
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would occur following the war and that the U.S. would lend money to the USSR for 
reconstruction in order to keep markets open for American manufacturers.72  In 
keeping with Marxist ideology, Stalin thought capitalism would eventually sow its 
own seeds of destruction and the countries of Western Europe would ultimately turn 
to communism as a solution.73  According to Gaddis’ interpretation, there was no 
need for offensive military action on the part of the USSR, as time would provide the 
eventual victory of communism. 
Regardless of Gaddis’s opinion of Stalin’s intentions, most Americans in the 
late 1940s saw communism and the USSR as a nefarious agent in world affairs bent 
upon global expansion.  Polls taken at this time overwhelming reflected the 
suspicious mood of Americans toward the Soviets.  In August 1946, 60 percent of 
Americans surveyed thought that Russia “was trying to build itself up to be the ruling 
power of the world” while only 26 percent thought the USSR was merely trying to 
protect itself from another war.74  A year later, another poll found that 71 percent of 
Americans believed that one nation was trying to dominate the world.  Furthermore, 
of that 71 percent, a full 78 percent believed that the one country attempting to 
dominate was Russia.75  Six months later in February 1948, 73 percent of those polled 
believed that that Russia would start a war with the U.S. to “get something she 
wanted.” 
On November 23, 1948, the National Security Council (NSC) Memo 20/4 
officially reflected the growing concern over Soviet actions and echoed the sentiment 
expressed by Kennan in his 1946 telegram and “Mr. X” article.  NSC 20/4 argued that 
“communist ideology and Soviet behavior clearly demonstrate that the ultimate 
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objective of the leaders of the USSR is the domination of the world” and in doing so 
Russia was “building up as rapidly as possible the war potential of the Soviet orbit in 
anticipation of war, which in the communist thinking is inevitable.”76  Furthermore, 
the document argued that the Red Army was capable of “over-running in about six 
months all of continental Europe and the Near East . . . while occupying important 
continental points in the Far East.”77  NSC 20/4 also speculated, “by no later than 
1955 the USSR will probably be capable of serious air attacks against the United 
States with atomic, biological and chemical weapons.”78 
In response to this threat, NSC 20/4 suggested that the U.S. needed to prepare 
itself militarily and provide a long-term deterrent stance against possible Soviet 
Aggression.79  Additionally, in the event of war the document stated that the U.S. 
“should endeavor by successful military and other operations to create conditions 
which would permit satisfactory accomplishment of U.S. objectives without a 
predetermined requirement for unconditional surrender.”80  NSC 20/4 established 
American national security policy and the military stance of nation until replaced by 
the equally assertive policy of NSC 68.  However, NSC 20/4 was really designed to 
help spur defense appropriation under Truman’s budgetary constraints and draw 
attention to external threats.81  Unlike its successor NSC 68 in this purpose, NSC 20/4 
was a failure.82  Nevertheless, as much as it failed to encourage defense spending it 
also failed to provide definitive guidance to military planners regarding goals and 
objectives of an atomic offensive.  As a result, targeting of Soviet cities and 
infrastructure was left largely to the devices of men like LeMay.83 
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Flush from victory, after World War II most of America turned inward for 
economic and domestic prosperity with the Truman administration looking to balance 
the federal budget and curb government costs, especially defense spending.  A 
smaller U.S. military reflected the mood of the nation as it maintained only a cadre 
force despite the possible growing threat of communist incursions.  However, as the 
hubris of victory wore off, world events effected national policies and directives that 
set in place a more pronounced defensive posture in light of the perceived danger 
from global monolithic communism.  To meet the challenge, America’s strategic 
policies changed and leveraged the most cost effective, yet destructive means to deter 
aggression: atomic warfare.  The adoption of atomic war and the ability to destroy 
whole cities certainly departed from America’s pre-war bombing doctrine and stood 
in contrast to previously held notions regarding civilian casualties.  
____________________________________________ 
 
 
Birth of Nuclear Planning and the Rise of the Air Force 
On March 31, 1949, at the Mid-Century Convocation at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, Former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill provided 
his perspectives regarding the emerging Cold War and the role of technology in 
recent world conflicts.  One sentence in Churchill’s speech stood above the others 
regarding the development of modern warfare and was held in high regard by the 
future commander of the USAF’s Strategic Air Command (SAC).  About half way 
through his speech Churchill quipped, “For good or ill air mastery is today the 
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supreme expression of military power, and fleets and armies, however necessary, 
must accept a subordinate rank.”84  The quote rang true with Curtis LeMay and he 
had the words printed, framed, and hung in his office at his SAC Headquarters.85  
While other military services may have bristled as such an idea, there is little doubt 
that many members of the newly created Air Force fully subscribed to Churchill’s 
observations. 
Following the war, Army Air Force leadership was convinced of the 
superiority of the air arm in modern war and firmly believed that their efforts had 
been the decisive factor in the Allied victory.86  The charred remains of German and 
Japanese cities stood as testaments to the destruction wrought by America’s air 
armadas and were harbingers to the potential of airpower.  However, with the 
publishing of the Strategic Bombing Survey in 1946, arguments ensued over how 
much aerial bombardment had actually contributed to winning the war.  While many 
air leaders believed that the Army Air Force’s bombing effort proved the value of 
airpower, the USSBS was not the definitive validation of air some expected.  Overall, 
the survey’s findings reported mixed results from both theaters.  The USSBS 
described in detail that many German production rates steadily increased up until mid 
1944 despite the “round the clock” bombing of the RAF and USAAF. 
Changes in German production methods and organization mitigated some of 
the Allied bombing effects the survey found that certain USAAF target sets had the 
wrong emphasis.  In the Pacific, while the firebombing efforts against the Japanese 
were certainly destructive, they did not start in earnest until March 1945.  By that 
time, the U.S. Navy had already sunk much of the Japanese merchant fleet and 
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isolated the home islands from its source of war materials in South East Asia and the 
East Indies.87  As a result, resources on the mainland were already scarce and 
factories increasingly had smaller amounts of raw materials to produce the equipment 
required for a modern mechanized military. 
In the end, the survey found that air power was a factor in the Allied victory, 
but not the decisive cause of the Axis defeat.  The USSBS went so far as to conclude 
that, “the role of air power cannot be considered separately . . . from the roles of 
ground and naval forces nor from the broad plans and strategy from which the war 
was conducted.”88  Analysis conducted by the widely regarded civilian strategist 
Bernard Brodie during the 1950s echoed the USSBS findings.  He argued that the 
strategic bombing campaign was one element in a combination of forces that defeated 
the Axis and that airpower alone could not have secured victory.89 
The USSBS conclusions did not necessarily provide the definitive validation 
of strategic bombing for which the Air Force had hoped.90  But while the 
contributions and effectiveness of strategic bombing in World War II were equivocal, 
airmen in the post-war era were steadfast in their defense of strategic bombardment 
and the belief that it could single-handedly bring victory.  Furthermore, with the 
advent of the atomic bomb and improvements in aviation technology, many believed 
that airpower was now the decisive force regardless of the USSBS findings.  In one of 
the first highly regarded books about nuclear war, The Ultimate Weapon, author 
Bernard Brodie argued that along with nuclear bombs came a wholesale change in 
warfare.  While Brodie saw some merit in the USAAF conventional wartime 
bombing efforts, he believed that atomic weaponry significantly changed the mission 
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of armed forces.  The salient message of the book was that “the chief purpose of our 
military establishment has been to win wars.  From now on, the chief purpose must be 
to avert them.  It can have no other useful purpose.”91  Furthermore, because of the 
airplane’s destructive potential with atomic weapons, Brodie believed that war in the 
future would be a short affair lasting only a few days.92  These ideas regarding war in 
the future also permeated throughout the USAF and served as the foundation for 
American defensive strategies during the Cold War. 
The polemics regarding the findings of the USSBS led one Air Force leader to 
submit an addendum to the Secretary of War.  The document provided a pro-Air 
Force perspective to the survey’s lukewarm results and argued the potential for 
airpower in future conflict.  Major General Orvil A. Anderson, Chief of the Army 
Analysis Division, argued that in light of the survey’s findings, the leaps in aviation 
technology and development of long-range air weapons provide an “effective means 
of striking directly at the enemy’s sustaining resources and his will to wage war.”93  
Furthermore, the General proffered the view that, “surface forces need be opposed 
and neutralized only as required in acquiring and/or defending necessary air bases 
[and] . . . In the future, the range of air weapons and their ability to penetrate enemy 
air defenses will be fundamental considerations in the development of a nation’s 
primary striking force.”94  Echoing the primacy of airpower, this same sentiment was 
expressed by Stuart Symington, future Secretary of the Air Force who told a crowd in 
Detroit, “our strength in the air will decide the destiny of America.”95  Regardless of 
what the Survey reported about the effectiveness of the strategic air effort in World 
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War II, it did not shake the Air Force’s opinion of its pivotal role in any upcoming 
conflict. 
Concern over the spread of communism, and a return to the pre-war hostility 
between the U.S. and the USSR, when combined with the large-scale demobilization 
of the military following the war, caused American planners increasingly to perceive 
atomic weapons as America’s trump card to offset a large Soviet Red Army.  In 
December 1947 the first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, acknowledged the 
primacy of atomic weapons in American strategy in a testimony to the Senate Armed 
Services committee.  Forrestal stated stating that there were only “four outstanding 
facts in the world at this time:  
1.  Predominance of Russian land power in Europe and Asia. 
2.  Predominance of American Sea power. 
3.  Our exclusive possession of the atomic bomb. 
4.  American productive capability.  
 
He asserted further, “As long as we can out produce the world, control the sea, and 
strike inland with the atomic bomb, we can assume risks otherwise unacceptable in an 
effort to restore world trade, to restore the balance of power-military power-and to 
eliminate some the conditions that breed war.”96  War plans in the immediate post 
war period called for more and more powerful atomic weapons to target both the 
Soviet armies in the field and the national infrastructure of the USSR. 
However, America’s stockpile of atomic weapons was limited to a mere 
thirteen bombs in 1947 and in late 1946 the nuclear delivery force consisted of only 
twenty-three of the special “Silverplate” B-29s.97  Furthermore, Air Force bomber 
crews were sadly deficient in both competency and airmanship during the post war 
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era.  The drawdown of the military had significant consequences for the USAF.  After 
LeMay took command of SAC he directed a practice raid upon Dayton Ohio with all 
the bomb groups in the command.  In January 1949, crews were given a pre-World 
War II photo of the town and directed to attack select targets, using radar, at thirty 
thousand feet.98  Many aircraft aborted due to mechanical difficulties, radar sets did 
not work at altitude so crews flew bomb runs at fifteen thousand feet, and 
inexperienced radar operators became confused as to the actual target.99  Weather also 
affected the bombers, but the average bombing score was between five thousand and 
eleven thousand feet from the target.100  Not one bomber finished the mission as 
briefed.101  LeMay called the raid “the darkest night in American aviation history.”102  
The Air Force asked famed aviator Charles Lindberg to assess the USAF 
during the post war era.  The aviator flew with SAC aircrews during 1948 and 
submitted a report that foreshadowed the Dayton raid results.103  He found 
deficiencies in SAC training programs created by the command’s leadership and their 
policies.104  America’s premier atomic strike unit was not immune to a lack of 
training as the 509th Bomb Group’s Circular Error Probable (CEP), the radius in 
which fifty percent of bombs dropped will fall, was over one mile when released from 
over twenty five thousand feet.105  This lack of high altitude proficiency led Lindberg 
to report, “the personnel for atomic squadrons are not carefully selected enough . . . 
and the average pilots proficiency is unsatisfactory, teamwork is not properly 
developed. . . . In general, personnel are not sufficiently experienced in their 
mission.”106 
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Regarding nuclear weapons, the U.S. military had no atomic bombs to train 
with as all fissionable materials fell under the purview of the civilian-run AEC 
established by the McMahon Act of 1946.  While the JCS attempted to gain access to 
these weapons in 1948, SAC did not have authorization to possess nuclear munitions 
until 1952.  As a result, ground crews had little experience, if any, on how to handle, 
assemble, or load nuclear ordnance.  The early MK III bombs had to be assembled by 
hand and then closely monitored as battery life and the generation of heat around the 
nuclear core prevented the stockpiling of fully assembled bombs.107  Furthermore, it 
could take up to sixteen hours to fully complete the assembly process.108  Despite 
these initial shortfalls in training, material, and organization, the idea of nuclear 
weapons began to gain popularity as an important tenet in American post war 
defensive strategy.109 
Regardless of the poor state of the U.S. strategic bombing force, reliance upon 
atomic weapons served a domestic political agenda.  Truman’s fiscal conservatism 
and desire to balance the national budget led to reliance on atomic weapons to 
mitigate the requirement for a large and expensive conventional standing army.  The 
portion of the GNP allocated to defense reflected Truman’s “Remainder Method” of 
budgeting.  During this period the White House continually exerted pressure upon the 
Pentagon to economize and stretch its meager budget allocations.110  Additionally, as 
inflation rose in the U.S. during the post war period, the purchasing power of the 
dollar shrank.  This situation not only affected the American consumer, but also the 
defense establishment.  In addition to the lack of purchasing power of the dollar, 
defensive systems and equipment were becoming increasingly more sophisticated and 
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therefore more expensive.111  The technological boon experienced in the war came 
with a price.  A B-17 bomber during the war cost $218,000 but the new B-36 the 
USAF was buying during the post war era cost over $3.6 million.112  While platforms 
grew in capability and performance, costs skyrocketed and the military had to 
conduct its missions with less assets and equipment. 
Even after the Berlin blockade of 1948 and rising tensions with the USSR, 
Truman refused to raise the defense budget and atomic weaponry served as a panacea 
to the Soviet threat while keeping defense expenditures minimal regardless of the sad 
shape of the nuclear force.113  Truman’s agenda combined with the thriving post war 
economy made it difficult to man, train, and equip the USAF.114  All of the services 
suffered from a lack of personnel and equipment during the post war era and military 
planners saw nuclear capability as a way to tip the balance of power toward the 
U.S.115  However, given the size of the budget and the USAF’s actual readiness 
capability for the nuclear mission, it is obvious that America’s nuclear trump card 
was largely a bluff and would remain so until global events forced the presidents 
hand. 
With the advent of atomic bombing, at the later half of 1945 Arnold directed a 
study to determine the employment, size, organization, and composition of the post-
war, atomic, Air Force.  The study, headed by Spaatz included future USAF Chief of 
Staff General Hoyt Vandenberg and the future Supreme Allied Commander-Europe, 
General Lauris Norstad.  One of the assumptions these men made regarding an atomic 
air force was that time was now at a premium and that the Air Force no longer had the 
luxury of years to build an air fleet once a war started.116  America’s military might in 
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1941 was only a fraction of what it became by 1945.  After Pearl Harbor, U.S. 
industry had time to build planes while the Army began recruiting and training 
aircrews.  In this effort, the U.S. had over a year to build up forces before the 
initiation of the CBO in Europe.  In Asia, the USAAF had a full two years before it 
started B-29 operations over Japan. 
In future war, however, the board assumed that America would not have the 
time to “ramp up” aircraft production and aircrew training much as it had in World 
War II.  Just as Brodie had envisioned, and given advances in technology, future wars 
were expected to be shorter in duration and required the ability to strike with full 
military might at the very beginning of the conflict.  Toward this end, the new USAF 
needed to exist in sufficient numbers of both men and aircraft at the start of any war.  
To support this posture American needed “an Air Force in being,” capable of 
delivering a knock out blow to an adversary during the early phases of a conflict.117  
Furthermore, military planners generally accepted that there was no defense against 
atomic bombing.  A nation could ill-afford to be caught unprepared for a war in 
which airpower and atomic bombs would provide the decisive victory.118  The term 
“an air force in being” was a common expression used by USAF leaders to sell the 
idea that America needed an air fleet in existence to counter potential aggression. 
A 1946 work written by a veteran of the strategic bombing campaign over 
Germany specifically addresses the issue of military preparedness for nuclear war in 
light of a democratic form of government.  William Borden’s There Will be No Time, 
argued that democratic governments were at a disadvantage to dictatorships in 
preparing for war as the focus of effort was different.119  While democratic citizens 
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focus upon jobs and economic domestic concerns, dictatorships were able to prepare 
for war because they did not answer to a constituency.120  Borden concluded that in 
the nuclear world a standing military force ready to strike back at an aggressor was an 
imperative, despite the democratic foundations of the country, and warned that the 
penalty for not supporting such preparation was not just a longer casualty list but 
“certain national death.”121 
The Spaatz board also determined that the atomic bomb was primarily an 
offensive weapon to be utilized against large cities and industrial targets.  Despite the 
bombs destructive power and potential, they concluded it “did not warrant a material 
change in our present conception of employment, size, organization, and composition 
of the post-war Air Force.”122  Furthermore, they found that the bomb “has not altered 
our basic concept of the strategic air offensive, but has given us an additional 
weapon.”123  Given USAAF doctrinal precepts before the war, this statement certainly 
alludes to a significant change in thought.  However, based upon this statement it is 
obvious, these men were referring to USAAF practices as it pertained to the World 
War II experience and not the pre-war doctrine of precision bombardment. 
As raids during World War II produced large-scale devastation and razed 
square miles of urban area, American air leaders became anesthetized to the 
widespread devastation created by aerial bombardment.  They became accustomed to 
the mass destruction produced during the war and carried such ideation into the post 
war era.124  The scale and scope of World War II hinted that the next conflict would 
include the use of more powerful weapons and leverage the most advanced 
technology.  Toward this end, USAF planners widely believed that future conflict 
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would be nuclear, air-centric, and fought in a relatively short time.  Public addresses, 
papers, and articles written during this time consistently echoed these sentiments and 
such ideas served as the foundation for bombardment strategies. 
USAF leaders of the era tended to be unsophisticated regarding their ideas of 
airpower and focused upon execution rather than reflective rationalized thought 
regarding geopolitics and nuclear conflagration.125  While these leaders were not 
unintelligent or dim-witted men, they did lack an appreciation of international politics 
and the nuances of diplomacy.  This lack of intellectual thought and reflection is 
evident in the demographics of the entire USAF officer corps.  Statistics from 1954 
state that that roughly only 43 percent of Air Force officers were college graduates, 
the lowest of any service, and of that, only 7 percent had come from a service 
academy.126  In Air Force Magazine, the Director of Education at the USAF’s Air 
University complained about the lack of emphasis in professional instruction in his 
service.  He made note that the Air Force was stagnant in regarding to education and 
intellectual development and argued,  
We tend to give precedence to the things that we cherish. Thus in today’s Air 
Force we lay great emphasis on the skills necessary to fly and maintain our 
weapons, and properly so.  However, although we clamor for the kinds of 
people professional education produces, we do not attach commensurate 
importance to the effort necessary to develop them.127  
Furthermore, he noted that while the Air Force doubled in personnel strength from 
1950-1953, professional education programs did not grow in concert with the increase 
and that the service did not have an Academy established for the development of its 
own officer corps.128  
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When LeMay assumed command of SAC on October 19, 1948, he quickly 
attempted to fill the ranks of his organization with what he referred to as the “right 
people,” meaning mostly his subordinates and colleagues from his wartime, World 
War II bombing operations.129  The “right people” LeMay surrounded himself with 
directed raids over Berlin, Tokyo, Hamburg, and Yokohama and had no qualms about 
executing missions they thought as militarily sound with the most destructive means 
at their disposal.  They were single-minded in their ideas regarding bombing and 
based their decisions upon wartime conventional experiences.130 
Paramount to this experience was the war fighting principle of “mass.”  This 
principle has a number of definitions but largely defined as to “concentrate the effects 
of combat power at the decisive place and time.”131  Mass allows a commander to 
“overwhelm enemies” to achieve both destructive and constructive results.132  For air 
commanders during World War II, this application of combat power eventually began 
to equate to mass more in different terms pertaining to large-scale application of 
bombing and widespread destruction.  The large raids over Germany and Japan and 
their considerable effects had a significant impact on these commanders at the 
operational level in World War II.  These men carried these experiences to the 
strategic level of war during the post war period with little or no appreciation for the 
new dimension of atomic war. 
As technology and bomb yield improved, little thought was given in USAF 
circles to a nuanced military strategy that reflected the larger political aims of the 
nation or to the development of doctrine in light of the new changes in warfare as 
Brodie suggested.133  While these leaders did consider the psychological, mental, and 
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political effects atomic weapons created, air planners looked mainly at the physical 
destruction and the effect upon enemy infrastructure reminiscent of World War II 
methods of bombardment.  USAF leaders failed to appreciate the implications of 
atomic war and revise air doctrine.134  While advocates of air power at the time saw 
an end to the bomber streams and large air battles of World War II, they failed to 
appreciate the larger implications of atomic warfare and its direct correlation to 
national political objectives.  When Brodie was hired by the Research and 
Development (RAND) Corporation to review SAC planning in the early 1950’s, he 
was chagrined to see that it was operationally focused and failed to consider the larger 
strategic political aims of the state in light of atomic war.135 
The legacy of the World War II experience greatly affected  post war planning 
and America’s air leaders relied upon their operational level combat experience for 
planning rather than intellectual, carefully measured thought regarding atomic war.  
What many USAF planners focused upon was the destruction of factories and 
infrastructure and the use of massive attacks to destroy an enemy; such operations 
might not be necessary given the overall requirements in support of national strategic 
aims.136  While targeting strategies changed as did the growth of the American 
nuclear stockpile, SAC planned to throw much of the atomic force against the Soviets 
in a single massive attack.  In January 1949, the first approved plan specifically 
including atomic attack, entitled TROJAN, called for the early targeting of vital 
elements of Soviet war making capacity and assumed that authorization for the use of 
nuclear weapons had been obtained.137  TROJAN was approved by both the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the president, and called for the nuclear targeting of 70 
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Soviet cities and the use of 133 atomic weapons.138  Still haunted to a degree 
regarding the use of the atomic bomb, Truman wanted to reject these plans in favor of 
a more conventional attack; however, the President was not willing to change his 
current fiscal policies to build a larger force with comparable potential.139 
The TROJAN plan was replaced by one entitled OFFTACKLE in 1949 with 
the later plan called for the destruction of Soviet war making capability as opposed to 
the mere “targeting of vital elements.”140  By the mid 1950s war plans envisioned that 
Russia would be “nothing but a smoking radiated ruin at the end of two hours.”141  
This kind of ideation fell in line with the air commanders World War II ideas 
regarding “mass” but and failed to acknowledge that the idea of restraint was more 
relevant in the nuclear age.142  Brodie argued that it was the very threat of nuclear war 
that was the real weapon and the accompanying psychological effect was of primary 
importance.  In this regard, Brodie believed that throwing all atomic weapons at once 
reduced the deterrent effect of holding an enemy hostage with future attacks.143  
Furthermore, Brodie was dismayed that Air Force planners had limited intelligence 
on Soviet infrastructure and did not really know how much destruction was required 
for Russia to collapse.144  Planners believed that by throwing atomic weapons at 
Soviet targets, the Russians would simply capitulate.145  Regardless of Brodie’s ideas, 
USAF planners paid more allegiance to their World War II ideas of mass than to 
other considerations.  As result, these men established targeting rationales that called 
for large-scale strikes that remained inherent in USAF nuclear planning for years. 
In an article written for Collier’s Magazine, in December 1945 entitled 
“Airpower in the Atomic Age,” Spaatz described a vision indicative of the USAF’s 
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thought regarding future conflict.  In the piece, he wrote war in the future “would be 
aimed at smashing the enemy’s whole organism and would counter his offensive 
incidentally in the process.”146  As Spaatz envisioned, an effective air offensive would 
“pulverize” the adversary’s industrial centers and by conducting “immediate blows 
against [enemy] means of civilization and military support, his industrial and 
economic areas would make his continuance of the struggle pointless and bring a 
quick surrender.”147 
Spaatz suggested a wholesale change in American military thinking.  With 
this vision of a new type of war, Spaatz argued that defense from atomic weapons 
means that American must be on the offensive from the very start.  In the nuclear 
world, with improvement in aircraft and missiles Spaatz concluded that the “offense 
has a crushing advantage” and “our habits of strictly defensive thought must be 
weeded out.  We need a national psychology of offense.”148  He argued further, “For 
the world’s greatest democracy to remain in its traditional defense minded rut during 
this time of military revolution would be an historic calamity.”149  Obviously, this 
idea represented a radical shift in American military thought. 
In speeches conducted by various members of USAAF leadership 
immediately after the war, the constant theme was that America needed an air force 
ready to retaliate to any aggressor with large-scale nuclear destruction from the air.  
In both the tone and intent of their words lie the foundations for what eventually 
became “massive retaliation” and the deterrence policy adopted by subsequent 
administrations.  Fears over an atomic Pearl Harbor underscored the importance of 
preparedness and the ability to attack immediately with nuclear weapons if 
 268 
required.150  Representative of this thought was an article written in the Air Force 
Academic journal Air University Quarterly Review (AUQR) that argued, “If bombing 
is required to enforce our will, let it be atomic bombing . . . we can concentrate our 
energies on the super air blitz which will force an unqualified decision within a month 
. . . a ready fighting team, a true atomic-bombing-force-in-being, can win the game 
without every making a substitution.”151  This same sentiment was consistently 
expressed throughout the post war era as nuclear confrontation was considered almost 
as inevitable.  When asked by a Naval officer visiting SAC headquarters about the 
command’s capability to conduct strategic bombing if atomic weapons were 
outlawed, LeMay replied, “foolish question.  It is inconceivable to me that this 
situation will ever arise.”152 
However, Spaatz was not insensitive to the moral aspect of what he was 
advocating and understood the ethical implications and consequences of nuclear war.  
Shortly after relieving Hap Arnold as the Commander of the Army Air Forces, he 
wrote a note to Stuart Symington similar in context to LeMay’s statement regarding 
the firebombing of Japan.  In the memo Spaatz writes, “Do you realize in accepting 
our new jobs and in the event of war with Russia we will be hanged as war criminals?  
There had better be some real hard honest-to-God thinking about what we need to 
avoid being on the losing side.  The U.S. has already set the pace for the atomic 
bomb, strategic bombing, and hanging war criminals.”153 
Conversely, an article written by the same General Anderson who responded 
to the USSBS with the pro USAF letter rebuking the survey’s tepid response, argued 
the morality of nuclear weapons in light of self-preservation and the defense of 
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democracy.  In the winter of 1949 in AUQR, he argued in modern war the “soldier 
and the worker are complimentary” and that the idea of strategic bombing as immoral 
is a “fallacious argument.”154  He goes on further to argue that “the informed 
viewpoint” knows that the western civilization is dependent upon nuclear weapons 
and military leaders would be “derelict in their duty to the people of the U.S. and the 
western democracies if they did not fully exploit the power of the air offensive.”155  In 
closing General Anderson argues that the U.S. has a moral obligation “as the 
champion of the dignity of man and human rights” to defend itself within the means 
available.156  In essence, America had a moral obligation to defend the free world 
with nuclear weapons. 
In addition to the USAF, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also developed similar ideas 
regarding the requirement for nuclear weapons and a “force in-being.”  Shortly after 
the war, the U.S. initiated Operation CROSSROADS and tested nuclear weapons on 
ships staged near the Bikini Atoll in early 1947.  Two tests conducted under this 
program, called ABLE and BAKER, targeted 88 ships of different class size and 
nationality.  The evaluation board consisted of Army and Navy personnel with 
prominent civilians also included.  After witnessing the tests and returning to 
Washington, the board submitted its findings in June.  The board came to the same 
conclusions as the USAF regarding the primacy of offense in the atomic age and that 
America “must be prepared to employ them [atomic bombs] before a potential enemy 
can inflict significant damage upon us.”157  It also suggested that the U.S. 
manufacture and stockpile sufficient quantities of fissionable materials to give the 
U.S. “the ability to overwhelm swiftly any potential enemy.”158  Moreover, the JCS 
 270 
report emphasized nuclear weapons by stating, “the possible penalty of a failure to 
retain dominance in the development of the atomic bomb and of the strategy and 
tactics of its use so great that it must serve as constant incentive to the best thought 
and effort of our military planners.”159 
As far as precision bombing was concerned, the board also concluded that the 
explosive yield of atomic bombs was greater than conventional munitions and that 
bombing accuracy was far less important.160  In this regard, the board suggested that 
precision was no longer going to be as significant a factor in bombing operations 
because of the widespread effects of the weapon.  These conclusions might be related 
to the fact that the ABLE drop was off target some 1500 yards.161  Why the bomb was 
so far off target is still a matter of conjecture, but the occurrence highlighted potential 
problems with dropping such a device accurately.  Given the nature of nuclear 
weapons, precision bombardment seemed to be an anachronism and a contradiction in 
the atomic age. 
However, over time the USAF determined that bomb placement was still 
important to create the desired effects at the target area.  While the blast of nuclear 
weapons destroyed large areas potentially killing thousands, the placement of the 
bomb at a given target was, and still is, important.  Because of topographical, 
meteorological, and architectural considerations, aircrews still have to place the 
weapon at a selected point to ensure the destruction of the target.  An underground 
bunker might safely withstand a nuclear airburst or an important factory would 
remain unaffected if the bomb was placed on the opposite side of an adjacent 
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mountain range or dropped into a body of water.  Regardless of their large-scale 
effects, precision still had a place in atomic bombing. 
Starting with LeMay and continuing into the contemporary era, SAC began to 
emphasize bombing accuracy holding an annual competition for aircrews.  The 
winning unit won the “Fairchild Trophy,” named after ACTS strategic bombing 
instructor Muir Fairchild, and winning the award became highly regarded by 
operational units.162  While bombing accuracy became less important as World War II 
unfolded, it initially appeared that this same trend was to continue into the nuclear 
age.  However, with the creation of SAC, the USAF was to renew interest in bombing 
accuracy, this time ironically with atomic weapons.  The departure point in the post 
war era from the original ACTS doctrine is not in the rejection or dismissal of 
accuracy in bombing operations, but in the intended massive, large-scale destruction, 
and collateral damage expected from the nuclear detonation. 
While the framers of precision bombing specifically tried to avoid civilian 
casualties, planned bombing methodologies in the post war Air Force were no longer 
constrained by such considerations.  Indicative of this thought, in 1947 the USAF 
Directorate of Intelligence forwarded a study of target sets in the USSR and entitled 
the document “To Kill a Nation.”163  While people were not necessarily the target of 
atomic strategic bombing, acceptance of massive casualties was now taken as a given 
in Air Force planning.  Implicit in war plans of the era was the destruction of entire 
cities and their populations.  Such operations were now an inherent part of modern 
warfare and attempting to avoid such annihilation was no longer a planning 
constraint. 
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Reminiscent of the morale bombing issue from before the war and related to 
the large-scale effect from atomic weapons, the CROSSROADS board concluded: 
In the face of these negative findings, and of the bomb’s demonstrated power 
to deliver death to tens of thousands, of primary military concern will be the 
bomb’s potentiality to break the will of nations and of peoples by the 
stimulation of man’s primordial fears, those of the unknown, the invisible, the 
mysterious. We may deduce from a wide variety of established facts that the 
effective exploitation of the bomb’s psychological implications will take 
precedence over the application of its destructive and lethal effects in deciding 
the issue of war.164 
Morale was again a major target despite the secondary importance placed on it at 
ACTS. 
However, members of the USAF leadership do not bear sole responsibility 
regarding the draconian application of nuclear bombardment.  While these men did 
rely on their recent experiences for their targeting and planning methods, they 
received no real guidance from the Truman administration or civilian leadership 
regarding the ends expected from a bombing strategy.165  LeMay recalled that “there 
wasn’t anything that came out of Washington.  As a matter of fact, I don’t think we 
got anything out of Washington other than maybe a little guidance on targets that 
should be hit.  We did the plan right up till the time I left [SAC] in 1957.”166  
Lieutenant General Jack Catton, an operations planner at SAC during LeMay’s tenure 
called SAC the “center of gravity for planning” during this time because only they 
had the expertise to design a bombing campaign.167 
By 1948, it was clear that international United Nations control over atomic 
energy, as embodied in the Baruch Plan and related initiatives, was a failure and 
America was free to incorporate nuclear applications into its war planning.168  The 
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Russians rejected international inspection fearing disruption of their own atomic 
bomb development efforts, and remained opposed to any outside scrutiny.  Following 
the Baruch failure, the Truman Administration published only vague guidelines 
regarding the use of nuclear weapons and never clearly defined a strategy for nuclear 
applications.  No distinct plans from the national authority outlined when and how 
atomic weapons might be used.  The first guideline for the use of nuclear weapons 
was not officially established until three years after Hiroshima in September 1948, 
under NSC 30 entitled “U.S. Policy on Atomic Warfare.”  In light of the Czech coup 
and the beginning of the Berlin blockade, the National Security Council began to 
outline policies for atomic weapons.169  NSC 30 merely designated the president as 
the sole approval authority for their use and mandated that the U.S. be ready to 
“utilize promptly and effectively all appropriate means available, including atomic 
weapons, in the interests of national security and must therefore plan accordingly.”170 
Outside of this, NSC 30 provided no further guidance on what to target in 
support of national goals or towards what end.  In this regard, questions remained as 
to what events might require a nuclear response and if approval was given, what 
target sets needed to be hit and when?171  Even before NSC 30 was approved, USAF 
General Vandenberg was already looking to gain guidance regarding the use of 
nuclear weapons and the goals of an American bombing campaign against Russia: 
In a war with the USSR is our purpose to destroy the Russian people, industry, 
the Communist party, the communist hierarchy, or a combination of these?  
Will there be a requirement to occupy, possible reconstruct, Russia after 
victory, or can we seal off the country, letting it work out its own salvation?172 
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Similarly, W. Walton Butterworth, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs at the 
State department echoed a similar sentiment.  In a memo dated September 15, 1948 
Butterworth  asked “when and how such weapons should be used?  Should we  . . . 
begin bombing major centers of population . . . or start with smaller centers important 
for transportation or specific industries?  This question should be answered not so 
much on the basis of humanitarian principles as from a practical weighing of the 
long-run advantage of this country.”173 
New York Times editor, Hanson Baldwin echoed these same sentiments almost 
a year earlier in a March 1947 article regarding the new role America played in 
securing the future of western civilization.  In the piece, Baldwin argued that 
American was now the west’s sole protector from the encroachment of Russia and 
stood as the most important factor in preventing a “reversion to nihilism and the dark 
ages.”174  While American was the bulwark against communist aggression, Hanson 
was concerned that the U.S. still had “no finished, over-all military policy [and that] 
our fighting forces are handicapped not only by the demands for economy but by lack 
of legislation and by piecemeal legislation.  There is no rounded and complete policy 
to guide them in organization or development of post war forces.”175  While the piece 
was addressing military applications as a whole, he was obviously addressing both 
conventional and atomic strategies. 
Regardless of Baldwin’s concerns, in November 1948 NSC 20/4 was signed.  
But the document still provided only a limited amount of guidance for Air Force 
planners.  In the event of war with the USSR, NSC 20/4 directed that the U.S. should 
“eliminate Soviet Russian domination in areas outside the borders of any Russian 
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state” and create conditions that would preclude the Russians from having “sufficient 
military power to wage aggressive war.”176  Furthermore, after the war NSC 20/4 
intended to prevent the Bolshevik regime from having any “military-industrial 
potential” to wage war with other regimes.177  Based upon these mandates, the USAF 
still had hardly any definitive guidance from which to plan and relied upon its 
previous bombing experiences as the foundation for targeting methodologies.178  As a 
result, due to the lack of strategic guidance from the national political leadership, the 
wartime operational influences of USAF leadership would dominate nuclear post war 
planning efforts up into the 1950s.  
As far as LeMay was concerned, it was not his job to “promulgate national 
policy” it was his job to provide the resources and capability to execute.179  He saw 
that his job was to produce a force that would place the U.S. in a position of power.  
In developing the force he wrote in his memoirs, “I never discussed the problem with 
President Truman or with President Eisenhower.  I stuck to my job at Offutt [Air 
Force Base, Nebraska] and in the command.  I never discussed what we were going to 
do with force we had, or what we should do with it, or anything of that sort.  Never 
discussed it with topside brass, military or civilian.  All I did was keep them abreast 
of the development of SAC.  I told them what strength we had, as fast as the strength 
grew.”180 
While USAF planners had little in the way of strategic guidance in light of 
nuclear applications, technological advances were having a significant impact upon 
the development of military capabilities.  The continued developments in science, 
engineering, and physics was transforming military hardware.  Contemporary thought 
 276 
at the time was that the rapid advances in aviation technology were shrinking both 
time and distance as it pertained to warfare.  Impressed with technological 
achievements made during World War II, and continuing in the same vein, the USAF 
embraced new scientific and engineering efforts in order leverage emerging 
capabilities.181  During the post war era, government sponsorship of research and 
development efforts continued to stimulate technological efforts in a number of areas.  
In order to continue the technological development of these new weapon systems, the 
USAF recognized the importance of collaborating with civilian scientist and 
academia.  Vannevar Bush, a member of the Interim Committee from 1945, and 
Director of the Office of Scientific Research at Wright Field in Dayton Ohio was a 
proponent of a close relationship between industry and the military.  He proffered that 
the relationship forged during World War II should continue for the security of the 
nation in the post war world.  As a result, the combined efforts of both the military 
and civilian sectors led to quantum leaps in technology. 
 
  
Figure 18, 19, 20:  From left to right: Convair B-36 Peacemaker dwarfing the B-29, Boeing B-47, and 
YB-52.  Source: U.S. Air Force Museum on Line Archives http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/ 
shared/media/ photodb/photos/061128-F-1234S-027.jpg; http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/shared/ 
media/photodb/ photos/061025-F-1234S-005.jpg; http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/shared/media/ 
photodb/photos/ 061026-F-1234S-016.jpg (accessed February 22, 2008). 
 
 
In aviation efforts, bomber aircraft development had the priority over 
fighters.182  During this period, special emphasis in aviation focused upon speed, 
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payload, range, and ceiling rather than designs that could generate large sortie rates 
and were more maneuverable.183  The design of the B-36, B-47, B-52, are indicative 
of this emphasis with marked improvements in performance in each successive 
design.  Eventually these manned, air breathing platforms would, partly, give way to 
advances in rocket technology and the development of the Intermediate Range 
Ballistic Missile (IRBM) and subsequently the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
(ICBM).  As a result, USAF collaboration with companies such as Boeing, Convair, 
General Dynamics, and Martin resulted in more efficient and more destructive 
weapon systems. 
The new designs, both manned and unmanned, also focused upon ability to 
penetrate enemy airspace and avoid anti-air defense systems.184  The ability to fly 
over an enemy nation and attack factories, military installations, and population 
centers in a matter of a few hours, meant future war would only last a few weeks if 
not days.  For the Air Force, in 1946, future Secretary of the Air Force Stuart 
Symington iterated that if American planes could accomplish these missions, an 
enemy air force would also eventually develop a similar capability.185  While 
American had a marked advantage in aircraft performance and had a monopoly on 
atomic weaponry up until 1949, most military planners understood that eventually 
other nations would develop similar capabilities that could threaten America. 
In addition to the development of air platforms, the U.S. also made advances 
in bomb technology.  In 1949 AEC scientists produced the MK IV atomic bomb.  
This bomb was a redesigned FAT MAN, but had a more aerodynamic shape for 
accuracy purposes and included a new implosion device.186  The design also included 
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a levitated, uranium-plutonium, core which increased the bombs explosive yield.187  
The yield of the MK IV was scalable but had a high end capacity of thirty-one 
KiloTons (KT) (compared with “Little Boy’s” approximate yield of twenty KT).188  
Successfully demonstrated during the SANDSTONE series of tests in 1948, the MK 
IV bomb improved efficiency of fissionable materials, but more importantly, the 
design paved the way for the mass production of nuclear weapons and improved the 
ability to stockpile the weapon.189  By 1950, both delivery and weapons systems 
engineers made important technological advances, making the idea of a nuclear 
offensive a feasible idea. 
Planners expected that in the future the continental U.S. would be equally 
vulnerable from attack as enemy bombers could range North American cities.  The 
advent of long-range jet bombers meant that America could no longer rely on the 
relative safety of two vast oceans as a defensive buffer.  Furthermore, with the 
increased destructive potential of atomic weapons, the devastation incurred from such 
an aerial attack would be more widespread and on an unprecedented scale.  Conflict 
in the future would be a ‘total war’ executed by attacking the entire national apparatus 
and not just selected segments of the society.  Much as Douhet had envisioned “all 
were directly menaced.” 
Also, due to the offensive nature of both the airplane and the atomic bomb, 
many Air Force leaders thought there was no real defense against an atomic attack.  
Even with developments of surface to air missiles and radar, the speed and altitude of 
new aircraft designs armed with nuclear ordnance would probably evade parts of an 
air defense system.  While an effective system could engage some of the attacking 
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aircraft, it in all probability would not be able to shoot down all the bombers.  
Regardless of how well designed the defense system was, a number of the attacking 
planes would likely reach their intended targets. 
With all the advances in technology and the growing importance and 
increasing relevance of the airplane in America, Truman decided to appoint a board to 
help clarify the role of aviation to the future.190  On July 18, 1947, the president 
established the Air Policy Commission and told the appointed members “There is an 
urgent need at this time for an evaluation of the course which the United States 
should follow in order to obtain, for itself and the world the greatest possible benefits 
from aviation.”191  In this effort, the Commission was to consider both the civilian 
and military application of aviation and look broad in scope and beyond the 
contemporary environment.  Philadelphia lawyer Thomas K. Finletter, who became 
Secretary of the Air Force in 1950, was appointed chairman.  He along with four 
other prominent businessmen, most without aviation experience, were tasked by 
Truman to report their results by the beginning of 1948.192 
During the Commission’s six-month deliberations, it conducted both closed 
and open door meetings, interviewed over 150 officials and executives, and visited 17 
civilian and military aircraft establishments.193  The Commission also received 
testimony from the chiefs of the respective military departments and Secretary of 
Defense Forrestal.  While the JCS saw the importance of a well-funded air arm, it 
argued for an equitable and even-handed approach to military expenditures.194  Each 
service stated its relevancy in the modern age, but Forrestal, keeping in mind 
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Truman’s fiscal conservatism, argued against huge sums for defense expenditures that 
might imperil the president’s goal economic solvency.195 
At the end of 1947 the “Finletter Commission,” as it was known, completed 
its investigation and submitted its finding to the president in a report with the 
ominous title “Survival in the Air Age.”  The Commission placed great emphasis 
upon the airplane in national defense and especially the USAF.  The board echoed the 
USAF’s arguments that American needed to have a robust deterrent military power so 
strong that “other nations will hesitate to attack us or our vital national interests 
because of the violence of the counter attack” and that such a capability required a 
“force in being.”196  Again this “force in being” needed to be present during phase 
one of any war.  Furthermore, while still envisioning a requirement of an Army and a 
Navy, the Commission stressed that the nation’s military security “must be based 
upon airpower.”197  Recognizing that the Russians would eventually develop the 
atomic bomb, the Commission reported that any future attack with weapons of mass 
destruction may likely come from the air and the only method to counter such a threat 
was a robust air force.198  Much like Churchill had argued in his MIT speech, the 
committee emphasized the primacy of airpower over other forms of warfare.  While 
still recognizing that armies and navies were still important to meet national aims, the 
air force was now the main effort for the defense of U.S. and western civilization. 
The Commission also stipulated that the “force in being” should be built 
around a fleet of bomber aircraft and that these planes would attack an enemy who 
would have their “cities destroyed and its war machine crushed.”199  In order to 
conduct this wartime mission, the Commission suggested that the 1947 USAF 
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strength of 55 groups be increased to 70 groups, with 700 very heavy bombers, and 
that this growth needed to be done by January 1950.200  To support this increase in the 
size of the USAF and build the additional bombers, the Commission recommended an 
increase in defense expenditures.  However, this increase in expenditures focused 
mainly at the Air Force.  According to the report during Fiscal Year (FY) 1947, the 
Navy was funded at over $4 billion with the Air Force only budgeted at $2.8 billion.  
In order to build the required airpower, the Commission recommended an increased 
USAF appropriation of over $4.1 billion in FY 1948 and kept the Navy and Army 
budgets at approximately $4 and $3.2 billion respectively.201  This increase in Air 
Force budget allocations was to continue under the Commission’s plan into FY 1949 
and in subsequent FYs. 
The commission’s request for increased budgets flew in the face of Truman’s 
fiscal outlook.  However, by 1948 with the Berlin blockade and other events in 
Eastern Europe the president could no longer avoid the issue America’s weak 
defensive posture.  Truman was determined to limit defense expenditures to $15 
billion and in order or to counter any potential Soviet threat, nuclear bombs were the 
most obvious answer.202  American leaders increasingly looked to the ill-equipped 
and poorly-trained SAC to thwart any potential Soviet invasion.  As a result, in the 
FY 48 appropriations the Air Force received an influx of money to the total of $4.5 
billion with SAC being the priority.203  Remarks to new Democratic Party members 
of Congress in April 1949, partly reflected the commission’s suggestions, Truman 
articulated his willingness to use atomic weapons in defense of American security.  
He told the new congressmen that he hoped we would never have to make the 
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decision again regarding the use of the bomb but “if it has to be made for the welfare 
of the United States, and the democracies of the world are at stake, I wouldn’t hesitate 
to make it again.”204 
In addition to the Finletter Commission, Congress established its own 
investigative body to review airpower requirements.  This investigation led to the 
“Hinshaw-Brewster Report,” and reiterated many of the same conclusions from the 
Finletter Commission including the need for a seventy group Air Force.  However, 
this recommended increase in the size of the USAF and its budget did not mean the 
argument of building a larger nuclear bomber fleet was finished.  With Truman’s 
defense spending limitations, all the services were feeling the fiscal restraints and the 
aforementioned reports only caused increased inter-service rivalries.  As Army and 
Navy budgets were called out to make accommodation for a bigger Air Force, the 
ability to man, train, and equip naval and ground forces was in jeopardy.  The Navy, 
which opposed the 1947 unification was the loudest critic of the Air Force’s new 
primacy and argued against the types of missions SAC was planning.  Reflecting this 
new emphasis on the USAF and strategic bombing, in July 1949, the FY 1951 budget 
proposed downsizing the Navy’s carrier fleet from eight to four and reducing the 
number of aircraft from 1,554 to a mere 690.205 
Adding to the issue of strategic nuclear bombardment was a report published 
in May by Air Force Lieutenant General H. R. Harmon that evaluated the results of a 
U.S. nuclear attack on the USSR.  A committee headed by the General found that the 
TROJAN plan for nuclear attack was no guarantee to meet the aims specified in NSC 
20/4 and argued that the war making capability of the Soviet Union “would not be 
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seriously impaired.”206  Despite this lukewarm evaluation of the TROJAN plan, the 
report estimated however, that some 2.7 million Russians would be killed, the Soviets 
would experience a 30 to 40 percent reduction in production capability, and that the 
aerial assault would “vastly complicate” the lives of 28 million people in the seventy 
targeted cities.207  Obviously, these statistics stand in stark contrast to what ACTS 
preached. 
The report went on further to state the overall effect of the atomic attack 
would not prevent Soviet offensive actions in Europe, the Middle East, or in the Far 
East.208  Furthermore, the report concluded that the effects of the planned nuclear 
strike would not cause the capitulation of the Soviet state or “weaken the power of the 
Soviet leadership to dominate people.”209  Lastly, the report speculated that the 
planned American offensive would only serve the propaganda purposes of the USSR 
by unifying the Soviets and “increasing their will to fight.”210  Kennan, author of the 
“Long Telegram,” concurred with this assessment by arguing that by bombing 
Moscow and other Soviet cities all the U.S. will accomplish it to convince Russians 
that we are “barbarians trying to destroy their very society.”211  The Harmon Report 
findings lead to a reassessment of the nuclear weapons requirement that eventually 
resulted in a substantial increase in the atomic stockpile.212  The report also suggested 
that the Air Force include the targeting of communist forces if they attacked in 
Western Europe.213  This targeting of enemy ground forces was a new wrinkle in 
strategic bombing as destruction of the enemy army was now an objective in order to 
“retard” a Soviet offense.214  While strategic bombing was designed to attack the war-
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making infrastructure behind enemy lines, the U.S. bomber fleet would also be used 
to attack enemy forces in the field. 
Just before the Harmon Report was published, the lightning rod for arguments 
over roles and missions between the Air Force and the Navy started in April 1949.  
New Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, who replaced James Forrestal, cancelled 
the Navy’s planned flush-deck aircraft carrier the U.S.S. United States.215  Adding 
fuel to the interservice fire was Secretary Johnson’s termination of the program 
without consulting the Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan.  Further complicating 
the situation was the fact that the JCS, including Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) 
Admiral Luis Denfeld, collectively signed the document killing the U.S.S. United 
States program.  This situation quickly festered into a well-publicized political 
scandal. 
In light of the emerging controversy, the Bureau of the Budget sent a memo to 
Truman the same month regarding atomic warfare and the B-36.  While the memo 
references the Spaatz Report quote about the atomic bomb being “just another 
military weapon,” the Bureau’s memo calls into question American nuclear defense 
posture and presidential authority.216  The memo warns that a commitment to B-36 
production and atomic re-armament might “put the president in a most awkward 
position if he desired to alter the strategy in the midst of the intense pressures of the 
hour.”217  In conclusion the memo recommends that the B-36 program be evaluated 
based upon what the program might mean regarding presidential nuclear authority.218  
The stage was now set for a public debate on the nuclear bombing strategy and the 
associated moral issues surrounding it. 
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In addition to the cancellation of the U.S.S. United States, dubious claims 
against Symington and others in the Air Force over the development of the B-36 
bombers surfaced.  During May 1949 an anonymous letter, written largely by pro 
Navy interest and sent to Congressman James E. Van Zant, charged that procurement 
irregularities existed in the B-36 program.219  The letter claimed that Air Force 
Secretary Stuart Symington and Secretary of Defense Johnson had a vested, personal 
monetary and political interest in the expensive bomber project.220  These charges not 
only led to a congressional investigation, but the inquiry provided a venue for a 
debate regarding the prospect of Naval aviation vis-à-vis the emerging USAF and the 
larger issue of the U.S. commitment to nuclear bombardment as the first line of 
defense. 
The charges against Symington, Johnson, and Vultee Corporation President 
Floyd Oldum, maker of the B-36, were summarily dismissed in August when former 
Navy Commander Cedric R. Worth, a Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy, 
admitted his part in the authorship of the anonymous letter.  Furthermore, in his 
testimony before the Congressional committee, Worth retracted his statements 
accusing Air Force leadership of wrongdoing and was subsequently suspended from 
his job at the Department of the Navy.221  Others were also implicated in writing the 
anonymous letter to include future CNO Admiral Arleigh “31 Knot” Burke’s OP-23 
office as well as another naval officer.  While the charges against Air Force officials 
were no longer valid, the battle over nuclear bombing and the primacy of the Air 
Force still loomed in the halls of Congress as naval officers still argued to present 
their case regarding the importance of carrier aviation. 
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Despite shortcomings in the initial design of the B-36, the Air Force proffered 
that the bomber provided a unique capability to deliver bombs throughout the globe.  
Naval officers claimed that the “atomic blitz” the Air Force proposed did not provide 
a deterrent effect and that the B-36 was “a billion dollar blunder.”222  They also 
thought the World War II design origins of the B-36 made the plane too slow for the 
nascent jet age and therefore vulnerable to an effective enemy air defense.223  
Additionally, these officers believed that fast attack carrier aviation had a role to play 
in the nuclear mission and that the value of a naval campaign had been proven during 
the Pacific war.  In his testimony during the congressional hearings in October 1949, 
Navy Admiral Arthur Radford expressed concern that the nation had placed too much 
emphasis on strategic bombing.224 
Not only did the Navy question the practicality of the B-36 in an upcoming 
war but called into question the morality of the nuclear offensive.  Radford went on 
further to argue the whole theory of “atomic annihilation” and that this application of 
power “would be politically and economically useless . . . [and] morally 
reprehensible.”225  Additionally Navy Rear Admiral Ralph A. Ofstie, a contributing 
author to the CROSSROADS Report, questioned the efficacy of strategic 
bombardment and asked “does the concept of strategic bombing effectively support 
the policies, objectives and commitment of the United States?”226  He also claimed 
“strategic bombing, as now accepted, unavoidably includes mass slaughter” and that 
“the moral force of the people of this country is in strong opposition to military 
methods so contrary to our fundamental ideals.  It is time that strategic bombing be 
squarely faced in this light; that it be examined in relation to the decent opinions of 
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mankind.”227  Ofstie went on further to classify strategic bombardment as a “ruthless 
and barbaric policy.”228 
Near the end of the October deliberations, Denfeld finally spoke.  Despite 
owing his job as CNO to Secretary Johnson, the Admiral now defiantly broke with 
this civilian superior and answered in contradiction to his earlier signature supporting 
the cancellation of the U.S.S. United States.  In this testimony Denfeld stated, “As the 
senior military spokesman for the Navy, I want to state . . . that I fully support the 
conclusion presented to this committee by the Navy and Marine officers who have 
preceded me.”229  Denfeld went on further to argue Navy grievances regarding 
Department of Defense (DoD) policies and its efforts to down size the Navy.  He 
decried that DoD “limitations are imposed without consultation” and the only 
guidance the Navy receives is to decommission ships and organizations.230  As a 
result of his defense of his Navy brethren, advocacy of carrier aviation, and in 
defiance of Secretary Johnson’s desires, Denfeld was fired as CNO and replaced by 
Admiral Forrest P. Sherman on November 2, 1949. 
Despite the Navy’s arguments, the results of the B-36 hearings were a boon 
for the Air Force, its role in national defense, and the strategic bombing effort.  While 
Truman still adhered to his limit on defense spending by allocating only $4.4 billion 
for the USAF, Congress voted 305-1 to provide the service with additional funds for 
FY 1950.231  Furthermore, the public debate on bombing served to highlight 
American security concerns.  During this same period, on October 1, 1949, Mao and 
the Red Army established a communist China and a few days earlier on September 
23, Truman announced the discovery of a Soviet atomic explosion.  These two events 
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in addition to other world events heightened the concern over American national 
security and military posture.  Concurrently with the B-36 hearings in October, the 
NSC, in coordination with the AEC recommended to Truman the acceleration of the 
atomic energy program.232  These two organizations were fully committed to the idea 
of deterrence and stated in a report to the president, “we should develop a level of 
military readiness which can be maintained as long as necessary as a deterrent to 
Soviet aggression, as indispensible support to our political attitude toward the USSR, 
as a source of encouragement to nation’s resisting Soviet political aggression, and as 
an adequate basis for immediate military commitments and for rapid mobilization 
should war prove unavoidable.”233  The result was a presidential call for an increase 
in the production of fissionable materials. These world events combined with the 
discussion on military strategy provided fertile ground for an increase in America’s 
atomic strategic bombing capability and embracement of methodologies divergent 
from ACTS precepts. 
As events unfolded, Americans increasingly saw a need for an atomic air 
force.  Even before Mao succeeded in China and the Soviet atomic explosion, in 
January 1949, 70 percent of polled American thought that the U.S. needed to increase 
the size of the Air Force.234  The same poll suggested that the other services also 
needed to grow in size, but responses to Army and Navy increases were only 56 and 
57 percent respectively.235  In August, American’s were asked if they believed the 
U.S. should swear off the first use of atomic weapons.236  Again, an overwhelming 70 
percent disagreed with this idea with only 20 percent agreeing to the statement.237  
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Regarding the actual use of the bomb, in an August 1950 poll, 77 percent of those 
asked answered in the affirmative that “we should use it.”238 
Concurrently, American atomic war plans matured and relied upon the use of 
more nuclear weapons.  When in December 1949, the TROJAN plan was superseded 
by OFFTACKLE, the new plan increased the size of the atomic attack by targeting 
104 cities with 220 weapons and included follow-up attacks planned with another 72 
nuclear weapons.239  These totals were significantly higher than TROJAN’s 72 cities 
with 133 bombs with no follow-on attacks.  Furthermore, the plan also targeted 
Soviet military forces in order to delay and frustrate their offensive thrust into 
Europe.  The “retardation mission”, as it was called, attacked Soviet offensive ground 
forces in Europe was the second priority to targeting of Soviet factories and 
infrastructure.  However, this retardation targeting was significant as it harkened back 
the World War II bombing applications when the Eighth Air Force bombed 
Normandy in preparation of the D-Day assault and the subsequent drive through 
France.  A third target set developed in OFFTACKLE was aimed at destroying Soviet 
fuel and power industries.240  The JCS endorsed the plan and in approving 
OFFTACKLE it reiterated support for the strategic atomic air offensive regardless of 
the discussion that occurred regarding the B-36.241 
As the 1940s came to an end, SAC was posed to grow in size commensurate 
to its increasing importance.  The strategic bombing mission was now the priority not 
just for the Air Force, but the entire U.S. defense establishment.  The public debate 
along with various federal commissions only served to reconfirm the growing 
commitment to atomic bombing strategy while Americans supported efforts to 
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preserve their nuclear supremacy.242  Furthermore, adherence to World War II 
methodologies and a failure to recognize the new dimension of atomic war facilitated 
the departure from ACTs precepts.  In addition, a wholesale change in American 
military thinking came about.  The primacy of the offense and the idea that a “force 
in-being” was now required.  The idea of a small American military for defensive 
means gave way to a relatively large force postured for offensive use.  This idea 
regarding America’s new military posture is illustrated by a quote from LeMay while 
commanding SAC “We had to be ready to go to war not next week, not tomorrow, 
but this afternoon.”243  In taking command of SAC LeMay instituted the idea that “we 
are at war now.”244  While fiscal frugality initially constrained the growth of 
America’s nuclear bomber fleet, concerns over communist encroachment and the 
growing popularity of offensively minded warfare in the atomic age precluded 
compassionate considerations regarding strategic bombardment. 
____________________________________________ 
NSC 68 and Korea 
As America entered the 1950s, the Truman Administration’s priority of effort 
was still the economy and a balanced federal budget.  During his 1950 State of the 
Union address, the president chided Congress over tax cuts, called for the reduction in 
federal expenditures, and argued that his fiscal policy was “the quickest and safest 
way of achieving a balanced budget.”245  He boasted that American’s GNP was over 
$225 billion a year and that continued economic prosperity needed business men to 
maintain initiative and enterprise, working men and unions need to be more 
productive, and that Americans needed to conserve its natural resources.246  Domestic 
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programs and the development of economic prosperity were still the major themes in 
his address.  While Truman emphasized the economy and internal stability, he 
expressed concern over foreign relations by stating, “people everywhere . . . [were] 
being corrupted and betrayed by the false promises of communism.”247  However, as 
the year unfolded, the president found his priority of effort shift from one of domestic 
economic prosperity to national defense and fears over global communist threats. 
Given the successful Soviet atomic test and fear of losing the lead on nuclear 
technology, at the end of January 1950, Truman directed that work begin on the 
development of the “super bomb” or what became known as the Hydrogen Bomb.  
The same day he directed Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Secretary of Defense 
Louis Johnson to review national security policy “in the light of probable fission 
bomb capacity and possible thermonuclear bomb capacity of the Soviet Union.”248  
The Director of Policy Planning at the State Department headed this review of policy.  
The office had been led by George Kennan, originator of the “long telegram,” but 
Policy Planning was now run by Paul Nitze.  While Kennan framed the initial 
American foreign policy regard the Soviets after World War II, he was less inclined 
to use military power and emphasized diplomacy over force.249  Acheson, while was 
no great proponent of atomic weapons, believed that Kennan’s emphasis on 
diplomacy in light of the nuclear age was impractical and simplistic.250 As a result 
Acheson sent Kennan on sabbatical to South America in a less influential and 
significant position. 
Kennan’s replacement, Nitze, was a member of the USSBS and a Wall Street 
investment banker.  Acheson saw Nitze as a pragmatist who understood the 
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contemporary environment and as someone who could formulate effective and 
practical strategies.251  Largely with Nitze’s influence and ideas, NSC 68 was drafted 
and the policy sent to Truman on April 7.  NSC 68 continued in much of the same 
fashion as Kennan’s long telegram regarding Soviet intention and stated that the goal 
of the Kremlin was “domination of the Eurasian land mass” and “to solidify their 
absolute power.”252  The draft offered four courses of action for American foreign 
policy, “Continuation of Current Policies, Isolationism, War, and A Rapid Build up of 
Political, Economic and Military Strength in a Free World.”253  In the conclusion of 
the document, Nitze reiterated the continuation of certain elements of NSC 20/4 and 
recommended that the president choose option four as the best course of action. 
NSC 68 speculated that the Soviets, by 1954 or 1955, would have a “military 
capability of delivering a surprise atomic attack of such weight that the U.S. must 
have a substantial increase in general air, ground, and sea strength, atomic 
capabilities, and air and civilian defenses to deter war and to provide reasonable 
assurance, in the event of war, that it could survive the initial blow and go on to the 
eventual attainment of its objectives.”254  As a result, 1954 is often referred to as “the 
year of maximum danger,” although, the phrase itself is not resident in the 
document.255  Nitze’s conclusions also recommended a “rapid and sustained build-up 
of political, economic, and military strength of the free world.”256  This suggestion 
was in stark contrast to the fiscal conservatism of the Truman administration policies 
and harkened to American defense spending during World War II.  However, this 
theme was consistent with the Finletter, Brewster, and Harmon commissions 
addressing similar topics. 
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While the document was submitted in April, the White House forwarded the 
draft to the JCS for consideration and was still under review when on June 25, the 
North Korean Army attacked south across the 38th parallel initiating the Korean War.  
Initially meeting with great success as they drove south, this offensive effort on the 
part of a communist country had propitious timing for NSC 68’s approval.  Given the 
actions in other parts of Asia and on the Korean Peninsula, Truman could not refute 
much of NSC 68’s speculation regarding communist intention and overall goals.  
Four months after the document was submitted to the president, on September 28, 
Truman formally approved the document and it became the basis for an explosive 
growth in the armed services and especially SAC. 
NSC 68 was specifically designed to counter Truman’s fiscal policies and to 
make a statement to senior officials that America had to make a change if it was to 
counter communist aggression throughout the world.257  While the document included 
no actual cost figures, the tone and intent of the verbiage made it clear that option 
four would not be cheap and that the restraint on defense spending needed to be 
removed.  The price tag in support of option four was around $50 billion annually, a 
far cry from Truman’s professed cap of $14 billion.258  Many claim NSC 68 over-
hyped the communist threat, and even Acheson acquiesced that the real purpose of 
the document was “to so bludgeon the mass mind of ‘top government’ that not only 
could the President make a decision, but that the decision could be carried out.”259  
Regardless of the hyperbole, Acheson hoped that execution of option four would 
create for America a position of strength if expected to be effective in foreign policy 
endeavors.260  From FY 1950 to FY 1952 defense spending increased from Truman’s 
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cap of $14 billion and grew to over $44 billion along with a significant increase in the 
size of the armed services.261 
At the end of 1950 SAC was a force of only 85,000 and had less than 1,000 
aircraft.  But a year later, by the end of 1951, the small, under funded command had 
grown to 145,000 airmen with 1,200 aircraft with plans to continue increasing its size.  
By 1954 SAC had doubled in size with over 2,100 planes of which 835 were bombers 
(B-36 and B-47), 315 were reconnaissance (RB-36 and RB-47s), 540 tankers, and 
325 fighters along with other support air fames.262  Flight personnel in SAC alone by 
1954 grew to over 1,000 crew with 490 fighter pilots and weapons operators.263  
Under LeMay’s direction aircrews were under constant training and made simulated 
bomb runs on a number of U.S. cities.264  This training began to pay off as crew 
accuracy began to rise appreciably from the debacle of the January 1949 Dayton 
exercise.  By 1954 when conducting a training exercise with 150 bombers, 133 
aircraft successfully “hit” their targets, with 24 having to abort prior to dropping their 
ordnance because of the navigation system failed at no fault of the aircrew.265  
Eventually LeMay instilled a determined sense of purpose in SAC and insisted that 
there was little differentiation between peacetime and wartime.  One planner quipped, 
“Training at SAC was harder than war.  It might have been a relief to go to war.”266 
The result of SAC’s growth and the approval of NSC 68 went hand in hand 
with contemporary American concerns of the early 1950s.  Not only did NSC 68 see 
communist threats aboard, but the American public was alarmed by events at home 
that appeared to threaten American democracy.  In February in Wheeling West 
Virginia, Joseph McCarthy began his infamous run on communist infiltrators in the 
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federal government.  At a speech at a local Republican Club lunch, he made his 
dubious claim of having a list of 205 State Department employees that were members 
of the communist party.  While the number of names on the list changed frequently 
and many, if not all, of his charges were specious, debate over communist infiltration 
was a popular topic.  A month earlier, in January, Alger Hiss was convicted of two 
counts of perjury in a trial from an original charge of espionage.  This conviction 
came after years of proceedings where Hiss testified in 1948 to the HUAC.  Similarly, 
in 1951 Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were convicted of espionage and spying for the 
Russians by passing nuclear secrets.  They were both executed at Sing Sing Prison in 
New York in June 1953. 
The Employee Loyalty Program and events surrounding the Rosenbergs, Hiss, 
and McCarthy are illustrative of the domestic concerns within U.S. culture during the 
time.  These domestic events combined with events in Berlin, Czechoslovakia, and 
the most importantly the Soviet atomic explosion created a sense of general fear as 
the Hearst press advocated the U.S. stockpiling four atomic weapons for every Soviet 
bomb.267  Further, indicative of this concern, the threat from internal communism was 
pronounced as 68 percent of Americans believed that the Communist party should be 
outlawed.268  Furthermore, 90 percent of polled Americans believed that members of 
the Communist Party should be removed now from jobs that would be important in 
wartime.269  By 1952 thirty states initiated their own kind of loyalty programs similar 
to the Federal one Truman started in 1947.270 
Even before the Korean War started, in March 1950 when American’s were 
asked “Do you think the United States is winning or losing the Cold War with 
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Russia” 40 percent believed America was losing with only 28 percent thought we 
were winning.271  Regarding defense expenditures, American’s also expressed 
opinions that were in-line with precepts in NSC 68.  In May, when asked what the 
U.S. government should do regarding national defense expenditures, 63 percent of 
those polled answered that the U.S. should increase spending, with only 7 percent 
believing it should be reduced, and 24 percent thought it should stay the same.272  By 
the time America was fully engaged in the Korean War, in October 1950, 49 percent 
of those polled believed that American should “produce planes, tanks, guns and other 
war equipment on a full war time basis and cut out making autos, refrigerators, 
television sets, and other items which people may want and need.”273 
By the end of the 1940s, any arguments or concerns over development of the 
atomic bomb was largely silenced.274  Americans largely accepted the bomb’s 
existence as the best bet for national security given the international situation at the 
time.275  In this vein, according to historian Gerard DeGroot, the American “fear of 
fallout [was] much less dangerous than the fear of falling behind” and the defense of 
the nation took priority over other considerations.276  In July, a month after the North 
Korean invasion, in a special message to Congress, Truman called for an “increase in 
military strength and preparedness not only to deal with Korea but also to increase 
our common defense.”277  In the same speech he authorized the Secretary of Defense 
to go beyond the budget allocations of all the services and called for a study to 
increase the size of the Armed force.278  By the end of the year, Truman called a state 
of national emergency “which required that the military . . . [and] defenses of this 
country be strengthened as speedily as possible.”279 
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While the Korean War served as a sort of catalyst for the implementation of 
NSC 68, it helped to infuse money into the U.S. defense establishment, and served as 
a warning of communist encroachment.  The North Korean invasion was not looked 
upon by SAC as another opportunity to prove the efficacy of strategic bombing.  
When tasked to provide bombers in support of the Far East Air Forces (FEAF), 
LeMay sent two low priority bomb groups.280  Fearing that a general war might break 
out during the Korean War, LeMay did not want to risk the strategic capability for 
what he viewed as a sideshow.  In his opinion, along with Catton, the only missions 
conducted by the B-29 over Korea were interdiction bombings.281 
Catton argued that there were no strategic targets in North Korea, nor 
significant factories, transportation centers, or infrastructure that supported the 
enemy’s military might.  Most of North Korea’s armaments and production were in 
China and the Soviet Union.  Since the UN forces, including the U.S. were prohibited 
to fly north of the Yalu River to strike targets in China, the only missions available 
were to bomb supply lines, caches, and a few hydro-electric dams on the Korean 
peninsula.  As far as LeMay was concerned, the only lesson learned from the Korea 
war experience regarding strategic bombing was “how not to use the strategic air 
weapon.”282 
While the units sent to Korea did not, in LeMay’s opinion, conduct a strategic 
bombing effort, they did eventually conduct bombing operations on the Korean 
Peninsula that came to resemble to the kind of firebombing done by LeMay during 
World War II.  The commander of the groups sent by SAC to FEAF, Major General 
Emmitt “Rosie” O’Donnell, initially requested to firebomb five major cities in North 
 298 
Korea, and selected captured South Korean cities.283  This request was initially turned 
down.  FEAF Commander, Lieutenant General George Stratemeyer, directed 
O’Donnell’s to strike specific military targets in urban areas but would not allow area 
bombardment as the overall commander, General Douglas MacArthur, wished to 
prevent wonton destruction from the air. 284  When O’Donnell briefed MacArthur 
about announcing a declaration to bombing the industrial cities of North Korea that 
might then serve as a warning for civilians to leave urban areas, MacArthur replied, 
“No Rosie, I’m not prepared to go that far yet.”285  Early in the war, O’Donnell 
refuted claims made by communist newspapers that the U.S. was conducting 
“indiscriminate bombing” and argued that his crew’s bombs were “aimed at a specific 
aiming point located with the area of a bona fide military objective.”286  
Early in the bombing campaign in Korea, Stratemeyer had two major 
considerations when conducting bombing operations, negative press and the fear of 
provoking a larger war with China or the Soviet Union.287  After the Chinese entered 
the war and the ground situation deteriorated, MacArthur changed his opinions 
regarding firebombing and the prevention of large-scale destruction.  He eventually 
designated every village in communist hands as a military target giving FEAF wide 
latitude to bomb any target they saw fit.  The definition of what was considered a 
military target was basically any man made structure behind communist lines.288  
With this wide latitude, many Korean cities were firebombed as O’Donnell’s 
bombers, burned 60 percent of Sinuiju, 95 percent of Manpoijin, 90 percent of 
Hoeryong and Namsi, with similar percentages in other urban centers.289  While 
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precise attacks did occur, many of the attacks conducted by the B-29s were area type 
raids against transportation routes from China and the Soviet Union.290 
Eventually the USAF burned the larger cities of Pyongyang, Wonsan, 
Hamhung, and Hungman but did so without any media coverage.  While O’Donnell’s 
bombers were careful not to bomb targets in the Soviet Union or China, they did 
bomb in areas close to the border but always wary of not wanting to start a larger war.  
From a propaganda perspective, most in the U.S. were not privy to the nature of the 
firebombing campaign in Korea, and while some communist newspapers and smaller 
news outlets decried bombing attacks, no huge public relations backlash occurred.  
Because of the wide latitude of what was considered a target, bombing operations on 
the peninsula fell within guidance given by the supreme commander however this 
guidance certainly diverged from previous doctrinal constructs.  Furthermore, ground 
troops on both sides conducted “scorched earth tactics” that destroyed large parts of 
urban and rural landscape that rivaled destruction from the air.291  In aggregate, much 
of the bombing either against urban targets or in support of the interdiction missions 
fell outside the doctrinal boundaries framed by ACTS. 
____________________________________________ 
Summary 
By the time Truman gave his State of the Union address to Congress on 
January 8, 1951, the tone of his words had changed significantly from his address a 
year earlier.  No longer did he focus upon domestic prosperity, social programs, and 
the continued rise of the American standard of living.  The overwhelming topic of his 
1951 speech related to national security issues and external threats to the U.S. and 
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western democracies.  In his opening remarks he stated, “the threat of world conquest 
by Soviet Russia endangers our liberty and endangers the kind of world in which the 
free spirit of man can survive.  This threat is aimed at all peoples who strive to win or 
defend their own freedom and national independence.”292  To a very large degree in a 
matter of one year, the president went from a preoccupation with peacetime 
prosperity and economic conservatism to concern over national defense, the spread of 
global communism, and nuclear war.  
After World War II, Americans enjoyed a growth in economic prosperity as 
the country’s infrastructure remained untouched from the war and possessed a trade 
surplus that drove a strong economy.  Despite a rise in inflation, Truman meant to 
continue America’s good fortune and placed priority of the economy over defense, 
and saw that a balanced federal budget was the best way to secure America’s future.  
Concurrently, Americans came to an uneasy acceptance of nuclear weapons and 
masked their concerns by embracing atomic culture as a way to alleviate their 
subconscious fears.  The U.S. monopoly over the technology provided a sense of 
comfort for Americans as they looked forward a promising future utilizing the power 
of the atom.  Nevertheless, with this new power came a dangerous potential and a 
pervasive worry that permeated much of society.  Regardless, the possession of the 
atomic bomb was America’s “ace-in-the hole” against any potential threats and 
served as a sort of panacea for contemporary concerns.293 
As the Air Force suffered from demobilization, officers and aviation minded 
leaders saw increased potential for the airplane in the atomic age.  Strategist 
envisioned that future war would be a different affair as the power of the offense was 
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now paramount with the existence of atomic weapons and that the country needed to 
have a standing force at the very outbreak of war.  Breaking with the American 
tradition of a small standing army, many strategists and civilian committees called for 
the building of a strategic bombing fleet that would meet the needs of the envisioned 
future conflict.  The call for an air “force in-being,” that eventually threatened the 
roles, missions, and budgets of the other armed services became fodder for political 
debate.  Regardless of its distracters, the public discourse regarding the morality and 
efficacy of nuclear weapons only resulted in the validation for a strong air arm that 
precluded allegiance to humanitarian and ethical considerations in the execution of 
strategic bombardment. 
As the USAF grew in importance so too did the reliance upon nuclear 
weapons.  Given the visions for future conflict, many saw the next war as only a 
nuclear conflict with conventional forces serving little consequence.  In light of the 
Korea War and its conventional battles, Air Force Chief of Staff Nathan Twining 
remarked, “limited war is nothing bud a fad.”294  He and his Air Force counterparts 
saw that war in the future was going to be a large-scale affair and the smaller 
conventional actions, in the words of LeMay, only “delayed the inevitable.”295  
Prominent Air Force historian Robert Futrell captured the essence of Air Force efforts 
during this era by observing, “the emphasis of air planners [was] in making war fit the 
weapon-nuclear power-rather than making the weapon fit the war.”296  Despite their 
singular ideation regarding war, USAF thinking was accepted not only by the rest of 
the federal government but also by the American public.  Despite the wholesale 
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slaughter of Russians that might come about from an U.S. nuclear strike, Americans 
accepted this idea despite its departure from previously accepted cultural mores. 
Similarly the leadership of the USAF, and to a larger degree SAC, were 
victims of their own experiences from World War II and could not grasp the idea that 
nuclear war was a new dimension of warfare.  Left to their own devices with little 
input from the national leadership, they applied their operational level experiences 
against Germany and Japan and translated it directly to the strategic level without 
appreciation for the larger political implications atomic attacks.  These men were not 
schooled in the nuances of international politics nor in grand strategy and failed to see 
the larger implications of what their attacks might yield.  They focused upon the 
principle of mass without considering the potential, and increasing value, of restraint.  
Furthermore, their idea to obliterate Russian cities and infrastructure was based upon 
the principle of simplicity rather than considering the overall political objective of the 
nuclear strike. 
Air Force planners saw their jobs as merely providing a means, but without 
consideration of the ultimate ends.  Indicative of SAC’s ideas regarding war and the 
American approbation of such strategies was evident in another LeMay cover story 
published in Time magazine in September 1950.  The story painted his methods, 
management style, and the B-36 in a very positive light.  The article was entitled 
“Man in the First Plane” stating that the General himself was willing to fly missions 
in case of war and that “nearly every night, the big B-36s nose through the long 
twilight of the 55th parallel, learning more and more about Russia’s kind of weather, 
and how to get through it, in case of war, with their death spreading weapons.”297 
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Furthermore, American foreign policies at this time contributed to the 
draconian nature of Air Force strategies.  The various NSC documents that 
established U.S. foreign policy set the nation on an ersatz war-footing that saw global 
monolithic communism as a direct threat to the very existence of America, 
democracy, and western civilization.  Utilizing Kennan’s long telegram as a starting 
point, NSC 20/4 and NSC 68 clearly articulated a threat from the Soviet Union that 
needed to be stopped and deterred.  While later interpretations of these documents 
tended to focus upon economic and diplomatic containment, U.S. foreign policy 
during this era clearly required military action that stood in contrast to previously 
held ideas regarding restraint.  
As events overseas unfolded and domestic concerns over communist 
infiltrations grew, American became more concerned with security issues.  As these 
concerns became more pronounced, American’s gave tacit approval to the federal 
government and the USAF to develop plans and acquire resources that might provide 
security from communist encroachment.  This approval included the acceptance of 
atomic warfare as a means to offset a potential Soviet offensive in Eurasia.  While 
this atomic offensive may cause indiscriminate killing, it was viewed by most 
American’s as a necessary evil given envisioned communist intentions.  Taking 
refuge in nuclear capability, most U.S. citizens concurred with the growth of the Air 
Force and America’s nuclear arsenal. 
The same rationales continued well into the 1950s and set the stage for the 
Eisenhower administration’s policy of “massive retaliation” and the “New Look.”  
Based upon the post war ideas, fears, rationales, and events, Americans and the 
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USAF progressively embraced a bombing theory and methodology that was ever 
more divergent for previous accepted doctrines and social values.  With the 
emergence of the hydrogen bomb and the Soviet mastery of this same technology, 
American fears grew as did their acceptance and  allegiance to bombing strategies 
that could effectively “kill a nation.” 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
180 Degrees Out: 
The Thermonuclear Decision and Expansion 
____________________________________________ 
On March 1, 1954, a lone Japanese fishing trawler, ironically named the 
Daigo Fukuryu Maru (Fifth Lucky Dragon), was anchored seventy-one miles east of 
the Pacific atoll of Bikini.  At precisely 0645 a member of the crew looked toward the 
west and saw the sky light up with “a huge whitish-yellow glow that turned orange.”1  
Startled by the bright light he ran down below deck and yelled to his fellow crewmen, 
“The Sun is rising in the west!”2  Alarmed, other crewmen went up topside and saw 
the horizon glowing yellow and red, with the yellow giving away to the red.3  The 
sailors also heard a loud roar described as “many thunders rolled into one” and saw a 
pyramid shape cloud rising in the distance.4 
Hours later, a fine white grey powder fell upon the crew that was difficult to 
wash away from the sailors bodies.  Soon after, the men began to lose their appetites, 
felt dizzy, and began vomiting.5  After a few days, the crew’s disposition’s had not 
improved.  Hauling in their nets, the Lucky Dragon headed for home with the catch in 
its holds destined for Japanese fish markets.  When the ship returned to port, it 
unloaded 16,500 pounds of tuna and twenty-three sharks with the crew still suffering 
from its afflictions.6  Eventually several men were forced to be hospitalized, and with 
dropping white corpuscle counts, they were finally diagnosed with radiation 
poisoning.  What the crewmen of the Lucky Dragon witnessed was the CASTLE 
BRAVO test explosion, the largest thermonuclear bomb ever detonated by the U.S. 
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By the time the Japanese authorities figured out what happened, Lucky 
Dragon’s catch had already been sold and distributed throughout the nation’s various 
fish markets.  Almost overnight, the Japanese fish market crashed as fears over 
contaminated catch spread over the island nation.7  The Japanese people were 
outraged that they had yet again become victims of nuclear weapons at the hands of 
the Americans.  All of the crewmen were quarantined and many of the men remained 
hospitalized for months.  Lucky Dragon sailor, Aiticki Kuboyama eventually died 
from complications associated with his exposure to the white-gray powder that the 
Japanese called “Ashes of Death.” 
The explosion had been part of the CASTLE series of thermonuclear tests and 
due to a miscalculation on the part of the bomb’s designers, the March 1 test 
detonated at more than twice the projected yield.  Instead of creating a seven megaton 
(MT) blast, the CASTLE BRAVO test erupted into a fifteen MT spectacle.8  The 
explosion created a fireball four miles in diameter and made a two hundred and fifty 
foot deep crater on the coral atoll where the device was placed.9  The giant fireball 
was so massive that it caused the test’s safety director to wonder, “Is it ever going to 
stop?”10  The fallout that affected the Japanese fishermen also irradiated adjacent 
atolls, a band of Marshall Islanders, forced U.S. Navy crewmen on a nearby ship to 
secure the weather deck of their vessel, and trapped scientists collecting data in the 
earthen-bank bunker for eleven hours.11 
While the CASTLE BRAVO test was the biggest explosion ever conducted by 
the U.S., it was also the first test of a potential deliverable thermonuclear weapon 
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design.  The test occurred less than two months after President Eisenhower’s 
Secretary of State, and fervent anti-communist, John Foster Dulles, remarked that 
“defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power” 
and that America’s “basic decision was to depend primarily upon a great capacity to 
retaliate instantly, by means and places of our choosing.”12  In this speech the 
Secretary outlined America’s “Massive Retaliation” strategy and the foundation for 
Eisenhower’s “New Look” defense policy. 
Following the BRAVO explosion, the U.S. detonated yet another 
thermonuclear device in the CASTLE series, this one code named ROMEO.  Before 
conducting the explosion the U.S. enlarged the dimension of the test zone to an area 
representing approximately 1 percent of the earth surface.13  This test too far 
exceeded projections with a yield of eleven megatons instead of the expected four.14  
Both the BRAVO and ROMEO tests dwarfed the atomic attacks of World War II 
with the BRAVO test equal to almost one thousand Nagasaki bombs.15  Weighing 
23,500 pounds and designed to fit in the bomb bay of the B-47, the CASTLE devices 
signified America’s ever-growing commitment to nuclear weapons, the desire for 
improved destructive yields, and the continued departure from previously accepted 
bombing methodologies. 
____________________________________________ 
Atomic Expansion and the Debate for the“Super” 
On January 1, 1947, the AEC took over control of all nuclear efforts from the 
Manhattan Project and assumed responsibility for the few atomic weapons in the 
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American inventory.  Since the post-war USAF capability reflected frugal defense 
spending, there was little interest in further development of America’s inventory of 
atomic weapons.  The CROSSROADS and SANDSTONE tests in the late 1940s did 
refine and improve bomb design, but with little federal guidance, efforts at LASL 
regarding atomic weapons slowed with many scientists leaving for other pursuits.16  
Additionally, production of fissionable materials at Hanford dropped appreciably with 
one of the three reactors shut down completely and the other two operating at a 
substantially reduced rate.17  As a result of this lethargy, the number of atomic bombs 
possessed by the U.S. during the later half of the 1940s is estimated at only nine in 
1946 and grew to only fifty by 1948.18  Correspondingly the military was slow to 
develop definitive target lists for the bomb and fully outline its atomic requirements. 
In light of the TROJAN and OFFTACKLE war plans, the USAF developed 
authoritative requirements regarding the atomic bomb stockpile.  In support of these 
requirements, in January 1949 the JCS wrote to the AEC requesting an increase in the 
production of atomic materials.19  Despite Truman’s parsimonious fiscal policies, the 
request for the increase in fissionable materials on the part of the JCS did not apply to 
the civilian controlled AEC.  Coinciding with this request was the May publishing of 
the Harmon Committee Report that propounded the limited effects of a U.S. atomic 
attack.  In June the JCS again recommended to the AEC an acceleration of the atomic 
energy program.20 
In addressing the need for more bombs, on July 14, Senator Brien McMahon, 
Chairman of Congress’s Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, wrote Secretary of 
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Defense Johnson and AEC Chairman David E. Lilienthal in support of an increase in 
the atomic weapons stockpile.  In the letter the Senator argued that it was both the 
AEC’s and the Joint Committee’s responsibilities to ensure that in case of war, 
enough bombs were available for use on an enemy and “assuming enough bombs 
were not available, we [the AEC and the Joint Committee] would be derelict in the 
discharge of our responsibilities.”21  He wrote that he was “fearful that we may have 
not set our sights high enough so far as quantity of output is concerned.”22  Days later, 
on July 26, Truman appointed a special committee of the NSC to review the 
“adequacy of the then current program of production of fissionable material.”23  
Correspondingly, USAF leadership also reported that they were dissatisfied with the 
size of the current nuclear stockpile and production rate.  However, USAF Secretary 
Symington and Chief of Staff Vandenberg admitted that it was not the responsibility 
of the Air Force to determine an increase in the production of fissionable materials, 
but that it was “a matter which must be left to higher authorities.”24 
On October 10, the special committee of the NSC reported back to Truman 
about accelerating atomic production.  The report specified that in light of the 
SANDSTONE series of atomic tests “it is probable that atomic bombs may be 
employed economically in lieu of conventional bombs against relatively small 
targets.”25  The NSC argued further that such weapons “provide a swift and 
tremendous striking power for certain operations at a smaller over-all cost than other 
means.”26  Since the SANDSTONE series of test proved that more advanced atomic 
weapons could be built and stored, the report concluded that the proposed 
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acceleration was “necessary in the interests of national security” and would yield a 
“net improvement in our military posture…[that]was feasible…and not untimely 
from the viewpoint of possible international repercussions, particularly in view of the 
recent atomic explosion in the USSR.”27  Since the August explosion of the Soviet 
bomb, America based much of its security concerns on nuclear armament and 
formulated military strategy based upon this threat.  The NSC Report argued further 
that the acceleration of atomic energy production was “consonant with paragraph 21a 
of NSC 20/4 which states that as a requirement toward the attainment of our national 
aims vis-à-vis the USSR, we should develop a level of military readiness which can 
be maintained in the long run.”28 
After reviewing the report, Truman concurred with the proposed expansion on 
17 October.29  Eventually, this would not be the last time Truman ordered an increase 
as he ordered two more expansion in his remaining time as president setting the stage 
for what became an arsenal of over 18,000 weapons by the end of 1959.30  These 
additional increases in atomic weapons were also supported by the State Department 
who responded in one instance that, “the planned expansion program is essential to 
national security.”31 
Discussion about the increase in atomic material, as it turned out, preceded an 
even more contentious debate over the development of an even bigger more powerful 
weapon, the hydrogen bomb, or what at the time was called the “Super.”  The genesis 
of the hydrogen bomb went back to World War II when scientists at LASL discussed 
the idea of a fusion reaction that could yield even more explosive power than fission.  
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While fission bombs, as used in “Fat Man” and “Little Boy,” were theoretically 
limited to a yield of one MT, the concept of fusion promised an unrestricted explosive 
yield assuming the reaction had sufficient access to thermal energy.32  Early estimates 
place the lower end of a thermonuclear bomb’s explosive yield between one-thousand 
to ten-thousand KTs.33  A one thousand KT weapon, scientists estimated, would 
destroy a sixty-five square mile area, while a ten-thousand KT bomb could devastate 
an area of three-hundred square miles.34  These numbers dwarfed the paltry four 
square miles of devastation wrought from the twenty KT “Little Boy” explosion at 
Hiroshima. 
The “super” used the method of fusion, rather than fission, to create even 
greater explosive power by combining atomic material instead of breaking it apart.  
The energy created in the “super” is generated when two light nuclei are fused 
together to form a new heavier nucleus.35  When this event occurs, the result of the 
reaction weighs less than the original atomic masses, with the resulting difference in 
mass released in various forms of energy.36  Since the various isotopes of hydrogen 
(deuterium and tritium) all have only one proton in the nucleus, it is easier to induce 
fusion with this molecular structure.37  In order to fuse two hydrogen elements 
together and over come their natural repulsive properties, the atomic structures are 
combined by applying large amounts of heat and pressure.38  Ironically, to create 
sufficient heat and pressure for fusion, scientist determined the best way to enable this 
environment was to initiate the process with a fission-type device.39 
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Discussions about building a fusion bomb began as early as 1942, and by 
summer 1943 a group of physicist at LASL, including Edward Teller, began 
theoretical calculations.40  At that time LASL, had yet to develop a method to create 
the sufficient thermal heat to enact a fusion device and as a result the work on this 
concept was a lesser priority.41  However, following the war, in an April 1946 
conference, Teller reported that a fusion reaction was possible and recommended this 
theoretical prospect be explored further.42  Debate about creating such a powerful 
new weapon was a hot topic of discussion within the scientific community.  
Nevertheless, in the years following the war, and with the lethargy of American 
atomic efforts, work on the “super” languished.  However, in light of the unexpected 
Soviet atomic explosion and the request to expand the atomic energy program, the 
timing for the “super” was propitious. 
Prior to October 6, 1949 Truman never heard about the hydrogen bomb.43  
However, after the Soviet explosion, members within the U.S. government were 
pushing for a renewed effort in thermonuclear research.  AEC Commissioners Luis 
Strauss and Gordon Dean, along with Senator McMahon, were proponents of a 
renewed “super” effort.44  On the same day the President authorized the expansion of 
the atomic energy program, McMahon urged AEC Chairman Lilienthal to be “as bold 
and urgent [with the development of hydrogen weapons] as the original [Manhattan] 
atomic program.”45  While many technical issues still existed, and the feasibility of 
such a weapon was still in doubt, the concern over falling behind in nuclear 
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technology prompted many to favor a renewed research effort.  A 1949 JCS report 
concluded that a “super” weapon might be developed in as little as three years.46 
Not all elements of the federal government were in agreement regarding the 
development of the “super.”  On October 5, AEC Commissioner Louis Strauss, 
recommended to his fellow members that an intensive effort to develop the “super” 
be initiated in the same high-priority manner as the Manhattan Project.47  In order to 
review the request, the AEC’s General Advisory Committee (GAC) met at the end of 
October to deliberate on the matter.48  This committee consisted of various prominent 
veteran members of the atomic scientific community including J. Robert 
Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, James Conant, and Isidor Rabi.49  At the end of their 
deliberations the GAC unanimously recommended against the development of the 
weapon for many reasons.  First, the GAC believed many technological issues still 
needed to be solved.50  Furthermore the GAC argued that researching the hydrogen 
bomb might squander precious nuclear resources, but more importantly, these men 
opposed the “super” largely upon moral grounds.51  According to a history of the JCS, 
these scientists argued, 
There was no theoretical limit to its size [the “super”].  Clearly such a weapon 
could not be restricted to use against strictly military targets and would make 
possible a policy of exterminating civilian populations.  Nor was it needed for 
national security.  By the time the Soviets attained an atomic attack capability, 
the U.S. stockpile of fission weapons would be sufficient to permit an 
adequate reprisal.52 
While the GAC unanimously opposed the “super,” the commissioners of the 
parent AEC were split on the matter with a count of two to three.  Commission 
members Gordon Dean and Strauss were for the development of the “super” with the 
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other three members, Chairman Lilienthal, Sumner Pike, and Henry Smyth, against.53  
As a result of this split in AEC membership, each commissioner communicated their 
respective positions to the president via separate correspondence.  Barely a month 
later, on December 3, 1949, the GAC filed a subsequent report that again 
unanimously protested the development of the “super” based upon moral grounds.54 
Initially the military was reticent about the potential of the “super” and 
thought that it might detract from the requested increase in atomic weapons.55  
However, after the AEC’s split vote, the JCS directed its own study of the weapon.  
The report submitted to the JCS on November 17 communicated a halfhearted 
response.  Given the estimated low-end, one-thousand KT yield of the “super” and its 
ability to destroy sixty-five square miles, the JCS report found that only four Soviet 
cities fit this description.56  Furthermore, the study reported that thermonuclear 
weapons were of limited value in offensive operations, but provided an economy of 
effort when combined with fission weapons.57  The report also took into consideration 
the psychological aspect of a possible Soviet monopoly on thermonuclear technology 
if the U.S. chose not to develop the “super.”  In that eventuality, the JCS argued that 
the United States would suffer a demoralizing blow that might shake the “confidence 
and determination of the western nations.”58 
In response to the AEC’s and the GAC’s position on the “super,” on 21 
November Senator McMahon submitted a seven page letter to Truman outlining the 
positive aspects of the bomb and arguing for its quick development.  McMahon 
emphasized the “super’s” economy of mass and stated that “23 current-type fission 
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bombs would be needed to duplicate the effect of one super which destroyed 150 
square miles; about 143 fission bombs would be needed to equal the effect of one 
super that destroyed 1,000 square miles.”59  He claimed that development of the 
bomb “is estimated at only $200 or $300 million-less than a sixth of what we spent on 
the Manhattan project and unit costs . . . may be expected to decline markedly when 
production and design improvements are achieved.”60 
Senator McMahon also argued the case for the “super” by referring the issue 
of bombing accuracy, or lack thereof.  “A fission bomb must usually detonate a mile 
or half-mile or even less distance from the target to be effective,” he observed, 
“whereas a super might miss its target by ten miles or more and still serve the purpose 
intended.”61  With the higher yield of thermonuclear weapons, accuracy was no 
longer as important.  This kind of reasoning reflected SAC targeting methodologies 
during this period.  The bottom line: area targeting once again became acceptable. 
Both advocates and proponents subscribed to the same argument used when 
developing the atomic bomb during World War II.  McMahon saw no difference 
between attacking an enemy with thermonuclear weapons or with conventional or 
fission-type bombs much as Oppenheimer saw no difference between the atomic 
bomb and LeMay’s firebombing efforts.  In support of this argument McMahon 
wrote: 
There is no moral dividing line that I can see between a big explosion which 
causes heavy damage and many smaller explosions causing equal or still greater 
damage.  What then is the distinction between 1,000 square miles which one 
super might scorch and the 1,000 square miles which 143 fission bombs might 
equally destroy?  Is a given weapon to be adjudged moral or immoral 
depending upon whether it requires hours, days or weeks to take its toll?62 
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On November 23, the JCS submitted its report to Secretary Johnson.  The 
overriding justification for the development of the “super” was that, “possession of a 
thermonuclear weapon by the USSR without such possession by the United States 
would be intolerable.”63  If thermonuclear weapons were feasible:  
[T]he possession of such a weapon by the United States may act as a possible 
deterrent . . . provide an offensive weapon of the greatest known power 
possibilities thereby adding flexibility to our planning . . . [and that] the cost in 
money, materials, and industrial effort of developing a thermonuclear weapon 
appears to be within the capabilities of the United States.64 
The report speculated that the larger weapon might serve as a “substitute for a greater 
number of fission bombs . . . [and] more efficient in utilization of available ore and 
production capacity per unit of destruction.”65 
To resolve the conflicting recommendations, Truman again enacted a special 
committee of the NSC.66  Debate over the “super” continued through December and 
well in January 1950.  NSC special committee members, AEC Chairman Lilienthal 
and Secretary of Defense Johnson, could not agree despite Secretary of State 
Acheson’s efforts to mediate the impasse.  As a result, the Committee conducted 
further deliberation only through correspondence.67  Johnson, looking at the issue 
from a military standpoint, made clear that he would only be dissuaded from 
recommending development of the weapon only if the Soviets agreed to some 
international control over nuclear weapons-an event not likely to occur given the 
history of initiatives such as the Baruch Plan.68 
The JCS elaborated their position in supplementary correspondence submitted 
on January 13, 1950.  The JCS reported that “they did not intend to destroy large 
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cities per se; rather only to attack such targets as are necessary in war to impose the 
national objectives of the United States upon an enemy.”69  Furthermore, in the same 
correspondence, the JCS saw the development of the “super” as a continuation of 
current strategic initiatives.  CJCS Army General Omar Bradley argued that the 
“super” might have a great value against massed enemy formations.70  Despite the 
position of the JCS, Lilienthal still clung to the moral arguments and continued to 
oppose development of the weapon.71 
On January 27, members of the AEC met again with the Joint Committee.  
The logjam between the two organizations could not be broken.72  Now public 
opinion exerted influence.  Once the press found out about the argument over the 
“super,” various public figures rallied support behind the development of the 
weapon.73  Finally, on January 31, 1950, Truman directed the AEC “to proceed to 
determine the technical feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon, the scale and rate of 
effort to be determined jointly by the [AEC] and the Department of Defense.”74  One 
account states that when objections continued to be raised, Truman supposedly 
barked “What the hell are we waiting for? Get on with it.”75  The president declared, 
“It is part of my responsibility as Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces to see to 
it that our country is able to defend itself against any possible aggressor... Like other 
work in the field of atomic weapons, it is being and will be carried forward on a basis 
consistent with the overall objectives of our program of peace and security.”76 
The decision to explore the possibility of the “super” was overwhelmingly 
supported by the American public.  Polls taken shortly after Truman's announcement 
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showed that 77 percent of those questioned supported the development of a hydrogen 
bomb with only 17 percent against.77  Correspondingly, concerns over Soviet 
weapons also persisted as months later 68 percent of those polled thought that 
Russian would use a hydrogen bomb on the United States if they had it.78  Many 
Americans and foreign nationals decried the building and testing of the H-bomb, to 
including the editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, Eugene Rabinowich, New 
York Times Critic Lewis Mumford, as well as India’s Jawaharlal Nehru, and members 
of Great Britain’s Labor Party in the House of Commons.79  Regardless of these 
objections, months after his initial decision, 78 percent of polled Americans still 
supported U.S. development of the weapon.80 
Reflecting popular enthusiasm, in 1951, Manhattan Project reporter William 
Laurence published a book entitled The Hell Bomb and argued for not only the 
increase in the atomic program, but for the development of the H-bomb.81  The same 
year that Laurence published his book, 56 percent of Americans believed that “war 
and foreign policy, Russia, threats to peace, and the cold war” were the most 
important problem facing the country.82  While concern over atomic war was an 
underlying, if not overt issue, the Cold War combined with Soviet advances in atomic 
weaponry gave impetus to expand and develop American nuclear weapon efforts.  
Clearly, the public agreed.83 
Truman also directed Johnson and Dulles to re-examine national security 
policy given the Soviet atomic explosion.  This re-examination of U.S. policy 
eventually led to the drafting of NSC 68, a document that defined the parameters of 
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U.S. foreign policy for a generation, and along with the Korean War, set the stage for 
American rearmament.84  As discussed previously, NSC 68 paved the way for the 
increase in defense appropriations and what Allen Millet and Peter Maslowski have 
described as a “holiday on defense spending.”85 
Truman’s statement called for the development of thermonuclear technology 
and not necessarily the approval to build a weapon.  However, once Truman made his 
announcement, the momentum behind the development of the “super” built 
appreciably.  On February 3, the Joint Committee was informed of Klaus Fuch’s 
spying efforts for the Soviets during the Manhattan Project.  On February 16, a memo 
authored by Brigadier General Herbert Loper, member of the Military Liaison 
Committee to the AEC, speculated that because of Fuch’s espionage the Soviets may 
have embarked upon an atomic program as early as 1943.86  If this was the case, the 
memo argued, the Soviets might already develop a larger weapons program and 
production capability that might yield more plentiful and powerful bombs.87  
Furthermore, Loper speculated that the Soviets may already have established 
thermonuclear weapons production.88 
Given Fuch’s spying and the suspicions over Soviet intent during this era, 
U.S. leaders saw merit in Loper’s speculation.89  In March, the JCS forwarded a 
request to Secretary Johnson asking him to give the thermonuclear effort the highest 
priority.  Forwarded to the president, the request was reviewed by Truman and 
approved on March 10.90  When the North Koreans crossed the border into the South 
in June, any lingering arguments against the development of the “super” had been 
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muted.91  The push by civilian members of the government for the “super,” along 
with popular U.S. sentiments, clearly made a difference in Truman’s decision to 
develop the weapon.  When Ed Teller was asked who deserved credit for overriding 
the GAC’s argument regarding the H-bomb, Teller replied, “Senator Brien 
McMahon, Lewis Strauss, and [ironically] Klaus Fuchs.”92 
On November 1, 1952, two days before the presidential election, the small 
island of Elugelab was vaporized by the world’s first truly thermonuclear explosion.  
The U.S. effort to develop the technology paid off as the test-bed device, two stories 
high and weighing some eighty tons, yielded an explosion of ten MTs.  The explosion 
proved the feasibility of a thermonuclear device but was not yet a deliverable weapon.  
That advance came afterward with the CASTLE series of tests.  The only thing 
needed now was an Air Force capable of delivering such a weapon, and by the time 
of CASTLE BRAVO in March 1954, the U.S. was already on its way to building that 
instrumentality. 
____________________________________________ 
Air Force Budgeting, Targeting, and Moral Imperatives 
On February 2, 1950, the Fort Worth Star Telegram newspaper ran an op-ed 
article lauding Truman’s decision to pursue thermonuclear technology.  The author 
claimed that the President had faced “a Hobson’s choice.  He could not, for the 
security of the nation, have decided otherwise that he did.  He nevertheless has 
assumed an enormous responsibility.  It required great courage.”93  While the paper 
praised the president, it also argued that the decision required further action.  
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According to the newspaper, what Truman needed to do now was provide the 
capability to deliver the “super.”  The article specified: “The hydrogen bomb is 
worthless unless the means exist to deliver it to its target.  Russia is at work to 
establish a far-flung warning and interception system and is pressing research in jet 
aircraft and guided missiles.  Sure evasion of interception is as important as the bomb 
itself.”94  These words argue the case for an increase in Air Force capability to 
leverage the destructive potential of thermonuclear technology.  Considering Convair 
Aircraft Corporation, builder of the B-36, was located in Fort Worth, the op-ed’s 
argument had a distinctively partisan tone.  Regardless of the paper’s local interests, 
the actions of both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations reflected this idea and 
provided sufficient resources for the growth of America’s strategic air arm. 
While the AEC and the Joint Committee were initiating debate regarding the 
“super,” on November 8, 1949, Air Force Secretary Symington wrote to Louis 
Johnson regarding the size of the Air Force and role it was expected to play in the 
future.  The letter stated that, given the unexpected Soviet atomic explosion, “we 
must conclude that the question of the survival of the United States may be 
involved.”95  The Air Force Secretary argued that the Russian achievement meant that 
they would have “a militarily significant number of atomic bombs . . . two or three 
years earlier than was expected.”96  As a result, to deter a Soviet attack or to conduct 
a strike against the Russians, the Air Force needed to accelerate the planned 
modernization program.97 
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Symington observed that the current expansion plan was actually 
“decelerating instead of accelerating” the size and capability of the Air Force.98  The 
Air Force Secretary argued this point because the approved seventy group program of 
1947 actually equated to sixty-seven groups as the Air Force changed its bomber 
group organization and the number of aircraft assigned to various groups.99  Based 
upon the planned budgeted allocation of $1.1 billion per year, the USAF would only 
have twenty-nine groups equipped with modern aircraft by 1955.  While the Finletter 
Commission and the Brewster Board both advocated a seventy group air force as a 
minimum requirement, the trend analysis done by Symington predicted that the 1955 
Air Force would fall far short of this requirement in terms of modern aircraft.100  
Additionally, he argued that the seventy group air force was the minimum peacetime 
requirement, and in light of the recent Soviet activity, this structure was now outdated 
and needed revision. 
Air Force planners adjusted their perceived requirements and in August 1950, 
Vandenberg forwarded to the JCS a request to increase the number of air groups to 
130.101  By September the JCS gave the USAF approval to grow to only ninety-five 
wings, and after the Chinese entered the Korean War, the NSC directed the Air Force 
to grow to eighty-seven wings by mid-1951 and then to ninety-five by 1952.102  
While the USAF did not initially get the approval to grow to one hundred and thirty 
wings, Vandenberg and Finletter accepted the ninety-five wing figure and still hoped 
to achieve their goal in the future.103  Although Truman still concerned himself with 
economic solvency and a balanced budget, the North Korean invasion, followed by 
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the Chinese entry into the conflict, changed the political climate in Washington.104  
By 1953, Truman’s defense budget included $48 billion with just under half, $21 
billion, allocated for the Air Force.105  Indicative of airpower’s new found importance 
was that an additional $2 billion of the USAF budget came from trimming the Army’s 
allocation.106 
In support of the importance of airpower, in 1951 Robert Lovett, assistant 
Secretary of Defense, and the designated successor to George Marshall, argued “We 
must put first things first and not everything at once.”107  Lovett assigned priority to 
strategic bombing as American’s number one defensive priority.  Seeing the growth 
of the Soviet airpower and capability, the JCS agreed that the USAF needed to 
continue its expansion.108  CJCS Bradley, while still holding to the idea that airpower 
itself cannot win a war, understood that airpower was critical.109  By 1953 the JCS 
supported the idea of increasing the USAF to an unprecedented one hundred and forty 
three wings while holding the size of the Army and Navy at existing levels.110 
Because NSC 68 stipulated1954 as the year in which the growing Soviet 
capability could credibly threaten the U.S., the JCS recommended the one hundred 
and forty three wing air force be accomplished by January 1954.111  Truman 
concurred with the assessment but asked Lovett to adjust the timeline so that defense 
expenditures would still be less than $60 billion annually.112  However, by allocating 
this much to defense, the nation faced a budget deficient of almost $10 billion for 
1954 and if this spending trend continued, the deficient could climb to $15 billion by 
1955.113  Despite Truman’s guidance to extend the funding timeline, nuclear 
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deterrence and the role of the USAF ensured the primacy of the service for the rest of 
the decade.  Apart from President Dwight Eisenhower’s 1954 budget, for the 
remainder of the decade, the Air Force alone consumed the lion share of the defense 
budget at the expanse of the other services.114 
As the Air Force grew in size, it took steps to remediate its precision bombing 
capability.  LeMay’s efforts to whip SAC into shape were paying off.  In May 1950, 
radar bombing accuracy improved as the average error dropped from 10,000 feet, 
from the 1949 Dayton Mission, to 4,500 feet.115  By 1951 bomb scores and accuracy 
continued to improve with an average error now only 3,000 feet.116  Some crews were 
able to place their loads within 2,500 feet and by late 1951, CEP was approximately 
1,800 feet.117  Eventually, by 1954 SAC reported that it’s CEP for all crews using 
radar bombing from an altitude of 25,000 feet, was 1,400 feet.118  Utilizing visual 
methods the figure dropped to 600 feet.  For lead crews only, those crews specifically 
designated to initiate the atomic assault due to their superior airmanship, SAC 
reported that dropping from the same altitude, the CEP was 1,390 feet using radar and 
352 feet using visual methods.119 
Also throughout the Korean War period SAC grew in both men and machines.  
The new B-36 began to mature and come into operational service in increasing 
numbers replacing the older B-50s and B-29s.  Not only were pilots and planes 
important, but trained personnel were key to arming and handling atomic ordnance.  
The command doubled in size from 85,000 personnel, in 1950 to 170,000 by 
December 1953.120  In 1950 Boeing received its first contract to build SAC’s new all-
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jet bomber, the B-47, and after the outbreak of the Korean War the company received 
production orders for what became the mainstay of the strategic bombing fleet, the 
venerable B-52 “Stratofortress.”121  By 1952 Convair won the contract to build the 
first supersonic bomber and what eventually became the sleek looking B-58 
“Hustler.” 
In September 1952, Truman concurred with a request to have the AEC 
transfer atomic weapons custody to the DoD despite his initial rejection of such a 
request years earlier.122  In addition to increases in capability and in aircraft, SAC 
continued to grow in prestige and importance.  Along with this meteoric rise came 
unmatched authority in the nuclear targeting process, as war planners agreed to run all 
nuclear target nominations through SAC before submitting them to the JCS.123 
To maximize the effectiveness of nuclear munitions and the bombing fleet, 
SAC proposed the concept of area bombardment with atomic weapons.  At a meeting 
in with the Air Staff Targeting Panel at Washington in January 1951, LeMay outlined 
what he thought was the best method for strategic targeting with nuclear weapons.124  
While the OFFTACKLE plan called for the bombing of 104 targets with 220 bombs, 
LeMay thought it would be hard to find, with either visual or radar bombing methods, 
individual targets.  For bomber crews to maximize their efforts and their atomic 
payloads, LeMay argued that they “should concentrate on industry itself which is 
located in urban areas” and if a bomb fell off target and missed its mark he claimed “a 
bonus will be derived from the use of the bomb.”125  By dropping on urban areas, 
LeMay surmised that there was a good chance the bomb would destroy other 
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elements of Soviet infrastructure and production capabilities even if it missed the 
intended target. 
By targeting urban areas LeMay reasoned he was conserving the atomic 
arsenal and getting the most out of each bomb dropped.126  This rationale was largely 
accepted in Air Force circles.  As a result, the term “bonus damage” became a 
common expression regarding nuclear targeting along with the ironic and seemingly 
contradictory phrase “precision attacks with an area weapon.”127  While the Air Staff 
had at one time looked at destroying individual targets and production facilities, 
LeMay and SAC were looking to attack entire municipal regions.128  This idea was 
not necessarily new, as early as 1947 Air Force planners argued that a city was 
largely a “collection of industry” and that hitting one city would probably cause the 
destruction of other factories and infrastructure.129  This line of reasoning reflects the 
ideas espoused in McMahon’s November 21, 1949, letter to Truman regarding the 
damage one hydrogen bomb might make even if it was dropped off target. 
During the first part of the 1950s, SAC planners picked aiming points that 
were important population and industrial areas that if attacked, would damage not just 
infrastructure, but also might have a potential effect upon Soviet morale.130  However, 
by 1954, LeMay thought that SAC needed to shift targeting priorities to Soviet air 
forces in an attempt to cripple Russian military capabilities, but the explicit targeting 
of urban areas with nuclear weapons during this time certainly subscribed to a 
Douhetian methodology.131  Regarding this dichotomy between targeting people or 
equipment, Air Force Chief of Staff Nathan Twinning, who replaced Vandenberg in 
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June 1953, stated, “Machines and weapons, not people, are the principal targets to be 
destroyed.  It would be a moral blunder and a military blunder to concentrate our 
hopes for victory on the piling up of casualties when the opportunity now exists to 
concentrate with great effect on the enemy’s weapons and weapons factories.”132  
While the Air Force Chief of Staff recognized the dilemma posed by SAC’s “bonus 
damage” targeting methodology, the net effect of a nuclear attack would still yield 
much of the same effect by generating massive numbers of Russian casualties. 
SAC targeted 118 of the 134 major population centers in Russian and a report 
conducted by the DoD’s Weapons System Evaluation Group (WSEG) estimated that 
approximately 80 percent of residents in the target area would be killed.133  The irony 
is while LeMay was pressing for “bonus targeting” with nuclear weapons, SAC crews 
were still evaluated on their bombing accuracy and CEP.  This seemingly 
contradictory thought on the part of SAC embraces some aspect of ACTS precepts, 
but obviously ignores others.  The dichotomy regarding massive destruction with 
either atomic or hydrogen bombs combined with the methodology of precision with 
nuclear munitions was generally accepted as standard procedure. 
Ironically, with the potential of hydrogen bombs yielding five, ten, or twenty 
MTs, the issue regarding targeting would eventually come down to not what to target, 
but what not to destroy.134  At RAND Strategist Bernard Brodie concluded that war 
was controlled chaos and violence, and as argued by 19th Century military 
philosopher Carl von Clausewitz, was merely “policy by other means.”135  In this 
regard war was a rational act, meaning is was a calculated event based upon 
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deliberate actions with definitive ends.  However, Brodie argued, with the advent of 
hydrogen bombs and their mass effects, the use of the weapons was no longer rational 
and use of such a weapon would equate to national, if not global, suicide.136  Despite 
this conundrum, Brodie too supported development of the “super.”  
Regardless of the arguments over the “super” and the expansion of the atomic 
stockpile, much of the Air Force concurred with the growth of the strategic bombing 
fleet and argued in support of the rearmament efforts.  While moral and legal 
implications were debated, a spring 1951 article in AUQR argued,  
To say that it [strategic bombing] violates international law is technically 
correct if the law is taken in light of the times in which the law was created-
times when war was treated as combat primarily between easily identifiable 
military forces. . . . But with the advent of total war these distinctions 
[between combatant and non combatant] have now faded.  Without an 
established court of final resort with power to bring violators before it and to 
enforce its judgments, the application of international law to war has faded in 
the face of nationalism.137 
While disregarding international legal interpretations and moral 
underpinnings, the same author stated that, “the United States should not feel that 
strategic bombardment violates the humane principles to which international law 
would compel adherence” and argued that “Few can doubt that the moral intentions 
of our country are of the best as regards for mankind, even though history may record 
some failures.”138  While this article is indicative of American ethnocentric thought, 
and reiterated General Anderson’s argument in his 1949 AUQR article, other 
commentaries in this periodical during the early 1950’s repeated this same sentiment 
by proffering a moral foundation for the USAF, and defended America’s strategic 
bombing capability. 
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Somewhat indicative of this idea was the American sentiment regarding the 
first use of an atomic bomb.  In February 1951, a polled asked Americans “If the U.S. 
gets into an all-out war with Russia, do you think we should drop the atom bomb on 
Russia first-or do you think we should use the atomic bomb only if it was used on 
us?”139  66 percent of respondents thought that we should drop the atomic bomb first 
with 19 percent answering that we should drop it only if it was used on the U.S.140  
Use of the weapon was generally accepted as fait accompli but more interesting is 
that “first use” was a policy many American’s subscribed to regarding nuclear 
confrontation with the Russians. 
____________________________________________ 
The New Look and Massive Retaliation 
Two days after the thermonuclear explosion on Elugelab in November 1952, 
Dwight Eisenhower easily defeated his Democratic opponent Thomas Dewey for the 
presidency.  With a change in administration and political parties in the White House, 
American defensive policy took a different direction.  While the U.S. conducted 
rearmament in light of the Soviet atomic explosion, the Korean War, and enacted a 
policy of containment regarding communist incursion under NSC 68, the Eisenhower 
administration developed a policy to take the initiative away from the Soviet Union 
and place emphasis on general war while avoiding smaller regional conflicts.141  
Truman’s rearmament plan was based upon a balance equal share approach to 
defense, but Ike brought nuclear weapons center-stage in U.S. military planning.142  
After assuming office in January 1953, the policies that the Eisenhower 
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administration eventually embraced were called the “New Look” and had its 
foundation in nuclear bombing and were the complete reversal from what ACTS 
taught only a few years earlier.  At this point, the USAF completed its 180 degree 
departure from its original bombing theory. 
Much as had his predecessor, Ike too concerned himself with the nation’s 
economic solvency, especially in light of the cost of America’s rearmament under 
NSC 68.  During his election bid, he promised to balance the federal budget and 
campaigned against the “Democrat’s profligacy” regarding national defense.143  
Supporting this contention, during his presidential campaign, Ike claimed “A 
bankrupt America is more the Soviet goal than an America conquered on the field of 
battle.”144  While still acknowledging the requirement to maintain a strong defense 
given communist expansion, Ike wanted to review American defensive policy in 
accordance with his campaign platform and in hopes of a balanced budget.  Similarly, 
many Americans during the campaign season were of a similar mindset as 53 percent 
of polled American’s supported the idea of having a small armed force equipped with 
special weapons that might be as effective as a large military based upon 
manpower.145  In keeping with his campaign promises, upon assuming office, the new 
administration called a halt to all new defensive spending pending a review of each 
program.146 
Under the Truman administration’s policy embodied in NSC 68, American 
planners identified 1954 as a target year for the full development of U.S. military 
capability.  However, by placing emphasis on 1954 and estimating that during this 
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year the Soviets would have a sufficient stockpile of nuclear weapons and sufficient 
ability to deliver them, the Truman administration allocated funds to meet a specific 
timeline.  This method of planning essentially front-loaded costs for national defense, 
and in Ike’s opinion, set the stage for a possible economic disaster.  To mitigate the 
fiscal danger and reduce the rapid expenditure of funds for defense, Ike thought the 
nation should not prepare for some fixed date, but needed to establish a military 
posture that would suit the nation’s needs for the long term.147  In order to strike a 
balance between fiscal solvency and the emerging nature of nuclear war, at a 
Legislative Leadership meeting in May 1953, Ike queried, “the real question . . . was 
how fast can you translate a peace time economy to a wartime economy, having 
enough force in being to meet the immediate situation.”148 
While the Eisenhower administration reviewed the nation’s overall defensive 
policy, it also proposed to reduce military expenditures for the upcoming fiscal year.  
In support of his campaign promise to have a more balanced approach to the federal 
budget, the Eisenhower administration quickly proposed a defensive budget cut for 
FY 1954.  New Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, fresh from leading General 
Motors corporation, initiated the process with the belief that DoD’s budget, like many 
other organizations, was bloated or overinflated.149 Air Force Chief of Staff 
Vandenberg protested potential budget cuts and clung to the NSC 68 timeline 
believing that the 1954 target date be heeded.150  The General argued his case to the 
new Air Force Secretary, Harold Talbott.  Despite Vandenberg’s disagreement with 
the new administration, and with similar objection from the JCS, Secretary Wilson 
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submitted a revised budget for 1954 that was substantially reduced.151  The newly 
proposed DoD budget reduced allocations by $7.5 billion overall, with the USAF’s 
shared decreased by $3.5 billion.152  
When put before Congress on 5 June, Vandenberg, while suffering form 
terminal prostate cancer, pleaded with lawmakers to reject the proposed cuts.  He was 
not alone in his displeasure.  Members of the Democratic Party, including former 
USAF Secretary Symington, argued against such actions.  The American public was 
also concerned about this cut in defensive spending and Vandenberg’s office received 
numerous letters protesting the smaller budget and the reduction in Air Fore wings.  
A letter from a Mrs. R. E. Brown from Los Angeles expressed her gratitude to 
Vandenberg for his defense of the Air Force budget and wrote, “We are rapidly losing 
all confidence in President Eisenhower and his judgment (especially in his support of 
McCarthyism!) so appreciate so much[sic] your COURAGE in talking against 
Secretary Wilson, and his ill-advised reduction in Airforce[sic] “Wings.”153  A letter 
from Mr. Garfield C. Burke of Lester, Pennsylvania also wrote to support 
Vandenberg’s stance and closed his letter by stating “IF A MAN IS WITHIN 
STRIKING DISTANCE OF A RATTLESNAKE, ONLY A FOOL WILL LET 
DOWN HIS GUARD WHEN THE SNAKE STOPS BUZZING.”154 
Regardless of Vandenberg’s congressional testimony against a budget cut, and 
ignoring Mrs, Brown’s opinion and Mr. Burke’s witticisms, the revised 1954 budget 
proposal passed on 29 July and Ike signed it on 1 August.  The final form of the 
budget was $6.7 billion less than the original Truman proposal, and for a time also 
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returned DoD back to a roughly equal share budget for all branches of the armed 
forces.155  However, this budgetary reduction and the implications it had for the Air 
Force would not be permanent. 
Before the debate over the 1954 budget ensued, Ike already began formulating 
a new defense policy for “the long haul” while looking to avoid protracted regional 
conflicts like Korea.156  In December 1952, after winning the election, Ike initiated a 
defense policy review while aboard the U.S.S. HELENA as the president-elect sailed 
home from his promised visit to Korea.  One of the members included in the 
president’s group was Admiral Arthur Radford, who despite his role in the 1949 
“revolt” against the B-36, was eventually named the CJCS.  Radford reported to Ike, 
and to many of the president-elects soon-to-be advisors, that the American military 
was overextended and overcommitted in various areas throughout the globe.157  
Furthermore, the Admiral believed that local or indigenous defense forces should 
carry the burden of regional conflicts, with the U.S. providing support should a 
conflict escalate into general war.158  Correspondingly, Radford’s ideas fit well with 
sentiment from future Secretary of State John Foster Dulles who believed that 
America’s best bet lie not in containing the Soviets around the globe in smaller 
conflicts, but through deterrence and maintenance of a massive strike capability.159  
Dulles’ ideas regarding national defense were formed before assuming office and 
were publically expressed in a 1952 Life magazine article arguing that, “the free 
world [needed] to develop the will to organize the means to retaliate instantly against 
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open aggression by Red armies, so that if it occurred anywhere we could and would 
strike back where it hurt, by means of our choosing.”160 
In a special message to Congress on April 30, the president asserted, “Our 
military plans are based primarily on military factors, but they must also take into 
account a wider range of policy and economic factors, as well as the latest 
developments of modern science.”161  The same day, in a press conference Ike 
argued, “We reject the idea that we must build up to a maximum attainable strength 
for some specific date theoretically fixed for a specified time in the future.”162  
Continuing his effort to conduct a review of national policy, in May 1954 Eisenhower 
initiated “Operation SOLARIUM.”  Aptly named because it started in the White 
Houses solarium room, this effort analyzed existing national strategy, established new 
defense priorities, and set the stage for Ike’s new military polices with regard to the 
Soviet power bloc.163  The review included input from some of Ike’s closest advisors 
and included former Army General Bedell Smith as the new Undersecretary of State, 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Allen Dulles, Special Assistant for 
national Security Affairs, Robert Cutler, and Chairman of the Psychological Strategy 
board, C. D. Jackson.164 
The SOLARIUM effort comprised of three separate “task forces” each 
directed to draw up differing courses of action regarding a future national security 
strategy.  Task Force A’s course involved increasing American forces while 
“assist[ing] in the building up of the economic and military strength and cohesion of 
the free world without risk of general war.”165  Task Force B focused upon drawing 
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“a continuous line around the Soviet Bloc beyond which the U.S. will not permit or 
satellite military forces to advance without general war.”166  Task Force C looked at a 
more vigorous offensive action designed to “increase efforts to disturb and weaken 
the Soviet Bloc and to accelerate the consolidation and strengthening of the free 
world to enable it to assume the greater risk involved.”167  In the end, the president 
went with a solution resembling Task Force A’s course of action, but included some 
of Task Force B’s.  A continuation of a form of Containment developed that became 
the basis for a new NSC policy, but included a reliance upon airpower.168 
As SOLARIUM proceeded the Soviet Union took the next step in nuclear 
technology and exploded what was thought to be a thermonuclear device on August 
12.  While the explosion was really more of a fission rather than a true fusion 
reaction, the Russians seemingly upped the nuclear ante.  As a result, Chairman of the 
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Sterling Cole, wrote to the president “this letter 
is written to assure you that the members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 
will lend their support to all measures intended to enlarge [and] still further our 
present advantage in atomic and hydrogen developments.”169  Cole reassured Ike that 
were still ahead in nuclear technology but warned that it was a “fast-evolving 
science.”170  In his letter he continued, “I presume that this latest sign of Soviet 
atomic progress will be reflected in the plans you and your advisors are formulating 
for more effective defenses against nuclear attack from land and sea.”171 
The SOLARIUM effort came to fruition on October 30, 1953 the president 
approved NSC 162/2 and served as the foundation for the “New Look.”  NSC 162/2 
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noticeably outlined a defensive policy that considered the economic viability of the 
nation and looked to limit defensive costs.  It clearly stated, “The United States must 
maintain a sound economy based upon free enterprise as a basis for both high defense 
productivity and for maintenance of its living standards...[and] avoid seriously 
weakening the U.S. economy or undermining our fundamental values and 
institutions.” 172  However, in order to provide sufficient security while limiting the 
economic repercussions, the policy statement argued for an offensive capability with 
“sufficient atomic weapons and effective means of delivery [that] are indispensable to 
U.S. security.  Moreover, in the face of Soviet atomic power . . . [our] atomic 
capability is also a major contribution to the security of our allies, as well as this 
country.”173  Furthermore, America needed “a strong military posture, with emphasis 
on the capability of inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking 
power.”174 
Outlining the deterrent effect of atomic weapons, NSC 162/2 speculated that 
“the risk of Soviet aggression will be minimized by maintaining a strong security 
posture, with emphasis on adequate offensive retaliatory strength and defensive 
strength.  This must be based on massive atomic capability.”175  In closing the 
document stated: 
In the face of the developing Soviet threat, the broad aim of the U.S. security 
policy must be to create, prior to the achievement of mutual atomic plenty, 
conditions under which the United States and the free world coalition are 
prepared to meet the Soviet-Communist threat with resolution . . . [and that] 
the foregoing conclusions are valid only so long as the United States 
maintains a retaliatory capability that cannot be neutralized by a surprise 
Soviet attack.176 
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In essence, the new policy put the bulk of American defense policy into the nuclear 
arena.  Furthermore by establishing deterrence and retaliation as cornerstones of 
national defense, NSC 162/2 relied largely upon SAC and its ability to deliver atomic 
weapons of mass destruction. 
 
Figure 26:  Air Force version of national security missions during the 1950s.  Source: “A Decade of 
Security Thru Airpower,” USAF Pamphlet, Box 96, Papers of General Curtis E. LeMay, Manuscripts 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.  
 
Despite the early budget cuts in 1953, guidance outlined in NSC 162/2 
returned the Air Force quickly back to a planned growth of 137 wings.  For the next 
three fiscal years, DoD again discarded the equal share method of defense spending 
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and allocated the majority of the budget, 47 percent, to the Air Force.177  While the 
other branches of the armed forces obviously disliked NSC 162/2 and the budget 
implications it held for the Army and the Navy, the JCS eventually approved the 
policy in December 1953.178  Admiral Radford, stated that the NSC 162/2 was 
designed for the “long pull, not a year of crisis” and that the U.S. “must be ready for 
tremendous, vast, retaliatory, and counteroffensive blows in the event of global 
war.”179  DoD Secretary Wilson stated the “New Look” as “a natural evolution from 
the crash program that was adopted following the beginning of hostilities in 
Korea.”180  The basic underlying principle of the new policy was that overwhelming 
nuclear firepower would in turn lessen manpower requirements that would equate to 
lower overall costs.181 
On January 12, 1954, while addressing the Council on Foreign Relations in 
New York, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles gave his famous “Massive 
Retaliation” speech and outlined American defense policy known as the “New Look.”  
Massive retaliation was designed to ensure more collective security for the U.S. as 
Dulles specified that the new policy was “placing more reliance on deterrent power, 
and less dependence upon defensive power.”182  The speech outlined America’s intent 
to regain the initiate by retaliating “by means and places of our choosing.”183  
According to Air Force historian Herman Wolk, “the stated objective posture marked 
a significant change from the post World War II containment doctrine which 
emphasized countermoves against Soviet power at the place of aggression.  
Deterrence and retaliation were at the heart of the “New Look” strategy, and it would 
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hinge upon strategic nuclear power and continental defense.”184  With criticism 
coming from Democrat Adlai Stevenson, Vice President Richard Nixon argued in 
support of the ‘New Look’ by stating “rather than let the Communist nibble us to 
death all over the world in little wars we would rely in the future primarily on our 
massive mobile retaliatory power which we could use in our discretion against the 
major source of aggression at the time and places that we choose.”185 
While the centerpiece of NSC 162/2 was SAC, the Eisenhower’s defensive 
plans included two other distinct elements.  As nuclear weapons development made 
bomb designs more compact and efficient, tactical use of such weapons became a 
popular option.186  In order to help in the “retardation mission” if Soviet forces 
attacked Western Europe, smaller fighter aircraft could now carry smaller atomic 
weapons and deliver them on massed armies and formations.187  The program also 
included a nuclear civil defense capability to maintain “a mobilization base, and its 
protection against crippling damage.”188 
Concurrently, while developing a new national security strategy, and seeing 
the need for wide-spread public support, the administration drew up plans for a media 
campaign to educate the American people about the dangers of the current Cold War.  
Six months before Dulles’s speech, in June 1953 the administration designed Project 
CANDOR in an effort to specifically “make clear the dangers that confronted us, the 
power of the enemy, the difficulty in reducing that power, and the probable duration 
of the conflict.”189  The effort consisted of six, fifteen-minute radio and TV talks with 
the overarching title of “The Age of Peril.”190  Some of the titles for the series 
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included, “Nature of Communism,” “The Threat to the United States,” and “What 
Good Citizens Could Do.”191  Each series included a prominent member of the 
Eisenhower administration delivering a specified presentation with Ike conducting the 
last program. 
Before CANDOR was broadcast, the program was merged with the 
Administration’s “Atoms for Peace” program.192  When Ike presented “Atoms for 
Peace” at the UN in December 1953, he portrayed American as a peaceful nation but 
addressed several of the messages included in CANDOR and clearly stated: 
Should such an atomic attack be launched against the United States, our 
reactions would be swift and resolute. But for me to say that the defense 
capabilities of the United States are such that they could inflict terrible losses 
upon an aggressor, for me to say that the retaliation capabilities of the United 
States are so great that such an aggressor's land would be laid waste, all this, 
while fact, is not the true expression of the purpose and the hopes of the 
United States.193 
Twelve days after Dulles’ speech, Ike presented his annual budget message to 
Congress of which one element was his fiscal plan for the “New Look.”  In 
comparison to four previous defense budget submissions, the trend for the 
Eisenhower administration was an overall reduction in expenditures.  For 1955, Ike 
recommended only $34 billion for new obligations, down from a previous four year 
NSC 68 average of $55 billion.194  Net defense budget expenditures went down only 
slightly from an average of $47 billion to $44 billion.195  Correspondingly however, 
the budget for the AEC rose to record levels as Ike proposed to increase its allocation 
from $912 million in 1954, to $1,182 million for 1955.196 
 349 
Weeks later, in March, the CASTLE BRAVO test occurred and following the 
explosion, new AEC Chairman Lewis Strauss reported in an interview to Time 
Magazine that the H-bomb could be made as large as “military requirements 
demanded, that is to say an H-bomb can be made as large enough to take out a city . . 
. any city.”197  In light of the possible explosion of a Soviet thermonuclear device in 
late 1953, and given the nature of American sentiment, the news of the CASTLE 
BRAVO explosion was accepted without widespread indignation.  Many accepted the 
development of the weapons as defensive requirement.  Dr Louis De Voti Newton of 
Atlanta’s Druid Hills Baptist Church expressed a common sentiment regarding the 
bomb; “In the H-bomb era we can’t go back to muskets.  We’ve got to maintain 
anything essential to our defense, the H-bomb or any other kind of bomb.”198 
As the hydrogen bombs tests continued, the American public continued to 
support the weapon’s development.  Approbation was widespread as 71 percent of 
Americans polled thought that the U.S. needed to continue such efforts.199  Americans 
found security in their new weapons as 44 percent of those asked thought that the 
hydrogen bomb made another war less likely with only 21 percent arguing the 
opposite.200  Excepting of disarmament or an agreed moratorium between the two 
powers, Americans largely resigned themselves to the idea that nuclear weapons were 
a necessity and accepted the idea of nuclear bombardment as a viable strategy.  Time 
magazine expressed the opinion that, “the non-communist world must protect itself, 
and in such a way as to exert maximum persuasion on the Communist.”201  
Additionally, Don Murray, editorial writer for the Boston Herald received a Pulitzer 
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Prize for his editorial “Defense in an Air Age.”202  In the piece Murray argued against 
the equal share budgeting of the armed forces and in support of the rise of strategic 
nuclear bombing he wrote, “we want the best force not the best balanced force.  
We’re with you Mr. Wilson.”  In regards to the application of force, Murray declared, 
“We must be able to deliver paralyzing blows to the solar plexus of their [Soviet] land 
mass.203 
However, New York Times reporter Hanson Baldwin was not so enamored 
with the new policy. The veteran commentator warned, “If we depend too greatly 
upon air power and the atomic bomb to deter war or to win it if it starts, we have 
certainly reverted to the much criticized “one weapon, one service, all the eggs in 
basket concept of some years ago.”204  Baldwin ended the article with the ominous 
comment that, “while the strategy of retaliation might nominally ‘win’ a war if one 
came, it offers no political objectives for victory.  An atomic war, with its mutual 
devastation and destruction, could certainly not result in a more stable peace; the 
ultimate outcome might well be the triumph of extremist doctrines and a reversion of 
the large areas of the earth to the Dark Ages.”205 
Based upon the “New Look,” airpower, in the form of strategic bombing, 
became a powerful and important extension of national policy to a level never before 
imagined.  A single arm of one military branch now served as the standard bearer not 
only for military applications, but also as the centerpiece diplomatic/political tool to 
influence allies and foes alike.  While no longer only a tool of precision for use war, 
as originally envisioned at ACTS, strategic bombing was now an instrument for 
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widespread destruction.  In fact, the mere threat of its use was a powerful political 
and psychological weapon.  The “New Look” and the promise of “massive 
retaliation” not only made SAC, with associated nuclear weapons, the preeminent 
element of national military power, but elevated the mere threat of strategic bombing 
as a means of diplomatic discourse in the international arena. 
____________________________________________ 
1955 
On 29 June 1955, the first B-52 jet bomber arrived at 93rd Bomb Wing at 
Castle Air Force Base, California.  The new jet had a range of 6,000 miles, was 
capable of being refueled in the air, flew at a speed of 650 mph, and had a service 
ceiling of 50,000 feet.206  During the same year the Air Force began testing the first 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and Air-to-Ground Missiles (AGM) designs 
as additional platforms for nuclear attack.207  As the Air Force received its new 
bomber and developed missile technology, the budget for the USAF began to grow 
again and allowed the organization to expand from 114 wings in 1954 to an eventual 
137 wings by 1957. 
Concurrently, a corresponding reduction occurred in the budgets sizes of the 
other branches of the armed services, a drop by approximately 13 percent.208  This 
growth of the Air Force was in line with popular contemporary thought at 71 percent 
of Americans surveyed thought that the Air Force was the most important branch of 
military service.209  During this same time LeMay argued that “for some time now 
Strategic Air Command has been this nation’s only real offensive force.”210  
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Hollywood reinforced this ideas with its release of the movie Strategic Air Command 
(Paramount, 1955), an opus that was nominated for an Academy Award.  The 
patriotic film portrayed the mission of SAC in the very best light while emphasizing 
the primacy of the deterrence mission.   
America survived 1954, often referred to “as the year of maximum danger” 
under the auspices of NSC 68, but anxiety over confrontation with communist 
countries continued.  While the Eisenhower administration set forth a new policy akin 
to a “floating D-Day” regarding wartime preparedness, Americans remained deeply 
concern over the Soviet threat and the potential for war.211  Supporting the “New 
Look” and the 1955 budget, Air Force Chief of Staff Nathan Twining reported to the 
House Appropriations Committee that “this new strategy is based on long term needs 
rather than preparations for a year of greatest danger.  It is intended to satisfy a two-
fold requirement-preparedness for general war, should one occur; and maintenance of 
the capability to cope with lesser situations-with at the same time less of a drain on 
our manpower, material, and financial resources.”212  While saving manpower, 
material, and financial resources, Twining envisioned a USAF utilizing nuclear 
weapons in various exigencies by testifying further, “a major portion of our atomic 
strength will be available for a wide range of military purposes-not only during 
general war, but also in situations of limited hostilities.”213  In this regard the Chief of 
Staff argued that “the strategic air offensive is designed to deliver a sudden, massive 
blow against the will and ability of the enemy to wage war.  Our ability to react 
immediately, and with tremendous force, is the principle deterrent to aggression.”214 
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Regarding Russia and its potential for aggression, in February 1955, 64 
percent of Americans still thought that “there was bound to be a major war sooner or 
later.”215  Representing the largest single concern of polled Americans in 1955, most 
thought that foreign policy and our relationship with Russia and China posed the 
biggest challenges for the new mid-term Congress.216  When asked about China, 
roughly half of the respondents thought that we should use atomic or hydrogen bombs 
if a war occurred.217  American concerns over communist incursion and the 
impending threat of war served as the rationale for public support of strategic 
bombing and the development of nuclear capabilities.  
While America put its defensive eggs in the nuclear basket under the New 
Look as directed in NSC 162/2, it also subscribed to a bombing policy that diverged 
greatly from what had preceded World War II.  While the large-scale bombardment 
of the communist bloc with nuclear weapons was widely accepted as a feasible and 
acceptable plan, included in this was an implicit acceptance of mass destruction and 
wholesale killing.  SAC still focused upon CEP and held bombing competitions to 
promote accuracy, but the development of thermonuclear technology and successfully 
converting it into a deliverable weapon promised huge explosive yields that enabled 
SAC planners to count upon “bonus damage.”  Despite General Kuter’s statement in 
1944 that it was “contrary to our national ideals to wage war against civilians,” the 
U.S. largely turned to the idea of that very application.218  As a result, attacking the 
war making capabilities of an enemy nation became indistinguishable from attacking 
urban centers and cities.219  By 1955 the policy of massive retaliation and the “New 
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Look” put the onus of American defensive posture on the threat of nuclear violence 
and widespread destruction.  Americans accepted this policy and supported their 
government in this departure from previous ideas. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
Conclusions 
____________________________________________ 
On January 17, 1991, the opening salvos of Operation DESERT STORM 
proclaimed the USAF’s strategic bombing operations against Saddam Hussein’s 
military and selected elements of Iraqi national infrastructure.  Using a mix of both 
precision guided munitions (PGMs) and conventional “dumb” bombs, coalition Air 
Forces attacked airfields, communication centers, chemical facilities, electrical plants, 
Hussein himself, and many other significant Iraqi targets.  One hundred and fifty two 
places were struck within a twenty-four hour period and targeted more sites than the 
entire Eighth Air Force had in 1942 and 1943.1  For the next few weeks, utilizing both 
PGMs and unguided bombs, the USAF effectively neutralized Iraqi command and 
control capabilities, destroyed much of its military support and logistical 
infrastructure, and eventually shattered its combat power.  As a result, when the 
ground campaign began on February 24, coalition forces rolled over the Iraqi Army 
with relative ease and in less than four days.  
While only 2 percent of the munitions dropped by the coalition air forces were 
done by F-117 “Nighthawk” stealth fighters with PGMs, these strikes comprised 43 
percent of the high priority targets on the master target list.2  The effectiveness of the 
air campaign during DESERT STORM helped paved the way for a quick ground 
victory.  Through the use of PGMs and stealth, what would have taken the USAAF in 
1943 over one thousand B-17 sorties to destroy, was done with one F-117 carrying a 
few PGMs.3  Furthermore, while the initial CEP for the B-17s in World War II was 
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over 3,000 feet, the F-117s CEP during DESERT STORM was reduced to a mere 10 
feet.4  This phenomenal decrease in CEP occurred by leveraging technology and 
stealth and allowed precision to redefine the concept of mass.5 
What occurred during the 1991 air campaign was similar to the kind of 
precision bombing ACTS envisioned back in the late 1930s.  While the officers at 
ACTS hoped to reduce collateral damage and strike only significant elements of an 
enemy’s war making capacity and thus avoid wholesale death and destruction, the 
reality of this vision was not yet a fully practical idea.  According to Air Force 
General David Deptula, chief architect of the DESERT STORM master air attack 
plan, new and advanced precision technology provided the capability to achieve these 
strategic effects.6  In this regard, technology was a key ingredient in fulfilling many 
of the ideas proffered by ACTS.  While target analysis and effective intelligence is 
still a significant challenge in the execution of any air campaign, technology provided 
the USAF the ability to accurately strike a designated objective on a regular basis.  
Erroneous intelligence, poor situational awareness, and technical problems still result 
in cases of fratricide and collateral damage, but use of precision bombardment is now 
a mainstay of USAF strategic air operations. 
However, this remarkable ability on the part of the USAF to strike, with ever-
increasing accuracy, designated targets is very different from what preceded it during 
World War II and the following post war era.  The select targeting and destruction of 
a single building, structure, and in some cases even an individual, is a significant 
change from mid-20th Century bombing methodologies.  The growing importance of 
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precision in modern strategic bombing application came from a changing definition 
as to what constituted precision as well as increased appreciation for its efficiency.  It 
also came from a growing rejection on the part of the military and the American 
public regarding mass casualties and widespread destruction.   
This shift in attitude is reflected in current U.S. joint doctrine.  Regarding 
targeting in contemporary conflict, DoD Joint Publication 3-60 states, “Incidental 
civilian injury or collateral damage to civilian objects must not be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained . . . this 
factor must be carefully balanced against the military benefits when making 
proportionality determination.”7  Current U.S. doctrine also specifies that “direct 
attacks on civilians or civilian objects are prohibited.”8  While much of this thought 
was resident in the pre-World War II bombing concepts and ideas, the preceding 
treatise argues that the current doctrine is a complete reversal from what became 
accepted during World War II and era following the war.   
As technology improved and values changed, Americans demanded a 
modification in bombing applications.  With the development of laser-guided bombs 
and other PGMs, the American populace in the late 20th Century was loathe to create 
widespread destruction and saw that accuracy was a more palatable and a politically 
feasible method of bombardment rather than wholesale attack.  Americans increasing 
viewed collateral damage as anathema in the conduct of war much as had been the 
case prior to World War II.  While the Iraqi’s claimed that the U.S. targeted “Baby 
Milk Plants” and struck public air raid shelters, strategic bombing in the 1990’s was 
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conducted largely in line with a new appreciation and concern over collateral damage 
and civilian casualties.   
Professors W. Michael Reisman and Chris Antonious argue that popular 
support for modern military action will erode “if people believe that the war is being 
conducted in an unfair, inhumane, and iniquitous way.”9  For America to win 
contemporary, and future, engagements and maintain the support of the people, the 
U.S. is required to apply discriminate use of its military power.  One observer noted, 
“winning today is much more dependent upon domestic and international public 
support as much as it is defeating the enemy on the battlefield.”10  In recent conflicts, 
America’s enemies are quick to highlight collateral damage done by the U.S. and use 
such events in their information operations and propaganda efforts.  Since U.S. 
military power in a conventional linear battlefield is largely unmatched, these 
enemies seek to undermine U.S. resolve and national will through an information 
campaign aimed at the emotions of the American people.  
Despite this recent concern and antipathy regarding collateral damage, mass 
has historically been a staple of U.S. military applications, especially as it pertained to 
airpower during the mid-20th century.  While the teachings of ACTS lessons during 
the inter-war years and the pre-war pronouncements of public officials attempted to 
curtail indiscriminate bombing, as World War II unfolded and in the years following, 
the USAAF and USAF embraced the application of mass.  This application came 
about from a synergy of reasons. 
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During World War II, public support allowed the USAAF to target Germany 
population centers, firebomb Japanese cities, and utilize atomic bombs.  The 
American public provided approbation of these bombing methodologies regardless of 
the widespread destruction caused by the Eighth, Fifteenth, and Twentieth Air Forces.  
Despite a prewar doctrine that focused upon targeting select elements of an enemy’s 
national infrastructure, and a widely held belief that civilian casualties were to be 
avoided, the USAAF was implicitly given a free hand to conduct the strategic 
bombing effort in any manner it saw fit without widespread condemnation from the 
American populace. 
While internal debate arose over acceptance of area bombing and the 
deliberate targeting of urban centers, the USAAF conducted raids like 
THUNDERCLAP, the firebombing efforts against Japan, and atomic warfare with the 
unspoken approval from the American public and support from elements of the 
national leadership.  The effects of the strategic bombing campaign were widely 
lauded by the American public with proof of this approbation resident in many 
venues.  While news agencies reported the devastation of Axis cities by Allied 
bombing, the articles filed by the press were largely laudatory and depicted strategic 
bombing in a positive light.  As a population, Americans were largely indifferent to 
the casualties and destruction created by USAAF and saw them as part of the price 
for victory, and in the case of the Pacific due to Pearl Harbor, as just retribution on an 
inferior and malevolent race.  
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This is not to say that the USAAF deliberately changed bombing tactics to 
celebrate naked violence at the behest of the American people.  The USAAF did not 
target Axis populations and raze cities merely for revenge or because the average 
American citizen wanted to, but initiated large scale-bombing operations as a means 
to a strategic end.  To obtain strategic end states, bombardment in World War II 
began to target not only national military objectives, but gradually began to served in 
a more pronounced political capacity.  As the war progressed, bombing alone became 
a political tool apart from the other elements of the U.S. military and by itself became 
an implement for achieving national goals.  
In Europe, area bombing was thought to hold promise for the quick 
capitulation of the Nazis and destruction of German morale.  In this regard, bombing 
raids were seen as a way to expedite the defeat of Germany and completely destroy 
the Nazi state, its political base, and it support structure.  Operations such as 
THUNDERCLAP and CLARION bear this out.  In the Pacific, LeMay hoped that the 
firebombing would bring about the defeat of Japan without need of a ground invasion.  
Although other members of the national leadership still envisioned the requirement 
for an amphibious assault of the Japanese home islands, LeMay and other USAAF 
officers saw the strategic bombing effort as a way to negate that requirement.  LeMay 
believed that the Twentieth Air Force’s firebombing efforts alone would preclude the 
need for any land invasion.  While Arnold supported the idea of invading the island of 
Kyushu, he also believed that by transferring the Eighth Air Force to the Pacific 
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theater and combining it with the efforts of the Twentieth, that airpower alone would 
then bring about the fall of Honshu and the remainder of the Japanese empire. 
Additionally, on both fronts the political goal of “unconditional surrender” not 
only mandated the complete destruction of the Axis powers political structures, but 
also intimated their physical destruction.  In this regard, as the war progressed 
strategic bombing increasingly began to directly support political objectives 
established by the national leadership in addition to the military objectives of theater 
commanders.  The attacks of Hiroshima and Nagasaki highlight this political use of 
strategic bombing. 
Regarding atomic warfare in World War II, the dropping of Fat Man and 
“Little Boy” had more to do with psychological operations than practical military 
necessity.  While military considerations were paramount to actual target selection, 
the use of the atomic bomb was largely political in purpose and was deliberately 
intended to influence the Japanese leadership.  The discussions of the Interim 
Committee in 1945 and Secretary of War Stimson’s own accounts prove that the 
atomic bombings were aimed primarily at the psychological over the physical.  The 
Japanese denunciation of the Potsdam Declaration, the Diet’s call for a mobilized 
national army, and the results of the Okinawa and Iwo Jima experiences provided 
ample evidence that the Japanese would continue to fight.  As a result, the atomic 
missions were largely diplomatic actions seeking to influence the Japanese 
government.  Conversely, any argument that the atomic bombings were politically 
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motivated to influence the leadership in the Kremlin for post war geopolitical 
posturing is specious and unsubstantiated by the historical record. 
Furthermore, Truman’s decision to use these bombs was largely a “non 
decision.” Assuming the bombs would work, his approval of atomic bombing was 
more of a continuation of a predetermined course of action and a “rubber stamp” 
rather than an actual choice.  Organizational momentum was already in play by the 
summer of 1945 for the time, effort, and expense committed to the Manhattan Project 
had taken on a life of its own.11  Internal domestic political forces mandated the use 
of the atomic bomb especially if Americans were to suffer tremendous casualties in 
the OLYMPIC and CORONET assaults.  Truman and the Democratic Party would 
have much to answer for if America withheld the use of the weapon while casualty 
lists climbed as a result of the planned amphibious assaults.  As the war dragged on 
and looked to continue into 1946, the development of atomic weapons and the 
promise of this technology provided a unique opportunity to spare American lives, 
shorten the war, and avoid potential economic crises on the home front.  In this 
regard, the USAAF alone provided the ways and mean for the political end.  The idea 
of atomic bombing did not originate with the USAAF but was tasked to the 
organization by outside forces.  While Arnold was eager to assume this new mission, 
the USAAF found itself elevated to an entirely new and unique role.  
For many practical reasons, each unique to a particular theater of war, 
bombing applications transformed.  In Europe the ability to actually hit a given 
building or target from 20,000 feet in cloudy skies proved problematic for advocates 
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of precision bombing.  Advanced optical bombsights were ineffective over cloud-
covered Germany and Allied technology failed to fully mitigate visibility problems.  
Early radar systems were unable to provide the definition and accuracy required for 
precision bombardment.  Furthermore, trying to develop a corps of men sufficiently 
trained to conduct precision bombardment while being attacked by enemy fighters or 
by anti-aircraft fire in an inhospitable environment also precluded full realization of 
the prewar doctrine. 
In the Pacific, not only clouds and prohibitive weather patterns, but winds 
aloft and the jet stream prevented the realization of precision bombing.  Additionally, 
the perceived nature of Japanese manufacturing processes added to the departure as 
cottage industry was, at one time, a staple of the Empire’s production base.  This 
means of production, and the known susceptibility of Japanese cities to fire, set the 
stage for the incendiary effort.  These considerations, combined with the early poor 
high altitude performance and mechanical difficulties associated with the newly 
fielded B-29, forced LeMay to develop pragmatic solutions that mitigated the 
Twentieth Air Force's challenges.  These solutions increased the lethality of the 
strategic bombing effort and maximized the capabilities of the B-29.  The synergy of 
these practical considerations exacerbated the departure during the Pacific war. 
Additionally, on both fronts, Hap Arnold looked to establish airpower as a 
potent and important tool in warfare.  He wanted to make the most of the USAAF’s 
opportunity and establish an independent air force.  Furthermore, his reputation was 
at stake not only in Europe, but was especially at risk given his advocacy of the B-29 
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and the huge expenditures allocated for the aircraft.  His personal influence on field 
commanders encouraged them to produce results that often equated to RAF style 
methods in Europe while lauding the annihilation of Japanese cities.  Although 
Arnold understood the fine line in which he was walking regarding precision and 
widespread destruction, his desire for the validation of the USAAF and the B-29 
served as catalysts for the change in bombing applications. 
In the decade following the Allied victory, similar issues continued to affect 
USAF practices and ideas.  Considerations that shaped bombing applications during 
the war were equally relevant in years following.  While the rationales and 
motivations for bombing concepts were significantly different than war time concerns 
and influences, the net effect was a continuation in the acceptance of mass, with an 
approval regarding the exacerbation of destructive methods. 
After the war Americans quickly shed their affinity for the Soviet Union and 
“Uncle Joe” with the Cold War beginning in earnest.  In addition to the rekindling of 
anti-communist sentiment, Americans saw communist encroachment as a threat to 
national security and world peace.  Following the Berlin Blockade, the fall of Eastern 
Europe to Russian influence, the explosion of the Soviet atomic bomb, Mao’s success 
in China, and the invasion of South Korea, Americans largely supported the further 
refinement and development of nuclear weapons.  Widespread support existed for the 
development of thermonuclear technology and the development of it as a deliverable 
weapon.  In tandem with this approval over the development of nuclear weaponry 
was popular support for a strategic bombing fleet and an Air Force capable of 
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delivering a lethal blow to the Soviet Union.  Despite the nature of nuclear warfare 
and the potential effect in had for humanity and the survival of the planet, Americans 
largely accepted the idea of an offensive, atomic-equipped force, posed for the 
annihilation of the Soviet Union and its populations.  
Concurrently, Americans developed a tenuous sense of security with their 
nuclear monopoly and largely accepted atomic bombs as part of the military’s 
inventory of weapons.  Given the “witch hunts” of Joseph McCarthy, the trial of the 
Rosenbergs, and the establishment of the Employee Loyalty Program, collective 
American thought reinforced anti-communist sentiment of the era.  Americans 
embraced nuclear technology as a way to protect itself from the “red menace” despite 
anxiety over the existence of atomic energy.  Given the contemporary political 
climate of the time, Americans saw the need for such defensive measures and 
envisioned that their superior nuclear capability would result in an “atomic pax 
Americana.”12 
From a military standpoint, atomic weapons served to offset the large Soviet 
Army.  Despite the poor shape of the post war U.S. military, its small budget 
allocations, and the dwindling numbers of troops, America reorganized its armed 
services under the Department of Defense and established an independent U.S. Air 
Force.  Under the new Air Force, the Strategic Air Command served as the lead 
component of America's defense.  Despite complaints from the other armed service, 
the USAF increasingly became the most prominent branch.  While Truman initially 
enacted equal share budgeting practices for the DoD, and as the Air Force gained in 
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prominence, airpower received more and more of the defense allocations.  “More 
bang for the buck” was a common euphemism regarding the increase in both Air 
Force and AEC budgets.  With the Korean War and NSC 68 serving as a catalyst for 
increased defense spending in the Truman administration, the primacy of nuclear 
airpower was re-enforced with Eisenhower's massive retaliation policy under NSC 
162/2.  
Additionally, in order to defeat the Soviet Union, Air Force leaders applied 
World War II targeting methodologies to the new war plans and assumed that 
complete devastation of the Soviet state was required for victory.  The legacy of the 
World War II experience shaped post war targeting methods without considering the 
fundamental changes and dimensions brought about by nuclear warfare.  Without any 
real reflection regarding the use of nuclear weapons, and with no real guidance from 
American political leadership, Air Force planners were free to target the Soviet Union 
in much the same way they did Axis nations in World War II.  To these officers the 
reduction of Soviet cities to rubble equated to an American victory.  While 
recognizing that one B-47 with a nuclear bomb could destroy a city as opposed to 
thousands of B-17s, the Air Force hoped to destroy the Soviet Union in a few weeks.  
Furthermore, with the advent of the H-bomb, the USAF embraced the idea of “bonus 
damage” and continued adhering to the idea of mass. 
In the political realm, in addition to suspicions over Soviet intent following 
World War II, much of the nation’s attention turned inward as reconversion of the 
domestic economy, labor issues, and inflation became prevailing issues.  After VJ 
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Day America experienced an era of new found prosperity and as servicemen left the 
military for civilian life, the size of the budget allocated for defense shrank 
appreciably.  As a result, a small U.S. military needed some way to cope with the 
growing threat of the Soviet Union.  Use of atomic bombs and maintaining the 
American lead in nuclear technology was seen by both the Truman and Eisenhower 
administrations as a way to defend America without ruining the economy and 
preserving the nation's financial prosperity.  While the development of atomic 
technology slowed following the war, the U.S. refined atomic bomb design, increased 
explosive yields, and improved handing characteristics.  Nuclear weapons served a 
number of political roles with each presidential administration having different 
policies regarding these weapons.  However, both saw them as a cornerstone to 
America's defensive position and a means to continue national economic prosperity.   
In the post war era both the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. 
government supported the change in American bombing applications and provided 
resources for a nuclear armed air force.  Both the Finletter and Brewster Reports 
reflected this acceptance of atomic defense from both the president and the congress 
and served as starting points for policies enabling America's nuclear arsenal.  In 
response to these reports and other influences, Congress approved budget 
appropriations to both the Air Force and the AEC that reflected the Truman 
administration national security policies.  Explicit of this support from the legislative 
branch was the efforts of Brien McMahon and his push to build the H-bomb over the 
objections of Oppenheimer and the rest of the General Advisory Committee.  During 
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the Eisenhower years, Congress continued in this theme and allocated funds in line 
with NSC 162/2 and also increased the budget for the AEC. 
Most important, post war presidential administrations came to the conclusion 
that nuclear weapons had a significant role to play in American national security 
policies.  While Truman directed the expansion of atomic capabilities in reaction to 
several global events, Ike saw nuclear weapons as a way to wrestle the initiative away 
from the Soviet Union and avoid protracted U.S. involvement in regional conflicts.  
Both NSC 68 and 162/2 put America's defense on a foundation of nuclear capabilities 
that also affected the diplomatic element of national power.  In response to this, 
nuclear weapons and strategic bombing became a part of the political discourse 
between the U.S. and the rest of the world, especially the Soviet Union.  Much as it 
had with the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks, strategic bombing now became a 
political tool in the same way Theodore Roosevelt wielded his “Great White Fleet” 
early in the beginning of the century.  For decades following the 1950s, the mere 
threat of nuclear attack became a cornerstone of American diplomacy and a tenet of 
its international relationships. 
Concurrent with the changes in bombing methodologies was the idea of 
precision.  While ACTS initially based the doctrine on striking targets within a certain 
CEP, this method fell out of practice toward the end of the war with area bombing in 
Europe and the firebombing efforts over Japan.  This is not to say that precision was 
forgotten completely by the end of the war, as accuracy increased as the war 
progressed, but it became less important by spring 1945.  Ironically, after the creation 
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of SAC and LeMay's assumption of command, precision once again became an 
important part of bomber crew training despite the widespread effect that the new 
atomic weapons would create.  As a result, a dichotomy was created between SAC’s 
quest for precision in comparison to mass effects of nuclear munitions.  Initiation of 
bombing competitions and the grading and recording of aircrew CEP's prove that 
SAC still placed emphasis on precision. 
While the accurate placement seems absurd considering nuclear weapons and 
their effects, precision is still important.  The physical location of the target in a 
geographic setting, its individual characteristics and composition, and the desired 
effects still require accurate placement of nuclear munitions regardless of their high 
end yield.  Current USAF aircrews are still evaluated on their ability to hit targets 
within a given CEP.  What did change was acceptance of large scale destruction and 
the idea that entire cities or even nations were to be destroyed as part of the strategic 
attack.  As war became more mechanized, technologically advanced, and lethal, 
widespread destruction became an accepted characteristic of modern war by the 
military, the government, and the constituent population.  Douhet’s blurring of 
combatant and non-combatant had come to fruition in both reality of World War II 
and theoretically in a nuclear war plans. 
By 1955, the U.S. had gone 180 degrees from its precision bombing doctrine 
of the 1930s.  The reasons for this change are as complex as they are varied and were 
a result of both domestic and foreign influences.  Political, economic, social, racial, 
and military factors were all in play regarding the shift in American bombing 
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methods with the synergy of these considerations effecting the change in American’s 
bombing concepts.  In this regard, strategic bombing reflects not just the nation’s 
military applications, but is representative of the whole country.  Indicative of this 
sentiment is a statement made by the noted scholar Samuel P. Huntington who in the 
1980s wrote, “The United States is a big country, as we should fight wars in a big 
way.  One of our greatest advantages is our mass; we should not hesitate to use it. . . . 
Bigness, not brains is our advantage, as we should exploit it.  If we have to intervene, 
we should intervene with overwhelming force.”13  American bombing methodologies 
were not just the sole realm of men like LeMay and Arnold, but were a reflection of 
the American society, its government, and the values they collectively embraced.  
The nation’s cultural values, moral tenets, and collective temperament were manifest 
in this departure.   
These same values and temperament are also in play in years following 1955 
as the USAF began to gradually move back to the concept of precision bombardment 
as conducted in DESERT STORM.  Perhaps because of the widespread criticism of 
the carpet bombing of Southeast Asian jungles during the Vietnam War, the USAF 
began utilizing laser guided bombs and continued to develop the technology.  
Following DESERT STORM, the USAF further refined its precision bombardment 
capabilities and continued to leverage technology in an ever increasing capacity.  As 
the result, the USAF, along with the American populace and the federal government, 
increasingly favored precision over mass and sought to avoid widespread destruction 
and annihilation.  By the end of the 20th Century, America came ‘full circle’ and 
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conducted a 360 degree turn regarding bombing methods and found that the precept 
of ACTS could now be successfully executed. 
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